GK SDK 源码库: XMIPCLinuxV100R005C00SPC030 (kernel/tools/open_source excluded)
This commit is contained in:
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U-Boot FIT Signature Verification
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=================================
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Introduction
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------------
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FIT supports hashing of images so that these hashes can be checked on
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loading. This protects against corruption of the image. However it does not
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prevent the substitution of one image for another.
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The signature feature allows the hash to be signed with a private key such
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that it can be verified using a public key later. Provided that the private
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key is kept secret and the public key is stored in a non-volatile place,
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any image can be verified in this way.
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See verified-boot.txt for more general information on verified boot.
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Concepts
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--------
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Some familiarity with public key cryptography is assumed in this section.
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The procedure for signing is as follows:
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- hash an image in the FIT
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- sign the hash with a private key to produce a signature
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- store the resulting signature in the FIT
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The procedure for verification is:
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- read the FIT
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- obtain the public key
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- extract the signature from the FIT
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- hash the image from the FIT
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- verify (with the public key) that the extracted signature matches the
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hash
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The signing is generally performed by mkimage, as part of making a firmware
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image for the device. The verification is normally done in U-Boot on the
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device.
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Algorithms
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----------
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In principle any suitable algorithm can be used to sign and verify a hash.
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At present only one class of algorithms is supported: SHA1 hashing with RSA.
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This works by hashing the image to produce a 20-byte hash.
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While it is acceptable to bring in large cryptographic libraries such as
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openssl on the host side (e.g. mkimage), it is not desirable for U-Boot.
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For the run-time verification side, it is important to keep code and data
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size as small as possible.
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For this reason the RSA image verification uses pre-processed public keys
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which can be used with a very small amount of code - just some extraction
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of data from the FDT and exponentiation mod n. Code size impact is a little
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under 5KB on Tegra Seaboard, for example.
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It is relatively straightforward to add new algorithms if required. If
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another RSA variant is needed, then it can be added to the table in
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image-sig.c. If another algorithm is needed (such as DSA) then it can be
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placed alongside rsa.c, and its functions added to the table in image-sig.c
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also.
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Creating an RSA key pair and certificate
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----------------------------------------
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To create a new public/private key pair, size 2048 bits:
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$ openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out keys/dev.key \
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-pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048 -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_pubexp:65537
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To create a certificate for this containing the public key:
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$ openssl req -batch -new -x509 -key keys/dev.key -out keys/dev.crt
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If you like you can look at the public key also:
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$ openssl rsa -in keys/dev.key -pubout
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Device Tree Bindings
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--------------------
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The following properties are required in the FIT's signature node(s) to
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allow the signer to operate. These should be added to the .its file.
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Signature nodes sit at the same level as hash nodes and are called
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signature-1, signature-2, etc.
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- algo: Algorithm name (e.g. "sha1,rsa2048")
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- key-name-hint: Name of key to use for signing. The keys will normally be in
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a single directory (parameter -k to mkimage). For a given key <name>, its
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private key is stored in <name>.key and the certificate is stored in
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<name>.crt.
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When the image is signed, the following properties are added (mandatory):
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- value: The signature data (e.g. 256 bytes for 2048-bit RSA)
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When the image is signed, the following properties are optional:
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- timestamp: Time when image was signed (standard Unix time_t format)
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- signer-name: Name of the signer (e.g. "mkimage")
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- signer-version: Version string of the signer (e.g. "2013.01")
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- comment: Additional information about the signer or image
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- padding: The padding algorithm, it may be pkcs-1.5 or pss,
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if no value is provided we assume pkcs-1.5
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For config bindings (see Signed Configurations below), the following
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additional properties are optional:
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- sign-images: A list of images to sign, each being a property of the conf
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node that contains then. The default is "kernel,fdt" which means that these
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two images will be looked up in the config and signed if present.
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For config bindings, these properties are added by the signer:
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- hashed-nodes: A list of nodes which were hashed by the signer. Each is
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a string - the full path to node. A typical value might be:
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hashed-nodes = "/", "/configurations/conf-1", "/images/kernel",
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"/images/kernel/hash-1", "/images/fdt-1",
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"/images/fdt-1/hash-1";
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- hashed-strings: The start and size of the string region of the FIT that
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was hashed
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Example: See sign-images.its for an example image tree source file and
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sign-configs.its for config signing.
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Public Key Storage
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------------------
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In order to verify an image that has been signed with a public key we need to
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have a trusted public key. This cannot be stored in the signed image, since
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it would be easy to alter. For this implementation we choose to store the
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public key in U-Boot's control FDT (using CONFIG_OF_CONTROL).
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Public keys should be stored as sub-nodes in a /signature node. Required
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properties are:
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- algo: Algorithm name (e.g. "sha1,rsa2048")
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Optional properties are:
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- key-name-hint: Name of key used for signing. This is only a hint since it
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is possible for the name to be changed. Verification can proceed by checking
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all available signing keys until one matches.
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- required: If present this indicates that the key must be verified for the
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image / configuration to be considered valid. Only required keys are
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normally verified by the FIT image booting algorithm. Valid values are
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"image" to force verification of all images, and "conf" to force verification
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of the selected configuration (which then relies on hashes in the images to
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verify those).
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Each signing algorithm has its own additional properties.
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For RSA the following are mandatory:
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- rsa,num-bits: Number of key bits (e.g. 2048)
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- rsa,modulus: Modulus (N) as a big-endian multi-word integer
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- rsa,exponent: Public exponent (E) as a 64 bit unsigned integer
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- rsa,r-squared: (2^num-bits)^2 as a big-endian multi-word integer
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- rsa,n0-inverse: -1 / modulus[0] mod 2^32
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These parameters can be added to a binary device tree using parameter -K of the
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mkimage command::
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tools/mkimage -f fit.its -K control.dtb -k keys -r image.fit
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Here is an example of a generated device tree node::
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signature {
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key-dev {
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required = "conf";
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algo = "sha256,rsa2048";
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rsa,r-squared = <0xb76d1acf 0xa1763ca5 0xeb2f126
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0x742edc80 0xd3f42177 0x9741d9d9
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0x35bb476e 0xff41c718 0xd3801430
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0xf22537cb 0xa7e79960 0xae32a043
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0x7da1427a 0x341d6492 0x3c2762f5
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0xaac04726 0x5b262d96 0xf984e86d
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0xb99443c7 0x17080c33 0x940f6892
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0xd57a95d1 0x6ea7b691 0xc5038fa8
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0x6bb48a6e 0x73f1b1ea 0x37160841
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0xe05715ce 0xa7c45bbd 0x690d82d5
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0x99c2454c 0x6ff117b3 0xd830683b
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0x3f81c9cf 0x1ca38a91 0x0c3392e4
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0xd817c625 0x7b8e9a24 0x175b89ea
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0xad79f3dc 0x4d50d7b4 0x9d4e90f8
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0xad9e2939 0xc165d6a4 0x0ada7e1b
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0xfb1bf495 0xfc3131c2 0xb8c6e604
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0xc2761124 0xf63de4a6 0x0e9565f9
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0xc8e53761 0x7e7a37a5 0xe99dcdae
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0x9aff7e1e 0xbd44b13d 0x6b0e6aa4
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0x038907e4 0x8e0d6850 0xef51bc20
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0xf73c94af 0x88bea7b1 0xcbbb1b30
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0xd024b7f3>;
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rsa,modulus = <0xc0711d6cb 0x9e86db7f 0x45986dbe
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0x023f1e8c9 0xe1a4c4d0 0x8a0dfdc9
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0x023ba0c48 0x06815f6a 0x5caa0654
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0x07078c4b7 0x3d154853 0x40729023
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0x0b007c8fe 0x5a3647e5 0x23b41e20
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0x024720591 0x66915305 0x0e0b29b0
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0x0de2ad30d 0x8589430f 0xb1590325
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0x0fb9f5d5e 0x9eba752a 0xd88e6de9
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0x056b3dcc6 0x9a6b8e61 0x6784f61f
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0x000f39c21 0x5eec6b33 0xd78e4f78
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0x0921a305f 0xaa2cc27e 0x1ca917af
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0x06e1134f4 0xd48cac77 0x4e914d07
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0x0f707aa5a 0x0d141f41 0x84677f1d
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0x0ad47a049 0x028aedb6 0xd5536fcf
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0x03fef1e4f 0x133a03d2 0xfd7a750a
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0x0f9159732 0xd207812e 0x6a807375
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0x06434230d 0xc8e22dad 0x9f29b3d6
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0x07c44ac2b 0xfa2aad88 0xe2429504
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0x041febd41 0x85d0d142 0x7b194d65
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0x06e5d55ea 0x41116961 0xf3181dde
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0x068bf5fbc 0x3dd82047 0x00ee647e
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0x0d7a44ab3>;
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rsa,exponent = <0x00 0x10001>;
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rsa,n0-inverse = <0xb3928b85>;
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rsa,num-bits = <0x800>;
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key-name-hint = "dev";
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};
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};
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Signed Configurations
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---------------------
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While signing images is useful, it does not provide complete protection
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against several types of attack. For example, it it possible to create a
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FIT with the same signed images, but with the configuration changed such
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that a different one is selected (mix and match attack). It is also possible
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to substitute a signed image from an older FIT version into a newer FIT
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(roll-back attack).
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As an example, consider this FIT:
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/ {
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images {
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kernel-1 {
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data = <data for kernel1>
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signature-1 {
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algo = "sha1,rsa2048";
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value = <...kernel signature 1...>
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};
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};
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kernel-2 {
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data = <data for kernel2>
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signature-1 {
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algo = "sha1,rsa2048";
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value = <...kernel signature 2...>
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};
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};
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fdt-1 {
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data = <data for fdt1>;
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signature-1 {
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algo = "sha1,rsa2048";
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vaue = <...fdt signature 1...>
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};
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};
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fdt-2 {
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data = <data for fdt2>;
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signature-1 {
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algo = "sha1,rsa2048";
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vaue = <...fdt signature 2...>
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};
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};
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};
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configurations {
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default = "conf-1";
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conf-1 {
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kernel = "kernel-1";
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fdt = "fdt-1";
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};
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conf-2 {
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kernel = "kernel-2";
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fdt = "fdt-2";
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};
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};
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};
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Since both kernels are signed it is easy for an attacker to add a new
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configuration 3 with kernel 1 and fdt 2:
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configurations {
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default = "conf-1";
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conf-1 {
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kernel = "kernel-1";
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fdt = "fdt-1";
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};
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conf-2 {
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kernel = "kernel-2";
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fdt = "fdt-2";
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};
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conf-3 {
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kernel = "kernel-1";
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fdt = "fdt-2";
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};
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};
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With signed images, nothing protects against this. Whether it gains an
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advantage for the attacker is debatable, but it is not secure.
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To solve this problem, we support signed configurations. In this case it
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is the configurations that are signed, not the image. Each image has its
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own hash, and we include the hash in the configuration signature.
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So the above example is adjusted to look like this:
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/ {
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images {
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kernel-1 {
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data = <data for kernel1>
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hash-1 {
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algo = "sha1";
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value = <...kernel hash 1...>
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};
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};
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kernel-2 {
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data = <data for kernel2>
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hash-1 {
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algo = "sha1";
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value = <...kernel hash 2...>
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};
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};
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fdt-1 {
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data = <data for fdt1>;
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hash-1 {
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algo = "sha1";
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value = <...fdt hash 1...>
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};
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};
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fdt-2 {
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data = <data for fdt2>;
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hash-1 {
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algo = "sha1";
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value = <...fdt hash 2...>
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};
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};
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};
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configurations {
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default = "conf-1";
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conf-1 {
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kernel = "kernel-1";
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fdt = "fdt-1";
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signature-1 {
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algo = "sha1,rsa2048";
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value = <...conf 1 signature...>;
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};
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};
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conf-2 {
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kernel = "kernel-2";
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fdt = "fdt-2";
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signature-1 {
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algo = "sha1,rsa2048";
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value = <...conf 1 signature...>;
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};
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};
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};
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};
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You can see that we have added hashes for all images (since they are no
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longer signed), and a signature to each configuration. In the above example,
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mkimage will sign configurations/conf-1, the kernel and fdt that are
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pointed to by the configuration (/images/kernel-1, /images/kernel-1/hash-1,
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/images/fdt-1, /images/fdt-1/hash-1) and the root structure of the image
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(so that it isn't possible to add or remove root nodes). The signature is
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written into /configurations/conf-1/signature-1/value. It can easily be
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verified later even if the FIT has been signed with other keys in the
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meantime.
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Verification
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------------
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FITs are verified when loaded. After the configuration is selected a list
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of required images is produced. If there are 'required' public keys, then
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each image must be verified against those keys. This means that every image
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that might be used by the target needs to be signed with 'required' keys.
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|
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This happens automatically as part of a bootm command when FITs are used.
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Enabling FIT Verification
|
||||
-------------------------
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In addition to the options to enable FIT itself, the following CONFIGs must
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be enabled:
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|
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CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE - enable signing and verification in FITs
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||||
CONFIG_RSA - enable RSA algorithm for signing
|
||||
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||||
WARNING: When relying on signed FIT images with required signature check
|
||||
the legacy image format is default disabled by not defining
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CONFIG_LEGACY_IMAGE_FORMAT
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||||
|
||||
Testing
|
||||
-------
|
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An easy way to test signing and verification is to use the test script
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provided in test/vboot/vboot_test.sh. This uses sandbox (a special version
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of U-Boot which runs under Linux) to show the operation of a 'bootm'
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||||
command loading and verifying images.
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A sample run is show below:
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$ make O=sandbox sandbox_config
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$ make O=sandbox
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$ O=sandbox ./test/vboot/vboot_test.sh
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||||
|
||||
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||||
Simple Verified Boot Test
|
||||
=========================
|
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Please see doc/uImage.FIT/verified-boot.txt for more information
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||||
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/home/hs/ids/u-boot/sandbox/tools/mkimage -D -I dts -O dtb -p 2000
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Build keys
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do sha1 test
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Build FIT with signed images
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Test Verified Boot Run: unsigned signatures:: OK
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Sign images
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Test Verified Boot Run: signed images: OK
|
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Build FIT with signed configuration
|
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Test Verified Boot Run: unsigned config: OK
|
||||
Sign images
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Test Verified Boot Run: signed config: OK
|
||||
check signed config on the host
|
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Signature check OK
|
||||
OK
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||||
Test Verified Boot Run: signed config: OK
|
||||
Test Verified Boot Run: signed config with bad hash: OK
|
||||
do sha256 test
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Build FIT with signed images
|
||||
Test Verified Boot Run: unsigned signatures:: OK
|
||||
Sign images
|
||||
Test Verified Boot Run: signed images: OK
|
||||
Build FIT with signed configuration
|
||||
Test Verified Boot Run: unsigned config: OK
|
||||
Sign images
|
||||
Test Verified Boot Run: signed config: OK
|
||||
check signed config on the host
|
||||
Signature check OK
|
||||
OK
|
||||
Test Verified Boot Run: signed config: OK
|
||||
Test Verified Boot Run: signed config with bad hash: OK
|
||||
|
||||
Test passed
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Hardware Signing with PKCS#11 or with HSM
|
||||
-----------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Securely managing private signing keys can challenging, especially when the
|
||||
keys are stored on the file system of a computer that is connected to the
|
||||
Internet. If an attacker is able to steal the key, they can sign malicious FIT
|
||||
images which will appear genuine to your devices.
|
||||
|
||||
An alternative solution is to keep your signing key securely stored on hardware
|
||||
device like a smartcard, USB token or Hardware Security Module (HSM) and have
|
||||
them perform the signing. PKCS#11 is standard for interfacing with these crypto
|
||||
device.
|
||||
|
||||
Requirements:
|
||||
Smartcard/USB token/HSM which can work with some openssl engine
|
||||
openssl
|
||||
|
||||
For pkcs11 engine usage:
|
||||
libp11 (provides pkcs11 engine)
|
||||
p11-kit (recommended to simplify setup)
|
||||
opensc (for smartcards and smartcard like USB devices)
|
||||
gnutls (recommended for key generation, p11tool)
|
||||
|
||||
For generic HSMs respective openssl engine must be installed and locateable by
|
||||
openssl. This may require setting up LD_LIBRARY_PATH if engine is not installed
|
||||
to openssl's default search paths.
|
||||
|
||||
PKCS11 engine support forms "key id" based on "keydir" and with
|
||||
"key-name-hint". "key-name-hint" is used as "object" name and "keydir" if
|
||||
defined is used to define (prefix for) which PKCS11 source is being used for
|
||||
lookup up for the key.
|
||||
|
||||
PKCS11 engine key ids:
|
||||
"pkcs11:<keydir>;object=<key-name-hint>;type=<public|private>"
|
||||
or
|
||||
"pkcs11:object=<key-name-hint>;type=<public|private>",
|
||||
|
||||
Generic HSM engine support forms "key id" based on "keydir" and with
|
||||
"key-name-hint". If "keydir" is specified for mkimage it is used as a prefix in
|
||||
"key id" and is appended with "key-name-hint".
|
||||
|
||||
Generic engine key ids:
|
||||
"<keydir><key-name-hint>"
|
||||
or
|
||||
"<key-name-hint>"
|
||||
|
||||
As mkimage does not at this time support prompting for passwords HSM may need
|
||||
key preloading wrapper to be used when invoking mkimage.
|
||||
|
||||
The following examples use the Nitrokey Pro using pkcs11 engine. Instructions
|
||||
for other devices may vary.
|
||||
|
||||
Notes on pkcs11 engine setup:
|
||||
|
||||
Make sure p11-kit, opensc are installed and that p11-kit is setup to use opensc.
|
||||
/usr/share/p11-kit/modules/opensc.module should be present on your system.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Generating Keys On the Nitrokey:
|
||||
|
||||
$ gpg --card-edit
|
||||
|
||||
Reader ...........: Nitrokey Nitrokey Pro (xxxxxxxx0000000000000000) 00 00
|
||||
Application ID ...: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
|
||||
Version ..........: 2.1
|
||||
Manufacturer .....: ZeitControl
|
||||
Serial number ....: xxxxxxxx
|
||||
Name of cardholder: [not set]
|
||||
Language prefs ...: de
|
||||
Sex ..............: unspecified
|
||||
URL of public key : [not set]
|
||||
Login data .......: [not set]
|
||||
Signature PIN ....: forced
|
||||
Key attributes ...: rsa2048 rsa2048 rsa2048
|
||||
Max. PIN lengths .: 32 32 32
|
||||
PIN retry counter : 3 0 3
|
||||
Signature counter : 0
|
||||
Signature key ....: [none]
|
||||
Encryption key....: [none]
|
||||
Authentication key: [none]
|
||||
General key info..: [none]
|
||||
|
||||
gpg/card> generate
|
||||
Make off-card backup of encryption key? (Y/n) n
|
||||
|
||||
Please note that the factory settings of the PINs are
|
||||
PIN = '123456' Admin PIN = '12345678'
|
||||
You should change them using the command --change-pin
|
||||
|
||||
What keysize do you want for the Signature key? (2048) 4096
|
||||
The card will now be re-configured to generate a key of 4096 bits
|
||||
Note: There is no guarantee that the card supports the requested size.
|
||||
If the key generation does not succeed, please check the
|
||||
documentation of your card to see what sizes are allowed.
|
||||
What keysize do you want for the Encryption key? (2048) 4096
|
||||
The card will now be re-configured to generate a key of 4096 bits
|
||||
What keysize do you want for the Authentication key? (2048) 4096
|
||||
The card will now be re-configured to generate a key of 4096 bits
|
||||
Please specify how long the key should be valid.
|
||||
0 = key does not expire
|
||||
<n> = key expires in n days
|
||||
<n>w = key expires in n weeks
|
||||
<n>m = key expires in n months
|
||||
<n>y = key expires in n years
|
||||
Key is valid for? (0)
|
||||
Key does not expire at all
|
||||
Is this correct? (y/N) y
|
||||
|
||||
GnuPG needs to construct a user ID to identify your key.
|
||||
|
||||
Real name: John Doe
|
||||
Email address: john.doe@email.com
|
||||
Comment:
|
||||
You selected this USER-ID:
|
||||
"John Doe <john.doe@email.com>"
|
||||
|
||||
Change (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (O)kay/(Q)uit? o
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Using p11tool to get the token URL:
|
||||
|
||||
Depending on system configuration, gpg-agent may need to be killed first.
|
||||
|
||||
$ p11tool --provider /usr/lib/opensc-pkcs11.so --list-tokens
|
||||
Token 0:
|
||||
URL: pkcs11:model=PKCS%2315%20emulated;manufacturer=ZeitControl;serial=000xxxxxxxxx;token=OpenPGP%20card%20%28User%20PIN%20%28sig%29%29
|
||||
Label: OpenPGP card (User PIN (sig))
|
||||
Type: Hardware token
|
||||
Manufacturer: ZeitControl
|
||||
Model: PKCS#15 emulated
|
||||
Serial: 000xxxxxxxxx
|
||||
Module: (null)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Token 1:
|
||||
URL: pkcs11:model=PKCS%2315%20emulated;manufacturer=ZeitControl;serial=000xxxxxxxxx;token=OpenPGP%20card%20%28User%20PIN%29
|
||||
Label: OpenPGP card (User PIN)
|
||||
Type: Hardware token
|
||||
Manufacturer: ZeitControl
|
||||
Model: PKCS#15 emulated
|
||||
Serial: 000xxxxxxxxx
|
||||
Module: (null)
|
||||
|
||||
Use the portion of the signature token URL after "pkcs11:" as the keydir argument (-k) to mkimage below.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Use the URL of the token to list the private keys:
|
||||
|
||||
$ p11tool --login --provider /usr/lib/opensc-pkcs11.so --list-privkeys \
|
||||
"pkcs11:model=PKCS%2315%20emulated;manufacturer=ZeitControl;serial=000xxxxxxxxx;token=OpenPGP%20card%20%28User%20PIN%20%28sig%29%29"
|
||||
Token 'OpenPGP card (User PIN (sig))' with URL 'pkcs11:model=PKCS%2315%20emulated;manufacturer=ZeitControl;serial=000xxxxxxxxx;token=OpenPGP%20card%20%28User%20PIN%20%28sig%29%29' requires user PIN
|
||||
Enter PIN:
|
||||
Object 0:
|
||||
URL: pkcs11:model=PKCS%2315%20emulated;manufacturer=ZeitControl;serial=000xxxxxxxxx;token=OpenPGP%20card%20%28User%20PIN%20%28sig%29%29;id=%01;object=Signature%20key;type=private
|
||||
Type: Private key
|
||||
Label: Signature key
|
||||
Flags: CKA_PRIVATE; CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE; CKA_SENSITIVE;
|
||||
ID: 01
|
||||
|
||||
Use the label, in this case "Signature key" as the key-name-hint in your FIT.
|
||||
|
||||
Create the fitImage:
|
||||
$ ./tools/mkimage -f fit-image.its fitImage
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Sign the fitImage with the hardware key:
|
||||
|
||||
$ ./tools/mkimage -F -k \
|
||||
"model=PKCS%2315%20emulated;manufacturer=ZeitControl;serial=000xxxxxxxxx;token=OpenPGP%20card%20%28User%20PIN%20%28sig%29%29" \
|
||||
-K u-boot.dtb -N pkcs11 -r fitImage
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Future Work
|
||||
-----------
|
||||
- Roll-back protection using a TPM is done using the tpm command. This can
|
||||
be scripted, but we might consider a default way of doing this, built into
|
||||
bootm.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Possible Future Work
|
||||
--------------------
|
||||
- Add support for other RSA/SHA variants, such as rsa4096,sha512.
|
||||
- Other algorithms besides RSA
|
||||
- More sandbox tests for failure modes
|
||||
- Passwords for keys/certificates
|
||||
- Perhaps implement OAEP
|
||||
- Enhance bootm to permit scripted signature verification (so that a script
|
||||
can verify an image but not actually boot it)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Simon Glass
|
||||
sjg@chromium.org
|
||||
1-1-13
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user