GK SDK 源码库: XMIPCLinuxV100R005C00SPC030 (kernel/tools/open_source excluded)

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/optee/optee.mk

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2016-2019, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+#
+# This makefile only aims at complying with Trusted Firmware-A build process so
+# that "optee" is a valid TF-A AArch32 Secure Playload identifier.
+
+ifneq ($(ARCH),aarch32)
+$(error This directory targets AArch32 support)
+endif
+
+$(eval $(call add_define,AARCH32_SP_OPTEE))
+
+$(info Trusted Firmware-A built for OP-TEE payload support)

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/sp_min/aarch32/entrypoint.S

@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <asm_macros.S>
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <common/runtime_svc.h>
+#include <context.h>
+#include <el3_common_macros.S>
+#include <lib/el3_runtime/cpu_data.h>
+#include <lib/pmf/aarch32/pmf_asm_macros.S>
+#include <lib/runtime_instr.h>
+#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h>
+#include <smccc_helpers.h>
+#include <smccc_macros.S>
+
+	.globl	sp_min_vector_table
+	.globl	sp_min_entrypoint
+	.globl	sp_min_warm_entrypoint
+	.globl	sp_min_handle_smc
+	.globl	sp_min_handle_fiq
+
+#define FIXUP_SIZE	((BL32_LIMIT) - (BL32_BASE))
+
+	.macro route_fiq_to_sp_min reg
+		/* -----------------------------------------------------
+		 * FIQs are secure interrupts trapped by Monitor and non
+		 * secure is not allowed to mask the FIQs.
+		 * -----------------------------------------------------
+		 */
+		ldcopr	\reg, SCR
+		orr	\reg, \reg, #SCR_FIQ_BIT
+		bic	\reg, \reg, #SCR_FW_BIT
+		stcopr	\reg, SCR
+	.endm
+
+	.macro clrex_on_monitor_entry
+#if (ARM_ARCH_MAJOR == 7)
+	/*
+	 * ARMv7 architectures need to clear the exclusive access when
+	 * entering Monitor mode.
+	 */
+	clrex
+#endif
+	.endm
+
+vector_base sp_min_vector_table
+	b	sp_min_entrypoint
+	b	plat_panic_handler	/* Undef */
+	b	sp_min_handle_smc	/* Syscall */
+	b	report_prefetch_abort	/* Prefetch abort */
+	b	report_data_abort	/* Data abort */
+	b	plat_panic_handler	/* Reserved */
+	b	plat_panic_handler	/* IRQ */
+	b	sp_min_handle_fiq	/* FIQ */
+
+
+/*
+ * The Cold boot/Reset entrypoint for SP_MIN
+ */
+func sp_min_entrypoint
+#if !RESET_TO_SP_MIN
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Preceding bootloader has populated r0 with a pointer to a
+	 * 'bl_params_t' structure & r1 with a pointer to platform
+	 * specific structure
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	mov	r9, r0
+	mov	r10, r1
+	mov	r11, r2
+	mov	r12, r3
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * For !RESET_TO_SP_MIN systems, only the primary CPU ever reaches
+	 * sp_min_entrypoint() during the cold boot flow, so the cold/warm boot
+	 * and primary/secondary CPU logic should not be executed in this case.
+	 *
+	 * Also, assume that the previous bootloader has already initialised the
+	 * SCTLR, including the CPU endianness, and has initialised the memory.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	el3_entrypoint_common					\
+		_init_sctlr=0					\
+		_warm_boot_mailbox=0				\
+		_secondary_cold_boot=0				\
+		_init_memory=0					\
+		_init_c_runtime=1				\
+		_exception_vectors=sp_min_vector_table		\
+		_pie_fixup_size=FIXUP_SIZE
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Relay the previous bootloader's arguments to the platform layer
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+#else
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * For RESET_TO_SP_MIN systems which have a programmable reset address,
+	 * sp_min_entrypoint() is executed only on the cold boot path so we can
+	 * skip the warm boot mailbox mechanism.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	el3_entrypoint_common					\
+		_init_sctlr=1					\
+		_warm_boot_mailbox=!PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS	\
+		_secondary_cold_boot=!COLD_BOOT_SINGLE_CPU	\
+		_init_memory=1					\
+		_init_c_runtime=1				\
+		_exception_vectors=sp_min_vector_table		\
+		_pie_fixup_size=FIXUP_SIZE
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * For RESET_TO_SP_MIN systems, BL32 (SP_MIN) is the first bootloader
+	 * to run so there's no argument to relay from a previous bootloader.
+	 * Zero the arguments passed to the platform layer to reflect that.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	mov	r9, #0
+	mov	r10, #0
+	mov	r11, #0
+	mov	r12, #0
+
+#endif /* RESET_TO_SP_MIN */
+
+#if SP_MIN_WITH_SECURE_FIQ
+	route_fiq_to_sp_min r4
+#endif
+
+	mov	r0, r9
+	mov	r1, r10
+	mov	r2, r11
+	mov	r3, r12
+	bl	sp_min_early_platform_setup2
+	bl	sp_min_plat_arch_setup
+
+	/* Jump to the main function */
+	bl	sp_min_main
+
+	/* -------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Clean the .data & .bss sections to main memory. This ensures
+	 * that any global data which was initialised by the primary CPU
+	 * is visible to secondary CPUs before they enable their data
+	 * caches and participate in coherency.
+	 * -------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	ldr	r0, =__DATA_START__
+	ldr	r1, =__DATA_END__
+	sub	r1, r1, r0
+	bl	clean_dcache_range
+
+	ldr	r0, =__BSS_START__
+	ldr	r1, =__BSS_END__
+	sub	r1, r1, r0
+	bl	clean_dcache_range
+
+	bl	smc_get_next_ctx
+
+	/* r0 points to `smc_ctx_t` */
+	/* The PSCI cpu_context registers have been copied to `smc_ctx_t` */
+	b	sp_min_exit
+endfunc sp_min_entrypoint
+
+
+/*
+ * SMC handling function for SP_MIN.
+ */
+func sp_min_handle_smc
+	/* On SMC entry, `sp` points to `smc_ctx_t`. Save `lr`. */
+	str	lr, [sp, #SMC_CTX_LR_MON]
+
+#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION
+	/*
+	 * Read the timestamp value and store it on top of the C runtime stack.
+	 * The value will be saved to the per-cpu data once the C stack is
+	 * available, as a valid stack is needed to call _cpu_data()
+	 */
+	strd	r0, r1, [sp, #SMC_CTX_GPREG_R0]
+	ldcopr16 r0, r1, CNTPCT_64
+	ldr	lr, [sp, #SMC_CTX_SP_MON]
+	strd	r0, r1, [lr, #-8]!
+	str	lr, [sp, #SMC_CTX_SP_MON]
+	ldrd	r0, r1, [sp, #SMC_CTX_GPREG_R0]
+#endif
+
+	smccc_save_gp_mode_regs
+
+	clrex_on_monitor_entry
+
+	/*
+	 * `sp` still points to `smc_ctx_t`. Save it to a register
+	 * and restore the C runtime stack pointer to `sp`.
+	 */
+	mov	r2, sp				/* handle */
+	ldr	sp, [r2, #SMC_CTX_SP_MON]
+
+#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION
+	/* Save handle to a callee saved register */
+	mov	r6, r2
+
+	/*
+	 * Restore the timestamp value and store it in per-cpu data. The value
+	 * will be extracted from per-cpu data by the C level SMC handler and
+	 * saved to the PMF timestamp region.
+	 */
+	ldrd	r4, r5, [sp], #8
+	bl	_cpu_data
+	strd	r4, r5, [r0, #CPU_DATA_PMF_TS0_OFFSET]
+
+	/* Restore handle */
+	mov	r2, r6
+#endif
+
+	ldr	r0, [r2, #SMC_CTX_SCR]
+	and	r3, r0, #SCR_NS_BIT		/* flags */
+
+	/* Switch to Secure Mode*/
+	bic	r0, #SCR_NS_BIT
+	stcopr	r0, SCR
+	isb
+
+	ldr	r0, [r2, #SMC_CTX_GPREG_R0]	/* smc_fid */
+	/* Check whether an SMC64 is issued */
+	tst	r0, #(FUNCID_CC_MASK << FUNCID_CC_SHIFT)
+	beq	1f
+	/* SMC32 is not detected. Return error back to caller */
+	mov	r0, #SMC_UNK
+	str	r0, [r2, #SMC_CTX_GPREG_R0]
+	mov	r0, r2
+	b	sp_min_exit
+1:
+	/* SMC32 is detected */
+	mov	r1, #0				/* cookie */
+	bl	handle_runtime_svc
+
+	/* `r0` points to `smc_ctx_t` */
+	b	sp_min_exit
+endfunc sp_min_handle_smc
+
+/*
+ * Secure Interrupts handling function for SP_MIN.
+ */
+func sp_min_handle_fiq
+#if !SP_MIN_WITH_SECURE_FIQ
+	b plat_panic_handler
+#else
+	/* FIQ has a +4 offset for lr compared to preferred return address */
+	sub	lr, lr, #4
+	/* On SMC entry, `sp` points to `smc_ctx_t`. Save `lr`. */
+	str	lr, [sp, #SMC_CTX_LR_MON]
+
+	smccc_save_gp_mode_regs
+
+	clrex_on_monitor_entry
+
+	/* load run-time stack */
+	mov	r2, sp
+	ldr	sp, [r2, #SMC_CTX_SP_MON]
+
+	/* Switch to Secure Mode */
+	ldr	r0, [r2, #SMC_CTX_SCR]
+	bic	r0, #SCR_NS_BIT
+	stcopr	r0, SCR
+	isb
+
+	push	{r2, r3}
+	bl	sp_min_fiq
+	pop	{r0, r3}
+
+	b	sp_min_exit
+#endif
+endfunc sp_min_handle_fiq
+
+/*
+ * The Warm boot entrypoint for SP_MIN.
+ */
+func sp_min_warm_entrypoint
+#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION
+	/*
+	 * This timestamp update happens with cache off.  The next
+	 * timestamp collection will need to do cache maintenance prior
+	 * to timestamp update.
+	 */
+	pmf_calc_timestamp_addr rt_instr_svc, RT_INSTR_EXIT_HW_LOW_PWR
+	ldcopr16 r2, r3, CNTPCT_64
+	strd	r2, r3, [r0]
+#endif
+	/*
+	 * On the warm boot path, most of the EL3 initialisations performed by
+	 * 'el3_entrypoint_common' must be skipped:
+	 *
+	 *  - Only when the platform bypasses the BL1/BL32 (SP_MIN) entrypoint by
+	 *    programming the reset address do we need to initialied the SCTLR.
+	 *    In other cases, we assume this has been taken care by the
+	 *    entrypoint code.
+	 *
+	 *  - No need to determine the type of boot, we know it is a warm boot.
+	 *
+	 *  - Do not try to distinguish between primary and secondary CPUs, this
+	 *    notion only exists for a cold boot.
+	 *
+	 *  - No need to initialise the memory or the C runtime environment,
+	 *    it has been done once and for all on the cold boot path.
+	 */
+	el3_entrypoint_common					\
+		_init_sctlr=PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS		\
+		_warm_boot_mailbox=0				\
+		_secondary_cold_boot=0				\
+		_init_memory=0					\
+		_init_c_runtime=0				\
+		_exception_vectors=sp_min_vector_table		\
+		_pie_fixup_size=0
+
+	/*
+	 * We're about to enable MMU and participate in PSCI state coordination.
+	 *
+	 * The PSCI implementation invokes platform routines that enable CPUs to
+	 * participate in coherency. On a system where CPUs are not
+	 * cache-coherent without appropriate platform specific programming,
+	 * having caches enabled until such time might lead to coherency issues
+	 * (resulting from stale data getting speculatively fetched, among
+	 * others). Therefore we keep data caches disabled even after enabling
+	 * the MMU for such platforms.
+	 *
+	 * On systems with hardware-assisted coherency, or on single cluster
+	 * platforms, such platform specific programming is not required to
+	 * enter coherency (as CPUs already are); and there's no reason to have
+	 * caches disabled either.
+	 */
+#if HW_ASSISTED_COHERENCY || WARMBOOT_ENABLE_DCACHE_EARLY
+	mov	r0, #0
+#else
+	mov	r0, #DISABLE_DCACHE
+#endif
+	bl	bl32_plat_enable_mmu
+
+#if SP_MIN_WITH_SECURE_FIQ
+	route_fiq_to_sp_min r0
+#endif
+
+	bl	sp_min_warm_boot
+	bl	smc_get_next_ctx
+	/* r0 points to `smc_ctx_t` */
+	/* The PSCI cpu_context registers have been copied to `smc_ctx_t` */
+
+#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION
+	/* Save smc_ctx_t */
+	mov	r5, r0
+
+	pmf_calc_timestamp_addr rt_instr_svc, RT_INSTR_EXIT_PSCI
+	mov	r4, r0
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalidate before updating timestamp to ensure previous timestamp
+	 * updates on the same cache line with caches disabled are properly
+	 * seen by the same core. Without the cache invalidate, the core might
+	 * write into a stale cache line.
+	 */
+	mov	r1, #PMF_TS_SIZE
+	bl	inv_dcache_range
+
+	ldcopr16 r0, r1, CNTPCT_64
+	strd	r0, r1, [r4]
+
+	/* Restore smc_ctx_t */
+	mov	r0, r5
+#endif
+
+	b	sp_min_exit
+endfunc sp_min_warm_entrypoint
+
+/*
+ * The function to restore the registers from SMC context and return
+ * to the mode restored to SPSR.
+ *
+ * Arguments : r0 must point to the SMC context to restore from.
+ */
+func sp_min_exit
+	monitor_exit
+endfunc sp_min_exit

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/sp_min/sp_min.ld.S

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2021, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <common/bl_common.ld.h>
+#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h>
+
+OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf32-littlearm)
+OUTPUT_ARCH(arm)
+ENTRY(sp_min_vector_table)
+
+MEMORY {
+    RAM (rwx): ORIGIN = BL32_BASE, LENGTH = BL32_LIMIT - BL32_BASE
+}
+
+#ifdef PLAT_SP_MIN_EXTRA_LD_SCRIPT
+#include <plat_sp_min.ld.S>
+#endif
+
+SECTIONS
+{
+    . = BL32_BASE;
+    ASSERT(. == ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE),
+           "BL32_BASE address is not aligned on a page boundary.")
+
+#if SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA
+    .text . : {
+        __TEXT_START__ = .;
+        *entrypoint.o(.text*)
+        *(SORT_BY_ALIGNMENT(.text*))
+        *(.vectors)
+        . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+        __TEXT_END__ = .;
+    } >RAM
+
+     /* .ARM.extab and .ARM.exidx are only added because Clang need them */
+     .ARM.extab . : {
+        *(.ARM.extab* .gnu.linkonce.armextab.*)
+     } >RAM
+
+     .ARM.exidx . : {
+        *(.ARM.exidx* .gnu.linkonce.armexidx.*)
+     } >RAM
+
+    .rodata . : {
+        __RODATA_START__ = .;
+        *(SORT_BY_ALIGNMENT(.rodata*))
+
+	RODATA_COMMON
+
+        /* Place pubsub sections for events */
+        . = ALIGN(8);
+#include <lib/el3_runtime/pubsub_events.h>
+
+        . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+        __RODATA_END__ = .;
+    } >RAM
+#else
+    ro . : {
+        __RO_START__ = .;
+        *entrypoint.o(.text*)
+        *(SORT_BY_ALIGNMENT(.text*))
+        *(SORT_BY_ALIGNMENT(.rodata*))
+
+	RODATA_COMMON
+
+        /* Place pubsub sections for events */
+        . = ALIGN(8);
+#include <lib/el3_runtime/pubsub_events.h>
+
+        *(.vectors)
+        __RO_END_UNALIGNED__ = .;
+
+        /*
+         * Memory page(s) mapped to this section will be marked as
+         * read-only, executable.  No RW data from the next section must
+         * creep in.  Ensure the rest of the current memory page is unused.
+         */
+        . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+        __RO_END__ = .;
+    } >RAM
+#endif
+
+    ASSERT(__CPU_OPS_END__ > __CPU_OPS_START__,
+           "cpu_ops not defined for this platform.")
+    /*
+     * Define a linker symbol to mark start of the RW memory area for this
+     * image.
+     */
+    __RW_START__ = . ;
+
+    DATA_SECTION >RAM
+    RELA_SECTION >RAM
+
+#ifdef BL32_PROGBITS_LIMIT
+    ASSERT(. <= BL32_PROGBITS_LIMIT, "BL32 progbits has exceeded its limit.")
+#endif
+
+    STACK_SECTION >RAM
+    BSS_SECTION >RAM
+    XLAT_TABLE_SECTION >RAM
+
+     __BSS_SIZE__ = SIZEOF(.bss);
+
+#if USE_COHERENT_MEM
+    /*
+     * The base address of the coherent memory section must be page-aligned (4K)
+     * to guarantee that the coherent data are stored on their own pages and
+     * are not mixed with normal data.  This is required to set up the correct
+     * memory attributes for the coherent data page tables.
+     */
+    coherent_ram (NOLOAD) : ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE) {
+        __COHERENT_RAM_START__ = .;
+        /*
+         * Bakery locks are stored in coherent memory
+         *
+         * Each lock's data is contiguous and fully allocated by the compiler
+         */
+        *(bakery_lock)
+        *(tzfw_coherent_mem)
+        __COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__ = .;
+        /*
+         * Memory page(s) mapped to this section will be marked
+         * as device memory.  No other unexpected data must creep in.
+         * Ensure the rest of the current memory page is unused.
+         */
+        . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+        __COHERENT_RAM_END__ = .;
+    } >RAM
+
+    __COHERENT_RAM_UNALIGNED_SIZE__ =
+        __COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__ - __COHERENT_RAM_START__;
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Define a linker symbol to mark the end of the RW memory area for this
+     * image.
+     */
+    __RW_END__ = .;
+
+    __BL32_END__ = .;
+
+    /DISCARD/ : {
+        *(.dynsym .dynstr .hash .gnu.hash)
+    }
+
+    ASSERT(. <= BL32_LIMIT, "BL32 image has exceeded its limit.")
+}

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/sp_min/sp_min.mk

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2016-2022, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+#
+
+ifneq (${ARCH}, aarch32)
+	$(error SP_MIN is only supported on AArch32 platforms)
+endif
+
+include lib/extensions/amu/amu.mk
+include lib/psci/psci_lib.mk
+
+INCLUDES		+=	-Iinclude/bl32/sp_min
+
+BL32_SOURCES		+=	bl32/sp_min/sp_min_main.c		\
+				bl32/sp_min/aarch32/entrypoint.S	\
+				common/runtime_svc.c			\
+				plat/common/aarch32/plat_sp_min_common.c\
+				services/std_svc/std_svc_setup.c	\
+				${PSCI_LIB_SOURCES}
+
+ifeq (${DISABLE_MTPMU},1)
+BL32_SOURCES		+=	lib/extensions/mtpmu/aarch32/mtpmu.S
+endif
+
+ifeq (${ENABLE_PMF}, 1)
+BL32_SOURCES		+=	lib/pmf/pmf_main.c
+endif
+
+ifeq (${ENABLE_AMU},1)
+BL32_SOURCES		+=	${AMU_SOURCES}
+endif
+
+ifeq (${WORKAROUND_CVE_2017_5715},1)
+BL32_SOURCES		+=	bl32/sp_min/wa_cve_2017_5715_bpiall.S	\
+				bl32/sp_min/wa_cve_2017_5715_icache_inv.S
+else
+ifeq (${WORKAROUND_CVE_2022_23960},1)
+BL32_SOURCES		+=	bl32/sp_min/wa_cve_2017_5715_icache_inv.S
+endif
+endif
+
+ifeq (${TRNG_SUPPORT},1)
+BL32_SOURCES		+=	services/std_svc/trng/trng_main.c	\
+				services/std_svc/trng/trng_entropy_pool.c
+endif
+
+ifeq (${ERRATA_ABI_SUPPORT}, 1)
+BL32_SOURCES		+=	services/std_svc/errata_abi/errata_abi_main.c
+endif
+
+ifeq (${ENABLE_SYS_REG_TRACE_FOR_NS},1)
+BL32_SOURCES		+=	lib/extensions/sys_reg_trace/aarch32/sys_reg_trace.c
+endif
+
+ifeq (${ENABLE_TRF_FOR_NS},1)
+BL32_SOURCES		+=	lib/extensions/trf/aarch32/trf.c
+endif
+
+BL32_LINKERFILE	:=	bl32/sp_min/sp_min.ld.S
+
+# Include the platform-specific SP_MIN Makefile
+# If no platform-specific SP_MIN Makefile exists, it means SP_MIN is not supported
+# on this platform.
+SP_MIN_PLAT_MAKEFILE := $(wildcard ${PLAT_DIR}/sp_min/sp_min-${PLAT}.mk)
+ifeq (,${SP_MIN_PLAT_MAKEFILE})
+  $(error SP_MIN is not supported on platform ${PLAT})
+else
+  include ${SP_MIN_PLAT_MAKEFILE}
+endif
+
+RESET_TO_SP_MIN	:= 0
+$(eval $(call add_define,RESET_TO_SP_MIN))
+$(eval $(call assert_boolean,RESET_TO_SP_MIN))
+
+# Flag to allow SP_MIN to handle FIQ interrupts in monitor mode. The platform
+# port is free to override this value. It is default disabled.
+SP_MIN_WITH_SECURE_FIQ 	?= 0
+$(eval $(call add_define,SP_MIN_WITH_SECURE_FIQ))
+$(eval $(call assert_boolean,SP_MIN_WITH_SECURE_FIQ))

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/sp_min/sp_min_main.c

@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <common/runtime_svc.h>
+#include <context.h>
+#include <drivers/console.h>
+#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h>
+#include <lib/pmf/pmf.h>
+#include <lib/psci/psci.h>
+#include <lib/runtime_instr.h>
+#include <lib/utils.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+#include <platform_sp_min.h>
+#include <services/std_svc.h>
+#include <smccc_helpers.h>
+
+#include "sp_min_private.h"
+
+#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION
+PMF_REGISTER_SERVICE_SMC(rt_instr_svc, PMF_RT_INSTR_SVC_ID,
+	RT_INSTR_TOTAL_IDS, PMF_STORE_ENABLE)
+#endif
+
+/* Pointers to per-core cpu contexts */
+static void *sp_min_cpu_ctx_ptr[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT];
+
+/* SP_MIN only stores the non secure smc context */
+static smc_ctx_t sp_min_smc_context[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT];
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ * Define the smccc helper library APIs
+ *****************************************************************************/
+void *smc_get_ctx(unsigned int security_state)
+{
+	assert(security_state == NON_SECURE);
+	return &sp_min_smc_context[plat_my_core_pos()];
+}
+
+void smc_set_next_ctx(unsigned int security_state)
+{
+	assert(security_state == NON_SECURE);
+	/* SP_MIN stores only non secure smc context. Nothing to do here */
+}
+
+void *smc_get_next_ctx(void)
+{
+	return &sp_min_smc_context[plat_my_core_pos()];
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function returns a pointer to the most recent 'cpu_context' structure
+ * for the calling CPU that was set as the context for the specified security
+ * state. NULL is returned if no such structure has been specified.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void *cm_get_context(uint32_t security_state)
+{
+	assert(security_state == NON_SECURE);
+	return sp_min_cpu_ctx_ptr[plat_my_core_pos()];
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function sets the pointer to the current 'cpu_context' structure for the
+ * specified security state for the calling CPU
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void cm_set_context(void *context, uint32_t security_state)
+{
+	assert(security_state == NON_SECURE);
+	sp_min_cpu_ctx_ptr[plat_my_core_pos()] = context;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function returns a pointer to the most recent 'cpu_context' structure
+ * for the CPU identified by `cpu_idx` that was set as the context for the
+ * specified security state. NULL is returned if no such structure has been
+ * specified.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void *cm_get_context_by_index(unsigned int cpu_idx,
+				unsigned int security_state)
+{
+	assert(security_state == NON_SECURE);
+	return sp_min_cpu_ctx_ptr[cpu_idx];
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function sets the pointer to the current 'cpu_context' structure for the
+ * specified security state for the CPU identified by CPU index.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void cm_set_context_by_index(unsigned int cpu_idx, void *context,
+				unsigned int security_state)
+{
+	assert(security_state == NON_SECURE);
+	sp_min_cpu_ctx_ptr[cpu_idx] = context;
+}
+
+static void copy_cpu_ctx_to_smc_stx(const regs_t *cpu_reg_ctx,
+				smc_ctx_t *next_smc_ctx)
+{
+	next_smc_ctx->r0 = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_GPREG_R0);
+	next_smc_ctx->r1 = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_GPREG_R1);
+	next_smc_ctx->r2 = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_GPREG_R2);
+	next_smc_ctx->lr_mon = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_LR);
+	next_smc_ctx->spsr_mon = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_SPSR);
+	next_smc_ctx->scr = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_SCR);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function invokes the PSCI library interface to initialize the
+ * non secure cpu context and copies the relevant cpu context register values
+ * to smc context. These registers will get programmed during `smc_exit`.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static void sp_min_prepare_next_image_entry(void)
+{
+	entry_point_info_t *next_image_info;
+	cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
+	u_register_t ns_sctlr;
+
+	/* Program system registers to proceed to non-secure */
+	next_image_info = sp_min_plat_get_bl33_ep_info();
+	assert(next_image_info);
+	assert(NON_SECURE == GET_SECURITY_STATE(next_image_info->h.attr));
+
+	INFO("SP_MIN: Preparing exit to normal world\n");
+
+	psci_prepare_next_non_secure_ctx(next_image_info);
+	smc_set_next_ctx(NON_SECURE);
+
+	/* Copy r0, lr and spsr from cpu context to SMC context */
+	copy_cpu_ctx_to_smc_stx(get_regs_ctx(cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)),
+			smc_get_next_ctx());
+
+	/* Temporarily set the NS bit to access NS SCTLR */
+	write_scr(read_scr() | SCR_NS_BIT);
+	isb();
+	ns_sctlr = read_ctx_reg(get_regs_ctx(ctx), CTX_NS_SCTLR);
+	write_sctlr(ns_sctlr);
+	isb();
+
+	write_scr(read_scr() & ~SCR_NS_BIT);
+	isb();
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ * Implement the ARM Standard Service function to get arguments for a
+ * particular service.
+ *****************************************************************************/
+uintptr_t get_arm_std_svc_args(unsigned int svc_mask)
+{
+	/* Setup the arguments for PSCI Library */
+	DEFINE_STATIC_PSCI_LIB_ARGS_V1(psci_args, sp_min_warm_entrypoint);
+
+	/* PSCI is the only ARM Standard Service implemented */
+	assert(svc_mask == PSCI_FID_MASK);
+
+	return (uintptr_t)&psci_args;
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ * The SP_MIN main function. Do the platform and PSCI Library setup. Also
+ * initialize the runtime service framework.
+ *****************************************************************************/
+void sp_min_main(void)
+{
+	NOTICE("SP_MIN: %s\n", version_string);
+	NOTICE("SP_MIN: %s\n", build_message);
+
+	/* Perform the SP_MIN platform setup */
+	sp_min_platform_setup();
+
+	/* Initialize the runtime services e.g. psci */
+	INFO("SP_MIN: Initializing runtime services\n");
+	runtime_svc_init();
+
+	/*
+	 * We are ready to enter the next EL. Prepare entry into the image
+	 * corresponding to the desired security state after the next ERET.
+	 */
+	sp_min_prepare_next_image_entry();
+
+	/*
+	 * Perform any platform specific runtime setup prior to cold boot exit
+	 * from SP_MIN.
+	 */
+	sp_min_plat_runtime_setup();
+
+	console_flush();
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ * This function is invoked during warm boot. Invoke the PSCI library
+ * warm boot entry point which takes care of Architectural and platform setup/
+ * restore. Copy the relevant cpu_context register values to smc context which
+ * will get programmed during `smc_exit`.
+ *****************************************************************************/
+void sp_min_warm_boot(void)
+{
+	smc_ctx_t *next_smc_ctx;
+	cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
+	u_register_t ns_sctlr;
+
+	psci_warmboot_entrypoint();
+
+	smc_set_next_ctx(NON_SECURE);
+
+	next_smc_ctx = smc_get_next_ctx();
+	zeromem(next_smc_ctx, sizeof(smc_ctx_t));
+
+	copy_cpu_ctx_to_smc_stx(get_regs_ctx(cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)),
+			next_smc_ctx);
+
+	/* Temporarily set the NS bit to access NS SCTLR */
+	write_scr(read_scr() | SCR_NS_BIT);
+	isb();
+	ns_sctlr = read_ctx_reg(get_regs_ctx(ctx), CTX_NS_SCTLR);
+	write_sctlr(ns_sctlr);
+	isb();
+
+	write_scr(read_scr() & ~SCR_NS_BIT);
+	isb();
+}
+
+#if SP_MIN_WITH_SECURE_FIQ
+/******************************************************************************
+ * This function is invoked on secure interrupts. By construction of the
+ * SP_MIN, secure interrupts can only be handled when core executes in non
+ * secure state.
+ *****************************************************************************/
+void sp_min_fiq(void)
+{
+	uint32_t id;
+
+	id = plat_ic_acknowledge_interrupt();
+	sp_min_plat_fiq_handler(id);
+	plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(id);
+}
+#endif /* SP_MIN_WITH_SECURE_FIQ */

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/sp_min/sp_min_private.h

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#ifndef SP_MIN_PRIVATE_H
+#define SP_MIN_PRIVATE_H
+
+void sp_min_main(void);
+void sp_min_warm_boot(void);
+void sp_min_fiq(void);
+
+#endif /* SP_MIN_PRIVATE_H */

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/sp_min/wa_cve_2017_5715_bpiall.S

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <asm_macros.S>
+
+	.globl	wa_cve_2017_5715_bpiall_vbar
+
+vector_base wa_cve_2017_5715_bpiall_vbar
+	/* We encode the exception entry in the bottom 3 bits of SP */
+	add	sp, sp, #1	/* Reset: 0b111 */
+	add	sp, sp, #1	/* Undef: 0b110 */
+	add	sp, sp, #1	/* Syscall: 0b101 */
+	add	sp, sp, #1	/* Prefetch abort: 0b100 */
+	add	sp, sp, #1	/* Data abort: 0b011 */
+	add	sp, sp, #1	/* Reserved: 0b010 */
+	add	sp, sp, #1	/* IRQ: 0b001 */
+	nop			/* FIQ: 0b000 */
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalidate the branch predictor, `r0` is a dummy register
+	 * and is unused.
+	 */
+	stcopr	r0, BPIALL
+	isb
+
+	/*
+	 * As we cannot use any temporary registers and cannot
+	 * clobber SP, we can decode the exception entry using
+	 * an unrolled binary search.
+	 *
+	 * Note, if this code is re-used by other secure payloads,
+	 * the below exception entry vectors must be changed to
+	 * the vectors specific to that secure payload.
+	 */
+
+	tst	sp, #4
+	bne	1f
+
+	tst	sp, #2
+	bne	3f
+
+	/* Expected encoding: 0x1 and 0x0 */
+	tst	sp, #1
+	/* Restore original value of SP by clearing the bottom 3 bits */
+	bic	sp, sp, #0x7
+	bne	plat_panic_handler	/* IRQ */
+	b	sp_min_handle_fiq	/* FIQ */
+
+1:
+	tst	sp, #2
+	bne	2f
+
+	/* Expected encoding: 0x4 and 0x5 */
+	tst	sp, #1
+	bic	sp, sp, #0x7
+	bne	sp_min_handle_smc	/* Syscall */
+	b	plat_panic_handler	/* Prefetch abort */
+
+2:
+	/* Expected encoding: 0x7 and 0x6 */
+	tst	sp, #1
+	bic	sp, sp, #0x7
+	bne	sp_min_entrypoint	/* Reset */
+	b	plat_panic_handler	/* Undef */
+
+3:
+	/* Expected encoding: 0x2 and 0x3 */
+	tst	sp, #1
+	bic	sp, sp, #0x7
+	bne	plat_panic_handler	/* Data abort */
+	b	plat_panic_handler	/* Reserved */

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/sp_min/wa_cve_2017_5715_icache_inv.S

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <asm_macros.S>
+
+	.globl	wa_cve_2017_5715_icache_inv_vbar
+
+vector_base wa_cve_2017_5715_icache_inv_vbar
+	/* We encode the exception entry in the bottom 3 bits of SP */
+	add	sp, sp, #1	/* Reset: 0b111 */
+	add	sp, sp, #1	/* Undef: 0b110 */
+	add	sp, sp, #1	/* Syscall: 0b101 */
+	add	sp, sp, #1	/* Prefetch abort: 0b100 */
+	add	sp, sp, #1	/* Data abort: 0b011 */
+	add	sp, sp, #1	/* Reserved: 0b010 */
+	add	sp, sp, #1	/* IRQ: 0b001 */
+	nop			/* FIQ: 0b000 */
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalidate the instruction cache, which we assume also
+	 * invalidates the branch predictor.  This may depend on
+	 * other CPU specific changes (e.g. an ACTLR setting).
+	 */
+	stcopr	r0, ICIALLU
+	isb
+
+	/*
+	 * As we cannot use any temporary registers and cannot
+	 * clobber SP, we can decode the exception entry using
+	 * an unrolled binary search.
+	 *
+	 * Note, if this code is re-used by other secure payloads,
+	 * the below exception entry vectors must be changed to
+	 * the vectors specific to that secure payload.
+	 */
+
+	tst	sp, #4
+	bne	1f
+
+	tst	sp, #2
+	bne	3f
+
+	/* Expected encoding: 0x1 and 0x0 */
+	tst	sp, #1
+	/* Restore original value of SP by clearing the bottom 3 bits */
+	bic	sp, sp, #0x7
+	bne	plat_panic_handler	/* IRQ */
+	b	sp_min_handle_fiq	/* FIQ */
+
+1:
+	/* Expected encoding: 0x4 and 0x5 */
+	tst	sp, #2
+	bne	2f
+
+	tst	sp, #1
+	bic	sp, sp, #0x7
+	bne	sp_min_handle_smc	/* Syscall */
+	b	plat_panic_handler	/* Prefetch abort */
+
+2:
+	/* Expected encoding: 0x7 and 0x6 */
+	tst	sp, #1
+	bic	sp, sp, #0x7
+	bne	sp_min_entrypoint	/* Reset */
+	b	plat_panic_handler	/* Undef */
+
+3:
+	/* Expected encoding: 0x2 and 0x3 */
+	tst	sp, #1
+	bic	sp, sp, #0x7
+	bne	plat_panic_handler	/* Data abort */
+	b	plat_panic_handler	/* Reserved */

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_entrypoint.S

@@ -0,0 +1,489 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <asm_macros.S>
+#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h>
+#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h>
+#include <smccc_helpers.h>
+
+#include "../tsp_private.h"
+
+
+	.globl	tsp_entrypoint
+	.globl  tsp_vector_table
+#if SPMC_AT_EL3
+	.globl tsp_cpu_on_entry
+#endif
+
+
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Populate the params in x0-x7 from the pointer
+	 * to the smc args structure in x0.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	.macro restore_args_call_smc
+	ldp	x6, x7, [x0, #SMC_ARG6]
+	ldp	x4, x5, [x0, #SMC_ARG4]
+	ldp	x2, x3, [x0, #SMC_ARG2]
+	ldp	x0, x1, [x0, #SMC_ARG0]
+	smc	#0
+	.endm
+
+	.macro	save_eret_context reg1 reg2
+	mrs	\reg1, elr_el1
+	mrs	\reg2, spsr_el1
+	stp	\reg1, \reg2, [sp, #-0x10]!
+	stp	x30, x18, [sp, #-0x10]!
+	.endm
+
+	.macro restore_eret_context reg1 reg2
+	ldp	x30, x18, [sp], #0x10
+	ldp	\reg1, \reg2, [sp], #0x10
+	msr	elr_el1, \reg1
+	msr	spsr_el1, \reg2
+	.endm
+
+func tsp_entrypoint _align=3
+
+#if ENABLE_PIE
+		/*
+		 * ------------------------------------------------------------
+		 * If PIE is enabled fixup the Global descriptor Table only
+		 * once during primary core cold boot path.
+		 *
+		 * Compile time base address, required for fixup, is calculated
+		 * using "pie_fixup" label present within first page.
+		 * ------------------------------------------------------------
+		 */
+	pie_fixup:
+		ldr	x0, =pie_fixup
+		and	x0, x0, #~(PAGE_SIZE_MASK)
+		mov_imm	x1, (BL32_LIMIT - BL32_BASE)
+		add	x1, x1, x0
+		bl	fixup_gdt_reloc
+#endif /* ENABLE_PIE */
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Set the exception vector to something sane.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	adr	x0, tsp_exceptions
+	msr	vbar_el1, x0
+	isb
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Enable the SError interrupt now that the
+	 * exception vectors have been setup.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	msr	daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Enable the instruction cache, stack pointer
+	 * and data access alignment checks and disable
+	 * speculative loads.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	mov	x1, #(SCTLR_I_BIT | SCTLR_A_BIT | SCTLR_SA_BIT)
+	mrs	x0, sctlr_el1
+	orr	x0, x0, x1
+	bic	x0, x0, #SCTLR_DSSBS_BIT
+	msr	sctlr_el1, x0
+	isb
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Invalidate the RW memory used by the BL32
+	 * image. This includes the data and NOBITS
+	 * sections. This is done to safeguard against
+	 * possible corruption of this memory by dirty
+	 * cache lines in a system cache as a result of
+	 * use by an earlier boot loader stage. If PIE
+	 * is enabled however, RO sections including the
+	 * GOT may be modified during pie fixup.
+	 * Therefore, to be on the safe side, invalidate
+	 * the entire image region if PIE is enabled.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+#if ENABLE_PIE
+#if SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA
+	adrp	x0, __TEXT_START__
+	add	x0, x0, :lo12:__TEXT_START__
+#else
+	adrp	x0, __RO_START__
+	add	x0, x0, :lo12:__RO_START__
+#endif /* SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA */
+#else
+	adrp	x0, __RW_START__
+	add	x0, x0, :lo12:__RW_START__
+#endif /* ENABLE_PIE */
+	adrp	x1, __RW_END__
+	add     x1, x1, :lo12:__RW_END__
+	sub	x1, x1, x0
+	bl	inv_dcache_range
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Zero out NOBITS sections. There are 2 of them:
+	 *   - the .bss section;
+	 *   - the coherent memory section.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	adrp	x0, __BSS_START__
+	add	x0, x0, :lo12:__BSS_START__
+	adrp	x1, __BSS_END__
+	add	x1, x1, :lo12:__BSS_END__
+	sub	x1, x1, x0
+	bl	zeromem
+
+#if USE_COHERENT_MEM
+	adrp	x0, __COHERENT_RAM_START__
+	add	x0, x0, :lo12:__COHERENT_RAM_START__
+	adrp	x1, __COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__
+	add	x1, x1, :lo12:__COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__
+	sub	x1, x1, x0
+	bl	zeromem
+#endif
+
+	/* --------------------------------------------
+	 * Allocate a stack whose memory will be marked
+	 * as Normal-IS-WBWA when the MMU is enabled.
+	 * There is no risk of reading stale stack
+	 * memory after enabling the MMU as only the
+	 * primary cpu is running at the moment.
+	 * --------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	bl	plat_set_my_stack
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Initialize the stack protector canary before
+	 * any C code is called.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+#if STACK_PROTECTOR_ENABLED
+	bl	update_stack_protector_canary
+#endif
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Perform TSP setup
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	bl	tsp_setup
+
+#if ENABLE_PAUTH
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Program APIAKey_EL1
+	 * and enable pointer authentication
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	bl	pauth_init_enable_el1
+#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Jump to main function.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	bl	tsp_main
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Tell TSPD that we are done initialising
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	mov	x1, x0
+	mov	x0, #TSP_ENTRY_DONE
+	smc	#0
+
+tsp_entrypoint_panic:
+	b	tsp_entrypoint_panic
+endfunc tsp_entrypoint
+
+
+	/* -------------------------------------------
+	 * Table of entrypoint vectors provided to the
+	 * TSPD for the various entrypoints
+	 * -------------------------------------------
+	 */
+vector_base tsp_vector_table
+	b	tsp_yield_smc_entry
+	b	tsp_fast_smc_entry
+	b	tsp_cpu_on_entry
+	b	tsp_cpu_off_entry
+	b	tsp_cpu_resume_entry
+	b	tsp_cpu_suspend_entry
+	b	tsp_sel1_intr_entry
+	b	tsp_system_off_entry
+	b	tsp_system_reset_entry
+	b	tsp_abort_yield_smc_entry
+
+	/*---------------------------------------------
+	 * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD when this
+	 * cpu is to be turned off through a CPU_OFF
+	 * psci call to ask the TSP to perform any
+	 * bookeeping necessary. In the current
+	 * implementation, the TSPD expects the TSP to
+	 * re-initialise its state so nothing is done
+	 * here except for acknowledging the request.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+func tsp_cpu_off_entry
+	bl	tsp_cpu_off_main
+	restore_args_call_smc
+endfunc tsp_cpu_off_entry
+
+	/*---------------------------------------------
+	 * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD when the
+	 * system is about to be switched off (through
+	 * a SYSTEM_OFF psci call) to ask the TSP to
+	 * perform any necessary bookkeeping.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+func tsp_system_off_entry
+	bl	tsp_system_off_main
+	restore_args_call_smc
+endfunc tsp_system_off_entry
+
+	/*---------------------------------------------
+	 * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD when the
+	 * system is about to be reset (through a
+	 * SYSTEM_RESET psci call) to ask the TSP to
+	 * perform any necessary bookkeeping.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+func tsp_system_reset_entry
+	bl	tsp_system_reset_main
+	restore_args_call_smc
+endfunc tsp_system_reset_entry
+
+	/*---------------------------------------------
+	 * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD when this
+	 * cpu is turned on using a CPU_ON psci call to
+	 * ask the TSP to initialise itself i.e. setup
+	 * the mmu, stacks etc. Minimal architectural
+	 * state will be initialised by the TSPD when
+	 * this function is entered i.e. Caches and MMU
+	 * will be turned off, the execution state
+	 * will be aarch64 and exceptions masked.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+func tsp_cpu_on_entry
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Set the exception vector to something sane.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	adr	x0, tsp_exceptions
+	msr	vbar_el1, x0
+	isb
+
+	/* Enable the SError interrupt */
+	msr	daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Enable the instruction cache, stack pointer
+	 * and data access alignment checks
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	mov	x1, #(SCTLR_I_BIT | SCTLR_A_BIT | SCTLR_SA_BIT)
+	mrs	x0, sctlr_el1
+	orr	x0, x0, x1
+	msr	sctlr_el1, x0
+	isb
+
+	/* --------------------------------------------
+	 * Give ourselves a stack whose memory will be
+	 * marked as Normal-IS-WBWA when the MMU is
+	 * enabled.
+	 * --------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	bl	plat_set_my_stack
+
+	/* --------------------------------------------
+	 * Enable MMU and D-caches together.
+	 * --------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	mov	x0, #0
+	bl	bl32_plat_enable_mmu
+
+#if ENABLE_PAUTH
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Program APIAKey_EL1
+	 * and enable pointer authentication
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	bl	pauth_init_enable_el1
+#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Enter C runtime to perform any remaining
+	 * book keeping
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	bl	tsp_cpu_on_main
+	restore_args_call_smc
+
+	/* Should never reach here */
+tsp_cpu_on_entry_panic:
+	b	tsp_cpu_on_entry_panic
+endfunc tsp_cpu_on_entry
+
+	/*---------------------------------------------
+	 * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD when this
+	 * cpu is to be suspended through a CPU_SUSPEND
+	 * psci call to ask the TSP to perform any
+	 * bookeeping necessary. In the current
+	 * implementation, the TSPD saves and restores
+	 * the EL1 state.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+func tsp_cpu_suspend_entry
+	bl	tsp_cpu_suspend_main
+	restore_args_call_smc
+endfunc tsp_cpu_suspend_entry
+
+	/*-------------------------------------------------
+	 * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD to pass
+	 * control for `synchronously` handling a S-EL1
+	 * Interrupt which was triggered while executing
+	 * in normal world. 'x0' contains a magic number
+	 * which indicates this. TSPD expects control to
+	 * be handed back at the end of interrupt
+	 * processing. This is done through an SMC.
+	 * The handover agreement is:
+	 *
+	 * 1. PSTATE.DAIF are set upon entry. 'x1' has
+	 *    the ELR_EL3 from the non-secure state.
+	 * 2. TSP has to preserve the callee saved
+	 *    general purpose registers, SP_EL1/EL0 and
+	 *    LR.
+	 * 3. TSP has to preserve the system and vfp
+	 *    registers (if applicable).
+	 * 4. TSP can use 'x0-x18' to enable its C
+	 *    runtime.
+	 * 5. TSP returns to TSPD using an SMC with
+	 *    'x0' = TSP_HANDLED_S_EL1_INTR
+	 * ------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+func	tsp_sel1_intr_entry
+#if DEBUG
+	mov_imm	x2, TSP_HANDLE_SEL1_INTR_AND_RETURN
+	cmp	x0, x2
+	b.ne	tsp_sel1_int_entry_panic
+#endif
+	/*-------------------------------------------------
+	 * Save any previous context needed to perform
+	 * an exception return from S-EL1 e.g. context
+	 * from a previous Non secure Interrupt.
+	 * Update statistics and handle the S-EL1
+	 * interrupt before returning to the TSPD.
+	 * IRQ/FIQs are not enabled since that will
+	 * complicate the implementation. Execution
+	 * will be transferred back to the normal world
+	 * in any case. The handler can return 0
+	 * if the interrupt was handled or TSP_PREEMPTED
+	 * if the expected interrupt was preempted
+	 * by an interrupt that should be handled in EL3
+	 * e.g. Group 0 interrupt in GICv3. In both
+	 * the cases switch to EL3 using SMC with id
+	 * TSP_HANDLED_S_EL1_INTR. Any other return value
+	 * from the handler will result in panic.
+	 * ------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	save_eret_context x2 x3
+	bl	tsp_update_sync_sel1_intr_stats
+	bl	tsp_common_int_handler
+	/* Check if the S-EL1 interrupt has been handled */
+	cbnz	x0, tsp_sel1_intr_check_preemption
+	b	tsp_sel1_intr_return
+tsp_sel1_intr_check_preemption:
+	/* Check if the S-EL1 interrupt has been preempted */
+	mov_imm	x1, TSP_PREEMPTED
+	cmp	x0, x1
+	b.ne	tsp_sel1_int_entry_panic
+tsp_sel1_intr_return:
+	mov_imm	x0, TSP_HANDLED_S_EL1_INTR
+	restore_eret_context x2 x3
+	smc	#0
+
+	/* Should never reach here */
+tsp_sel1_int_entry_panic:
+	no_ret	plat_panic_handler
+endfunc tsp_sel1_intr_entry
+
+	/*---------------------------------------------
+	 * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD when this
+	 * cpu resumes execution after an earlier
+	 * CPU_SUSPEND psci call to ask the TSP to
+	 * restore its saved context. In the current
+	 * implementation, the TSPD saves and restores
+	 * EL1 state so nothing is done here apart from
+	 * acknowledging the request.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+func tsp_cpu_resume_entry
+	bl	tsp_cpu_resume_main
+	restore_args_call_smc
+
+	/* Should never reach here */
+	no_ret	plat_panic_handler
+endfunc tsp_cpu_resume_entry
+
+	/*---------------------------------------------
+	 * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD to ask
+	 * the TSP to service a fast smc request.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+func tsp_fast_smc_entry
+	bl	tsp_smc_handler
+	restore_args_call_smc
+
+	/* Should never reach here */
+	no_ret	plat_panic_handler
+endfunc tsp_fast_smc_entry
+
+	/*---------------------------------------------
+	 * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD to ask
+	 * the TSP to service a Yielding SMC request.
+	 * We will enable preemption during execution
+	 * of tsp_smc_handler.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+func tsp_yield_smc_entry
+	msr	daifclr, #DAIF_FIQ_BIT | DAIF_IRQ_BIT
+	bl	tsp_smc_handler
+	msr	daifset, #DAIF_FIQ_BIT | DAIF_IRQ_BIT
+	restore_args_call_smc
+
+	/* Should never reach here */
+	no_ret	plat_panic_handler
+endfunc tsp_yield_smc_entry
+
+	/*---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD to abort a pre-empted Yielding
+	 * SMC. It could be on behalf of non-secure world or because a CPU
+	 * suspend/CPU off request needs to abort the preempted SMC.
+	 * --------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+func tsp_abort_yield_smc_entry
+
+	/*
+	 * Exceptions masking is already done by the TSPD when entering this
+	 * hook so there is no need to do it here.
+	 */
+
+	/* Reset the stack used by the pre-empted SMC */
+	bl	plat_set_my_stack
+
+	/*
+	 * Allow some cleanup such as releasing locks.
+	 */
+	bl	tsp_abort_smc_handler
+
+	restore_args_call_smc
+
+	/* Should never reach here */
+	bl	plat_panic_handler
+endfunc tsp_abort_yield_smc_entry

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_exceptions.S

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <asm_macros.S>
+#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h>
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+
+	/* ----------------------------------------------------
+	 * The caller-saved registers x0-x18 and LR are saved
+	 * here.
+	 * ----------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+
+#define SCRATCH_REG_SIZE #(20 * 8)
+
+	.macro save_caller_regs_and_lr
+	sub	sp, sp, SCRATCH_REG_SIZE
+	stp	x0, x1, [sp]
+	stp	x2, x3, [sp, #0x10]
+	stp	x4, x5, [sp, #0x20]
+	stp	x6, x7, [sp, #0x30]
+	stp	x8, x9, [sp, #0x40]
+	stp	x10, x11, [sp, #0x50]
+	stp	x12, x13, [sp, #0x60]
+	stp	x14, x15, [sp, #0x70]
+	stp	x16, x17, [sp, #0x80]
+	stp	x18, x30, [sp, #0x90]
+	.endm
+
+	.macro restore_caller_regs_and_lr
+	ldp	x0, x1, [sp]
+	ldp	x2, x3, [sp, #0x10]
+	ldp	x4, x5, [sp, #0x20]
+	ldp	x6, x7, [sp, #0x30]
+	ldp	x8, x9, [sp, #0x40]
+	ldp	x10, x11, [sp, #0x50]
+	ldp	x12, x13, [sp, #0x60]
+	ldp	x14, x15, [sp, #0x70]
+	ldp	x16, x17, [sp, #0x80]
+	ldp	x18, x30, [sp, #0x90]
+	add	sp, sp, SCRATCH_REG_SIZE
+	.endm
+
+	/* ----------------------------------------------------
+	 * Common TSP interrupt handling routine
+	 * ----------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	.macro	handle_tsp_interrupt label
+	/* Enable the SError interrupt */
+	msr	daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT
+
+	save_caller_regs_and_lr
+	bl	tsp_common_int_handler
+	cbz	x0, interrupt_exit_\label
+
+	/*
+	 * This interrupt was not targetted to S-EL1 so send it to
+	 * the monitor and wait for execution to resume.
+	 */
+	smc	#0
+interrupt_exit_\label:
+	restore_caller_regs_and_lr
+	exception_return
+	.endm
+
+	.globl	tsp_exceptions
+
+	/* -----------------------------------------------------
+	 * TSP exception handlers.
+	 * -----------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+vector_base tsp_exceptions
+	/* -----------------------------------------------------
+	 * Current EL with _sp_el0 : 0x0 - 0x200. No exceptions
+	 * are expected and treated as irrecoverable errors.
+	 * -----------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+vector_entry sync_exception_sp_el0
+	b	plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry sync_exception_sp_el0
+
+vector_entry irq_sp_el0
+	b	plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry irq_sp_el0
+
+vector_entry fiq_sp_el0
+	b	plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry fiq_sp_el0
+
+vector_entry serror_sp_el0
+	b	plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry serror_sp_el0
+
+
+	/* -----------------------------------------------------
+	 * Current EL with SPx: 0x200 - 0x400. Only IRQs/FIQs
+	 * are expected and handled
+	 * -----------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+vector_entry sync_exception_sp_elx
+	b	plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry sync_exception_sp_elx
+
+vector_entry irq_sp_elx
+	handle_tsp_interrupt irq_sp_elx
+end_vector_entry irq_sp_elx
+
+vector_entry fiq_sp_elx
+	handle_tsp_interrupt fiq_sp_elx
+end_vector_entry fiq_sp_elx
+
+vector_entry serror_sp_elx
+	b	plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry serror_sp_elx
+
+
+	/* -----------------------------------------------------
+	 * Lower EL using AArch64 : 0x400 - 0x600. No exceptions
+	 * are handled since TSP does not implement a lower EL
+	 * -----------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+vector_entry sync_exception_aarch64
+	b	plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry sync_exception_aarch64
+
+vector_entry irq_aarch64
+	b	plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry irq_aarch64
+
+vector_entry fiq_aarch64
+	b	plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry fiq_aarch64
+
+vector_entry serror_aarch64
+	b	plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry serror_aarch64
+
+
+	/* -----------------------------------------------------
+	 * Lower EL using AArch32 : 0x600 - 0x800. No exceptions
+	 * handled since the TSP does not implement a lower EL.
+	 * -----------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+vector_entry sync_exception_aarch32
+	b	plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry sync_exception_aarch32
+
+vector_entry irq_aarch32
+	b	plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry irq_aarch32
+
+vector_entry fiq_aarch32
+	b	plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry fiq_aarch32
+
+vector_entry serror_aarch32
+	b	plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry serror_aarch32

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_request.S

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <asm_macros.S>
+#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h>
+
+	.globl tsp_get_magic
+
+/*
+ * This function raises an SMC to retrieve arguments from secure
+ * monitor/dispatcher, saves the returned arguments the array received in x0,
+ * and then returns to the caller
+ */
+func tsp_get_magic
+	/* Load arguments */
+	ldr	w0, _tsp_fid_get_magic
+
+	/* Raise SMC */
+	smc	#0
+
+	/* Return arguments in x1:x0 */
+	ret
+endfunc tsp_get_magic
+
+	.align 2
+_tsp_fid_get_magic:
+	.word	TSP_GET_ARGS

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/tsp/ffa_helpers.c

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include "ffa_helpers.h"
+#include <services/ffa_svc.h>
+#include "tsp_private.h"
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Wrapper function to send a direct request.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+smc_args_t ffa_msg_send_direct_req(ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender,
+				   ffa_endpoint_id16_t receiver,
+				   uint32_t arg3,
+				   uint32_t arg4,
+				   uint32_t arg5,
+				   uint32_t arg6,
+				   uint32_t arg7)
+{
+	uint32_t src_dst_ids = (sender << FFA_DIRECT_MSG_SOURCE_SHIFT) |
+			       (receiver << FFA_DIRECT_MSG_DESTINATION_SHIFT);
+
+
+	/* Send Direct Request. */
+	return smc_helper(FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC64, src_dst_ids,
+			0, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Wrapper function to send a direct response.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+smc_args_t *ffa_msg_send_direct_resp(ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender,
+				     ffa_endpoint_id16_t receiver,
+				     uint32_t arg3,
+				     uint32_t arg4,
+				     uint32_t arg5,
+				     uint32_t arg6,
+				     uint32_t arg7)
+{
+	uint32_t src_dst_ids = (sender << FFA_DIRECT_MSG_SOURCE_SHIFT) |
+			       (receiver << FFA_DIRECT_MSG_DESTINATION_SHIFT);
+
+	return set_smc_args(FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC64, src_dst_ids,
+			    0, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Memory Management Helpers.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+/**
+ * Initialises the header of the given `ffa_mtd`, not including the
+ * composite memory region offset.
+ */
+static void ffa_memory_region_init_header(
+	struct ffa_mtd *memory_region, ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender,
+	ffa_mem_attr16_t attributes, ffa_mtd_flag32_t flags,
+	uint64_t handle, uint64_t tag, ffa_endpoint_id16_t *receivers,
+	uint32_t receiver_count, ffa_mem_perm8_t permissions)
+{
+	struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad;
+
+	memory_region->emad_offset = sizeof(struct ffa_mtd);
+	memory_region->emad_size = sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0);
+	emad = (struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *)
+		    ((uint8_t *) memory_region +
+		     memory_region->emad_offset);
+	memory_region->sender_id = sender;
+	memory_region->memory_region_attributes = attributes;
+	memory_region->reserved_36_39 = 0;
+	memory_region->flags = flags;
+	memory_region->handle = handle;
+	memory_region->tag = tag;
+	memory_region->reserved_40_47 = 0;
+	memory_region->emad_count = receiver_count;
+	for (uint32_t i = 0U; i < receiver_count; i++) {
+		emad[i].mapd.endpoint_id = receivers[i];
+		emad[i].mapd.memory_access_permissions = permissions;
+		emad[i].mapd.flags = 0;
+		emad[i].comp_mrd_offset = 0;
+		emad[i].reserved_8_15 = 0;
+	}
+}
+/**
+ * Initialises the given `ffa_mtd` to be used for an
+ * `FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_REQ` by the receiver of a memory transaction.
+ * TODO: Support differing attributes per receiver.
+ *
+ * Returns the size of the descriptor written.
+ */
+static uint32_t ffa_memory_retrieve_request_init(
+	struct ffa_mtd *memory_region, uint64_t handle,
+	ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender, ffa_endpoint_id16_t *receivers, uint32_t receiver_count,
+	uint64_t tag, ffa_mtd_flag32_t flags,
+	ffa_mem_perm8_t permissions,
+	ffa_mem_attr16_t attributes)
+{
+	ffa_memory_region_init_header(memory_region, sender, attributes, flags,
+				      handle, tag, receivers,
+				      receiver_count, permissions);
+
+	return sizeof(struct ffa_mtd) +
+	       memory_region->emad_count * sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0);
+}
+
+/* Relinquish access to memory region. */
+bool ffa_mem_relinquish(void)
+{
+	smc_args_t ret;
+
+	ret = smc_helper(FFA_MEM_RELINQUISH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+	if (ffa_func_id(ret) != FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32) {
+		ERROR("%s failed to relinquish memory! error: (%x) %x\n",
+		      __func__, ffa_func_id(ret), ffa_error_code(ret));
+		return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+/* Retrieve memory shared by another partition. */
+smc_args_t ffa_mem_retrieve_req(uint32_t descriptor_length,
+				uint32_t fragment_length)
+{
+	return smc_helper(FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_REQ_SMC32,
+		      descriptor_length,
+		      fragment_length,
+		      0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/* Retrieve the next memory descriptor fragment. */
+smc_args_t ffa_mem_frag_rx(uint64_t handle, uint32_t recv_length)
+{
+	return smc_helper(FFA_MEM_FRAG_RX,
+		       FFA_MEM_HANDLE_LOW(handle),
+		       FFA_MEM_HANDLE_HIGH(handle),
+		       recv_length,
+		       0, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+
+bool memory_retrieve(struct mailbox *mb,
+			    struct ffa_mtd **retrieved,
+			    uint64_t handle, ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender,
+			    ffa_endpoint_id16_t *receivers, uint32_t receiver_count,
+			    ffa_mtd_flag32_t flags, uint32_t *frag_length,
+			    uint32_t *total_length)
+{
+	smc_args_t ret;
+	uint32_t descriptor_size;
+	struct ffa_mtd *memory_region = (struct ffa_mtd *)mb->tx_buffer;
+
+	if (retrieved == NULL || mb == NULL) {
+		ERROR("Invalid parameters!\n");
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* Clear TX buffer. */
+	memset(memory_region, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	/* Clear local buffer. */
+	memset(mem_region_buffer, 0, REGION_BUF_SIZE);
+
+	descriptor_size = ffa_memory_retrieve_request_init(
+	    memory_region, handle, sender, receivers, receiver_count, 0, flags,
+	    FFA_MEM_PERM_RW | FFA_MEM_PERM_NX,
+	    FFA_MEM_ATTR_NORMAL_MEMORY_CACHED_WB |
+	    FFA_MEM_ATTR_INNER_SHAREABLE);
+
+	ret = ffa_mem_retrieve_req(descriptor_size, descriptor_size);
+
+	if (ffa_func_id(ret) == FFA_ERROR) {
+		ERROR("Couldn't retrieve the memory page. Error: %x\n",
+		      ffa_error_code(ret));
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Following total_size and fragment_size are useful to keep track
+	 * of the state of transaction. When the sum of all fragment_size of all
+	 * fragments is equal to total_size, the memory transaction has been
+	 * completed.
+	 */
+	*total_length = ret._regs[1];
+	*frag_length = ret._regs[2];
+
+	/* Validate frag_length is less than total_length and mailbox size. */
+	if (*frag_length == 0U || *total_length == 0U ||
+	    *frag_length > *total_length || *frag_length > (mb->rxtx_page_count * PAGE_SIZE)) {
+		ERROR("Invalid parameters!\n");
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* Copy response to local buffer. */
+	memcpy(mem_region_buffer, mb->rx_buffer, *frag_length);
+
+	if (ffa_rx_release()) {
+		ERROR("Failed to release buffer!\n");
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	*retrieved = (struct ffa_mtd *) mem_region_buffer;
+
+	if ((*retrieved)->emad_count > MAX_MEM_SHARE_RECIPIENTS) {
+		VERBOSE("SPMC memory sharing supports max of %u receivers!\n",
+			MAX_MEM_SHARE_RECIPIENTS);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We are sharing memory from the normal world therefore validate the NS
+	 * bit was set by the SPMC.
+	 */
+	if (((*retrieved)->memory_region_attributes & FFA_MEM_ATTR_NS_BIT) == 0U) {
+		ERROR("SPMC has not set the NS bit! 0x%x\n",
+		      (*retrieved)->memory_region_attributes);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	VERBOSE("Memory Descriptor Retrieved!\n");
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/* Relinquish the memory region. */
+bool memory_relinquish(struct ffa_mem_relinquish_descriptor *m, uint64_t handle,
+		       ffa_endpoint_id16_t id)
+{
+	ffa_mem_relinquish_init(m, handle, 0, id);
+	return ffa_mem_relinquish();
+}
+
+/* Query SPMC that the rx buffer of the partition can be released. */
+bool ffa_rx_release(void)
+{
+	smc_args_t ret;
+
+	ret = smc_helper(FFA_RX_RELEASE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+	return ret._regs[SMC_ARG0] != FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32;
+}
+
+/* Map the provided buffers with the SPMC. */
+bool ffa_rxtx_map(uintptr_t send, uintptr_t recv, uint32_t pages)
+{
+	smc_args_t ret;
+
+	ret = smc_helper(FFA_RXTX_MAP_SMC64, send, recv, pages, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+	return ret._regs[0] != FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32;
+}

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/tsp/ffa_helpers.h

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#ifndef FFA_HELPERS_H
+#define FFA_HELPERS_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "../../services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc.h"
+#include "../../services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.h"
+#include <services/el3_spmc_ffa_memory.h>
+#include <services/ffa_svc.h>
+#include "tsp_private.h"
+
+static inline uint32_t ffa_func_id(smc_args_t val)
+{
+	return (uint32_t) val._regs[0];
+}
+
+static inline int32_t ffa_error_code(smc_args_t val)
+{
+	return (uint32_t) val._regs[2];
+}
+
+extern uint8_t mem_region_buffer[4096 * 2]  __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+#define REGION_BUF_SIZE sizeof(mem_region_buffer)
+
+/** The maximum number of recipients a memory region may be sent to. */
+#define MAX_MEM_SHARE_RECIPIENTS	2U
+
+/* FFA Memory Management mode flags. */
+#define FFA_FLAG_SHARE_MEMORY (1U << 3)
+#define FFA_FLAG_LEND_MEMORY (1U << 4)
+
+#define FFA_FLAG_MEMORY_MASK (3U << 3)
+
+#define FFA_MEM_HANDLE_LOW(x) (x & 0xFFFFFFFF)
+#define FFA_MEM_HANDLE_HIGH(x) (x >> 32)
+
+#define FFA_MEM_PERM_DATA_OFFSET 0
+#define FFA_MEM_PERM_DATA_MASK 0x3
+
+static inline uint32_t ffa_mem_relinquish_init(
+	struct ffa_mem_relinquish_descriptor *relinquish_request,
+	uint64_t handle, ffa_mtd_flag32_t flags,
+	ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender)
+{
+	relinquish_request->handle = handle;
+	relinquish_request->flags = flags;
+	relinquish_request->endpoint_count = 1;
+	relinquish_request->endpoint_array[0] = sender;
+
+	return sizeof(struct ffa_mem_relinquish_descriptor) + sizeof(ffa_endpoint_id16_t);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Gets the `ffa_comp_mrd` for the given receiver from an
+ * `ffa_mtd`, or NULL if it is not valid.
+ */
+static inline struct ffa_comp_mrd *
+ffa_memory_region_get_composite(struct ffa_mtd *memory_region,
+				uint32_t receiver_index)
+{
+	struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *receivers;
+	uint32_t offset;
+
+	receivers = (struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *)
+		    ((uint8_t *) memory_region +
+		    memory_region->emad_offset +
+		    (memory_region->emad_size * receiver_index));
+	offset = receivers->comp_mrd_offset;
+
+	if (offset == 0U) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return (struct ffa_comp_mrd *)
+	       ((uint8_t *) memory_region + offset);
+}
+
+static inline uint32_t ffa_get_data_access_attr(ffa_mem_perm8_t perm)
+{
+	return ((perm >> FFA_MEM_PERM_DATA_OFFSET) & FFA_MEM_PERM_DATA_MASK);
+}
+
+smc_args_t ffa_mem_frag_rx(uint64_t handle, uint32_t recv_length);
+bool ffa_mem_relinquish(void);
+bool ffa_rx_release(void);
+bool memory_relinquish(struct ffa_mem_relinquish_descriptor *m, uint64_t handle,
+		       ffa_endpoint_id16_t id);
+bool ffa_rxtx_map(uintptr_t send, uintptr_t recv, uint32_t pages);
+bool memory_retrieve(struct mailbox *mb,
+		     struct ffa_mtd **retrieved,
+		     uint64_t handle, ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender,
+		     ffa_endpoint_id16_t *receivers, uint32_t receiver_count,
+		     ffa_mtd_flag32_t flags, uint32_t *frag_length,
+		     uint32_t *total_length);
+
+smc_args_t ffa_msg_send_direct_req(ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender,
+				   ffa_endpoint_id16_t receiver,
+				   uint32_t arg3,
+				   uint32_t arg4,
+				   uint32_t arg5,
+				   uint32_t arg6,
+				   uint32_t arg7);
+smc_args_t *ffa_msg_send_direct_resp(ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender,
+				     ffa_endpoint_id16_t receiver,
+				     uint32_t arg3,
+				     uint32_t arg4,
+				     uint32_t arg5,
+				     uint32_t arg6,
+				     uint32_t arg7);
+#endif /* FFA_HELPERS_H */

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/tsp/tsp.ld.S

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <common/bl_common.ld.h>
+#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h>
+
+OUTPUT_FORMAT(PLATFORM_LINKER_FORMAT)
+OUTPUT_ARCH(PLATFORM_LINKER_ARCH)
+ENTRY(tsp_entrypoint)
+
+
+MEMORY {
+    RAM (rwx): ORIGIN = TSP_SEC_MEM_BASE, LENGTH = TSP_SEC_MEM_SIZE
+}
+
+
+SECTIONS
+{
+    . = BL32_BASE;
+    ASSERT(. == ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE),
+           "BL32_BASE address is not aligned on a page boundary.")
+
+#if SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA
+    .text . : {
+        __TEXT_START__ = .;
+        *tsp_entrypoint.o(.text*)
+        *(.text*)
+        *(.vectors)
+        . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+        __TEXT_END__ = .;
+    } >RAM
+
+    .rodata . : {
+        __RODATA_START__ = .;
+        *(.rodata*)
+
+	RODATA_COMMON
+
+        . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+        __RODATA_END__ = .;
+    } >RAM
+#else
+    ro . : {
+        __RO_START__ = .;
+        *tsp_entrypoint.o(.text*)
+        *(.text*)
+        *(.rodata*)
+
+	RODATA_COMMON
+
+        *(.vectors)
+
+        __RO_END_UNALIGNED__ = .;
+        /*
+         * Memory page(s) mapped to this section will be marked as
+         * read-only, executable.  No RW data from the next section must
+         * creep in.  Ensure the rest of the current memory page is unused.
+         */
+        . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+        __RO_END__ = .;
+    } >RAM
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Define a linker symbol to mark start of the RW memory area for this
+     * image.
+     */
+    __RW_START__ = . ;
+
+    DATA_SECTION >RAM
+    RELA_SECTION >RAM
+
+#ifdef TSP_PROGBITS_LIMIT
+    ASSERT(. <= TSP_PROGBITS_LIMIT, "TSP progbits has exceeded its limit.")
+#endif
+
+    STACK_SECTION >RAM
+    BSS_SECTION >RAM
+    XLAT_TABLE_SECTION >RAM
+
+#if USE_COHERENT_MEM
+    /*
+     * The base address of the coherent memory section must be page-aligned (4K)
+     * to guarantee that the coherent data are stored on their own pages and
+     * are not mixed with normal data.  This is required to set up the correct
+     * memory attributes for the coherent data page tables.
+     */
+    coherent_ram (NOLOAD) : ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE) {
+        __COHERENT_RAM_START__ = .;
+        *(tzfw_coherent_mem)
+        __COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__ = .;
+        /*
+         * Memory page(s) mapped to this section will be marked
+         * as device memory.  No other unexpected data must creep in.
+         * Ensure the rest of the current memory page is unused.
+         */
+        . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+        __COHERENT_RAM_END__ = .;
+    } >RAM
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Define a linker symbol to mark the end of the RW memory area for this
+     * image.
+     */
+    __RW_END__ = .;
+    __BL32_END__ = .;
+
+    /DISCARD/ : {
+        *(.dynsym .dynstr .hash .gnu.hash)
+    }
+
+    __BSS_SIZE__ = SIZEOF(.bss);
+#if USE_COHERENT_MEM
+    __COHERENT_RAM_UNALIGNED_SIZE__ =
+        __COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__ - __COHERENT_RAM_START__;
+#endif
+
+    ASSERT(. <= BL32_LIMIT, "BL32 image has exceeded its limit.")
+}

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/tsp/tsp.mk

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2013-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+#
+
+INCLUDES		+=	-Iinclude/bl32/tsp
+
+ifeq (${SPMC_AT_EL3},1)
+   BL32_SOURCES            +=      bl32/tsp/tsp_ffa_main.c                    \
+				   bl32/tsp/ffa_helpers.c
+else
+   BL32_SOURCES            +=      bl32/tsp/tsp_main.c
+endif
+
+BL32_SOURCES		+=	bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_entrypoint.S	\
+				bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_exceptions.S	\
+				bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_request.S		\
+				bl32/tsp/tsp_interrupt.c		\
+				bl32/tsp/tsp_timer.c			\
+				bl32/tsp/tsp_common.c			\
+				common/aarch64/early_exceptions.S	\
+				lib/locks/exclusive/aarch64/spinlock.S
+
+BL32_LINKERFILE		:=	bl32/tsp/tsp.ld.S
+
+# This flag determines if the TSPD initializes BL32 in tspd_init() (synchronous
+# method) or configures BL31 to pass control to BL32 instead of BL33
+# (asynchronous method).
+TSP_INIT_ASYNC         :=      0
+
+$(eval $(call assert_boolean,TSP_INIT_ASYNC))
+$(eval $(call add_define,TSP_INIT_ASYNC))
+
+# Include the platform-specific TSP Makefile
+# If no platform-specific TSP Makefile exists, it means TSP is not supported
+# on this platform.
+TSP_PLAT_MAKEFILE := $(wildcard ${PLAT_DIR}/tsp/tsp-${PLAT}.mk)
+ifeq (,${TSP_PLAT_MAKEFILE})
+  $(error TSP is not supported on platform ${PLAT})
+else
+  include ${TSP_PLAT_MAKEFILE}
+endif

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/tsp/tsp_common.c

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include <arch_features.h>
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h>
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <lib/spinlock.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+#include <platform_tsp.h>
+#include "tsp_private.h"
+
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Per cpu data structure to populate parameters for an SMC in C code and use
+ * a pointer to this structure in assembler code to populate x0-x7.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static smc_args_t tsp_smc_args[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT];
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Per cpu data structure to keep track of TSP activity
+ ******************************************************************************/
+work_statistics_t tsp_stats[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT];
+
+smc_args_t *set_smc_args(uint64_t arg0,
+			 uint64_t arg1,
+			 uint64_t arg2,
+			 uint64_t arg3,
+			 uint64_t arg4,
+			 uint64_t arg5,
+			 uint64_t arg6,
+			 uint64_t arg7)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id;
+	smc_args_t *pcpu_smc_args;
+
+	/*
+	 * Return to Secure Monitor by raising an SMC. The results of the
+	 * service are passed as an arguments to the SMC.
+	 */
+	linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+	pcpu_smc_args = &tsp_smc_args[linear_id];
+	write_sp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, SMC_ARG0, arg0);
+	write_sp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, SMC_ARG1, arg1);
+	write_sp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, SMC_ARG2, arg2);
+	write_sp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, SMC_ARG3, arg3);
+	write_sp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, SMC_ARG4, arg4);
+	write_sp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, SMC_ARG5, arg5);
+	write_sp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, SMC_ARG6, arg6);
+	write_sp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, SMC_ARG7, arg7);
+
+	return pcpu_smc_args;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Setup function for TSP.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void tsp_setup(void)
+{
+	/* Perform early platform-specific setup. */
+	tsp_early_platform_setup();
+
+	/* Perform late platform-specific setup. */
+	tsp_plat_arch_setup();
+
+#if ENABLE_PAUTH
+	/*
+	 * Assert that the ARMv8.3-PAuth registers are present or an access
+	 * fault will be triggered when they are being saved or restored.
+	 */
+	assert(is_armv8_3_pauth_present());
+#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function performs any remaining bookkeeping in the test secure payload
+ * before the system is switched off (in response to a psci SYSTEM_OFF request).
+ ******************************************************************************/
+smc_args_t *tsp_system_off_main(uint64_t arg0,
+				uint64_t arg1,
+				uint64_t arg2,
+				uint64_t arg3,
+				uint64_t arg4,
+				uint64_t arg5,
+				uint64_t arg6,
+				uint64_t arg7)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+
+	/* Update this cpu's statistics. */
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++;
+
+	INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx SYSTEM_OFF request\n", read_mpidr());
+	INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets requests\n", read_mpidr(),
+	     tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count,
+	     tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count);
+
+	/* Indicate to the SPD that we have completed this request. */
+	return set_smc_args(TSP_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function performs any remaining bookkeeping in the test secure payload
+ * before the system is reset (in response to a psci SYSTEM_RESET request).
+ ******************************************************************************/
+smc_args_t *tsp_system_reset_main(uint64_t arg0,
+				  uint64_t arg1,
+				  uint64_t arg2,
+				  uint64_t arg3,
+				  uint64_t arg4,
+				  uint64_t arg5,
+				  uint64_t arg6,
+				  uint64_t arg7)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+
+	/* Update this cpu's statistics. */
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++;
+
+	INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx SYSTEM_RESET request\n", read_mpidr());
+	INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets requests\n", read_mpidr(),
+	     tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count,
+	     tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count);
+
+	/* Indicate to the SPD that we have completed this request. */
+	return set_smc_args(TSP_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * TSP smc abort handler. This function is called when aborting a preempted
+ * yielding SMC request. It should cleanup all resources owned by the SMC
+ * handler such as locks or dynamically allocated memory so following SMC
+ * request are executed in a clean environment.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+smc_args_t *tsp_abort_smc_handler(uint64_t func,
+				  uint64_t arg1,
+				  uint64_t arg2,
+				  uint64_t arg3,
+				  uint64_t arg4,
+				  uint64_t arg5,
+				  uint64_t arg6,
+				  uint64_t arg7)
+{
+	return set_smc_args(TSP_ABORT_DONE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+}

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/tsp/tsp_ffa_main.c

@@ -0,0 +1,655 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "../../services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc.h"
+#include "../../services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.h"
+#include <arch_features.h>
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h>
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include "ffa_helpers.h"
+#include <lib/psci/psci.h>
+#include <lib/spinlock.h>
+#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h>
+#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+#include <platform_tsp.h>
+#include <services/ffa_svc.h>
+#include "tsp_private.h"
+
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+static ffa_endpoint_id16_t tsp_id, spmc_id;
+uint8_t mem_region_buffer[4096 * 2]  __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+
+/* Partition Mailbox. */
+static uint8_t send_page[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+static uint8_t recv_page[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+
+/*
+ * Declare a global mailbox for use within the TSP.
+ * This will be initialized appropriately when the buffers
+ * are mapped with the SPMC.
+ */
+static struct mailbox mailbox;
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This enum is used to handle test cases driven from the FF-A Test Driver.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+/* Keep in Sync with FF-A Test Driver. */
+enum message_t {
+	/* Partition Only Messages. */
+	FF_A_RELAY_MESSAGE = 0,
+
+	/* Basic Functionality. */
+	FF_A_ECHO_MESSAGE,
+	FF_A_RELAY_MESSAGE_EL3,
+
+	/* Memory Sharing. */
+	FF_A_MEMORY_SHARE,
+	FF_A_MEMORY_SHARE_FRAGMENTED,
+	FF_A_MEMORY_LEND,
+	FF_A_MEMORY_LEND_FRAGMENTED,
+
+	FF_A_MEMORY_SHARE_MULTI_ENDPOINT,
+	FF_A_MEMORY_LEND_MULTI_ENDPOINT,
+
+	LAST,
+	FF_A_RUN_ALL = 255,
+	FF_A_OP_MAX = 256
+};
+
+#if SPMC_AT_EL3
+extern void tsp_cpu_on_entry(void);
+#endif
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Test Functions.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Enable the TSP to forward the received message to another partition and ask
+ * it to echo the value back in order to validate direct messages functionality.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static int ffa_test_relay(uint64_t arg0,
+			  uint64_t arg1,
+			  uint64_t arg2,
+			  uint64_t arg3,
+			  uint64_t arg4,
+			  uint64_t arg5,
+			  uint64_t arg6,
+			  uint64_t arg7)
+{
+	smc_args_t ffa_forward_result;
+	ffa_endpoint_id16_t receiver = arg5;
+
+	ffa_forward_result = ffa_msg_send_direct_req(ffa_endpoint_source(arg1),
+						     receiver,
+						     FF_A_ECHO_MESSAGE, arg4,
+						     0, 0, 0);
+	return ffa_forward_result._regs[3];
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function handles memory management tests, currently share and lend.
+ * This test supports the use of FRAG_RX to use memory descriptors that do not
+ * fit in a single 4KB buffer.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static int test_memory_send(ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender, uint64_t handle,
+			    ffa_mtd_flag32_t flags, bool multi_endpoint)
+{
+	struct ffa_mtd *m;
+	struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *receivers;
+	struct ffa_comp_mrd *composite;
+	int ret, status = 0;
+	unsigned int mem_attrs;
+	char *ptr;
+	ffa_endpoint_id16_t source = sender;
+	uint32_t total_length, recv_length = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * In the case that we're testing multiple endpoints choose a partition
+	 * ID that resides in the normal world so the SPMC won't detect it as
+	 * invalid.
+	 * TODO: Should get endpoint receiver id and flag as input from NWd.
+	 */
+	uint32_t receiver_count = multi_endpoint ? 2 : 1;
+	ffa_endpoint_id16_t test_receivers[2] = { tsp_id, 0x10 };
+
+	/* Ensure that the sender ID resides in the normal world. */
+	if (ffa_is_secure_world_id(sender)) {
+		ERROR("Invalid sender ID 0x%x.\n", sender);
+		return FFA_ERROR_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	if (!memory_retrieve(&mailbox, &m, handle, source, test_receivers,
+			     receiver_count, flags, &recv_length,
+			     &total_length)) {
+		return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	receivers = (struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *)
+		    ((uint8_t *) m + m->emad_offset);
+	while (total_length != recv_length) {
+		smc_args_t ffa_return;
+		uint32_t frag_length;
+
+		ffa_return = ffa_mem_frag_rx(handle, recv_length);
+
+		if (ffa_return._regs[0] == FFA_ERROR) {
+			WARN("TSP: failed to resume mem with handle %lx\n",
+			     handle);
+			return ffa_return._regs[2];
+		}
+		frag_length = ffa_return._regs[3];
+
+		/* Validate frag_length is less than total_length and mailbox size. */
+		if (frag_length > total_length ||
+				frag_length > (mailbox.rxtx_page_count * PAGE_SIZE)) {
+			ERROR("Invalid parameters!\n");
+			return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		/* Validate frag_length is less than remaining mem_region_buffer size. */
+		if (frag_length + recv_length >= REGION_BUF_SIZE) {
+			ERROR("Out of memory!\n");
+			return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		memcpy(&mem_region_buffer[recv_length], mailbox.rx_buffer,
+		       frag_length);
+
+		if (ffa_rx_release()) {
+			ERROR("Failed to release buffer!\n");
+			return FFA_ERROR_DENIED;
+		}
+
+		recv_length += frag_length;
+
+		assert(recv_length <= total_length);
+	}
+
+	composite = ffa_memory_region_get_composite(m, 0);
+	if (composite == NULL) {
+		WARN("Failed to get composite descriptor!\n");
+		return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	VERBOSE("Address: %p; page_count: %x %lx\n",
+		(void *)composite->address_range_array[0].address,
+		composite->address_range_array[0].page_count, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	/* This test is only concerned with RW permissions. */
+	if (ffa_get_data_access_attr(
+	    receivers[0].mapd.memory_access_permissions) != FFA_MEM_PERM_RW) {
+		ERROR("Data permission in retrieve response %x does not match share/lend %x!\n",
+		      ffa_get_data_access_attr(receivers[0].mapd.memory_access_permissions),
+		      FFA_MEM_PERM_RW);
+		return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	mem_attrs = MT_RW_DATA | MT_EXECUTE_NEVER;
+
+	/* Only expecting to be sent memory from NWd so map accordingly. */
+	mem_attrs |= MT_NS;
+
+	for (uint32_t i = 0U; i < composite->address_range_count; i++) {
+		size_t size = composite->address_range_array[i].page_count * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+		ptr = (char *) composite->address_range_array[i].address;
+		ret = mmap_add_dynamic_region(
+				(uint64_t)ptr,
+				(uint64_t)ptr,
+				size, mem_attrs);
+
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			ERROR("Failed [%u] mmap_add_dynamic_region %u (%lx) (%lx) (%x)!\n",
+				i, ret,
+				(uint64_t)composite->address_range_array[i].address,
+				size, mem_attrs);
+
+			/* Remove mappings created in this transaction. */
+			for (i--; i >= 0U; i--) {
+				ret = mmap_remove_dynamic_region(
+					(uint64_t)ptr,
+					composite->address_range_array[i].page_count * PAGE_SIZE);
+
+				if (ret != 0) {
+					ERROR("Failed [%d] mmap_remove_dynamic_region!\n", i);
+					panic();
+				}
+			}
+			return FFA_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+
+		/* Increment memory region for validation purposes. */
+		++(*ptr);
+
+		/*
+		 * Read initial magic number from memory region for
+		 * validation purposes.
+		 */
+		if (!i) {
+			status = *ptr;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (uint32_t i = 0U; i < composite->address_range_count; i++) {
+		ret = mmap_remove_dynamic_region(
+			(uint64_t)composite->address_range_array[i].address,
+			composite->address_range_array[i].page_count * PAGE_SIZE);
+
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			ERROR("Failed [%d] mmap_remove_dynamic_region!\n", i);
+			return FFA_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!memory_relinquish((struct ffa_mem_relinquish_descriptor *)mailbox.tx_buffer,
+				m->handle, tsp_id)) {
+		ERROR("Failed to relinquish memory region!\n");
+		return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+	return status;
+}
+
+static smc_args_t *send_ffa_pm_success(void)
+{
+	return set_smc_args(FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC32,
+			    ((tsp_id & FFA_DIRECT_MSG_ENDPOINT_ID_MASK)
+			    << FFA_DIRECT_MSG_SOURCE_SHIFT) | spmc_id,
+			    FFA_FWK_MSG_BIT |
+			    (FFA_PM_MSG_PM_RESP & FFA_FWK_MSG_MASK),
+			    0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function performs any remaining book keeping in the test secure payload
+ * before this cpu is turned off in response to a psci cpu_off request.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_off_main(uint64_t arg0,
+			     uint64_t arg1,
+			     uint64_t arg2,
+			     uint64_t arg3,
+			     uint64_t arg4,
+			     uint64_t arg5,
+			     uint64_t arg6,
+			     uint64_t arg7)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+
+	/*
+	 * This cpu is being turned off, so disable the timer to prevent the
+	 * secure timer interrupt from interfering with power down. A pending
+	 * interrupt will be lost but we do not care as we are turning off.
+	 */
+	tsp_generic_timer_stop();
+
+	/* Update this cpu's statistics. */
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_off_count++;
+
+	VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx off request\n", read_mpidr());
+	VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu off requests\n",
+		read_mpidr(),
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count,
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count,
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_off_count);
+
+	return send_ffa_pm_success();
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function performs any book keeping in the test secure payload before
+ * this cpu's architectural state is saved in response to an earlier psci
+ * cpu_suspend request.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_suspend_main(uint64_t arg0,
+				 uint64_t arg1,
+				 uint64_t arg2,
+				 uint64_t arg3,
+				 uint64_t arg4,
+				 uint64_t arg5,
+				 uint64_t arg6,
+				 uint64_t arg7)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the time context and disable it to prevent the secure timer
+	 * interrupt from interfering with wakeup from the suspend state.
+	 */
+	tsp_generic_timer_save();
+	tsp_generic_timer_stop();
+
+	/* Update this cpu's statistics. */
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_suspend_count++;
+
+	VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu suspend requests\n",
+		read_mpidr(),
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count,
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count,
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_suspend_count);
+
+	return send_ffa_pm_success();
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function performs any bookkeeping in the test secure payload after this
+ * cpu's architectural state has been restored after wakeup from an earlier psci
+ * cpu_suspend request.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_resume_main(uint64_t max_off_pwrlvl,
+				uint64_t arg1,
+				uint64_t arg2,
+				uint64_t arg3,
+				uint64_t arg4,
+				uint64_t arg5,
+				uint64_t arg6,
+				uint64_t arg7)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+
+	/* Restore the generic timer context. */
+	tsp_generic_timer_restore();
+
+	/* Update this cpu's statistics. */
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_resume_count++;
+
+	VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx resumed. maximum off power level %" PRId64 "\n",
+	     read_mpidr(), max_off_pwrlvl);
+	VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu resume requests\n",
+		read_mpidr(),
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count,
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count,
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_resume_count);
+
+	return send_ffa_pm_success();
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function handles framework messages. Currently only PM.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static smc_args_t *handle_framework_message(uint64_t arg0,
+					    uint64_t arg1,
+					    uint64_t arg2,
+					    uint64_t arg3,
+					    uint64_t arg4,
+					    uint64_t arg5,
+					    uint64_t arg6,
+					    uint64_t arg7)
+{
+	/* Check if it is a power management message from the SPMC. */
+	if (ffa_endpoint_source(arg1) != spmc_id) {
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Check if it is a PM request message. */
+	if ((arg2 & FFA_FWK_MSG_MASK) == FFA_FWK_MSG_PSCI) {
+		/* Check if it is a PSCI CPU_OFF request. */
+		if (arg3 == PSCI_CPU_OFF) {
+			return tsp_cpu_off_main(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3,
+						arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7);
+		} else if (arg3 == PSCI_CPU_SUSPEND_AARCH64) {
+			return tsp_cpu_suspend_main(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3,
+						arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7);
+		}
+	} else if ((arg2 & FFA_FWK_MSG_MASK) == FFA_PM_MSG_WB_REQ) {
+		/* Check it is a PSCI Warm Boot request. */
+		if (arg3 == FFA_WB_TYPE_NOTS2RAM) {
+			return tsp_cpu_resume_main(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3,
+						arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7);
+		}
+	}
+
+err:
+	ERROR("%s: Unknown framework message!\n", __func__);
+	panic();
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Handles partition messages. Exercised from the FF-A Test Driver.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static smc_args_t *handle_partition_message(uint64_t arg0,
+					    uint64_t arg1,
+					    uint64_t arg2,
+					    uint64_t arg3,
+					    uint64_t arg4,
+					    uint64_t arg5,
+					    uint64_t arg6,
+					    uint64_t arg7)
+{
+	uint16_t sender = ffa_endpoint_source(arg1);
+	uint16_t receiver = ffa_endpoint_destination(arg1);
+	int status = -1;
+	const bool multi_endpoint = true;
+
+	switch (arg3) {
+	case FF_A_MEMORY_SHARE:
+		INFO("TSP Tests: Memory Share Request--\n");
+		status = test_memory_send(sender, arg4, FFA_FLAG_SHARE_MEMORY, !multi_endpoint);
+		break;
+
+	case FF_A_MEMORY_LEND:
+		INFO("TSP Tests: Memory Lend Request--\n");
+		status = test_memory_send(sender, arg4, FFA_FLAG_LEND_MEMORY, !multi_endpoint);
+		break;
+
+	case FF_A_MEMORY_SHARE_MULTI_ENDPOINT:
+		INFO("TSP Tests: Multi Endpoint Memory Share Request--\n");
+		status = test_memory_send(sender, arg4, FFA_FLAG_SHARE_MEMORY, multi_endpoint);
+		break;
+
+	case FF_A_MEMORY_LEND_MULTI_ENDPOINT:
+		INFO("TSP Tests: Multi Endpoint Memory Lend Request--\n");
+		status = test_memory_send(sender, arg4, FFA_FLAG_LEND_MEMORY, multi_endpoint);
+		break;
+	case FF_A_RELAY_MESSAGE:
+		INFO("TSP Tests: Relaying message--\n");
+		status = ffa_test_relay(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4,
+					arg5, arg6, arg7);
+		break;
+
+	case FF_A_ECHO_MESSAGE:
+		INFO("TSP Tests: echo message--\n");
+		status = arg4;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		INFO("TSP Tests: Unknown request ID %d--\n", (int) arg3);
+	}
+
+	/* Swap the sender and receiver in the response. */
+	return ffa_msg_send_direct_resp(receiver, sender, status, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function implements the event loop for handling FF-A ABI invocations.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static smc_args_t *tsp_event_loop(uint64_t smc_fid,
+				  uint64_t arg1,
+				  uint64_t arg2,
+				  uint64_t arg3,
+				  uint64_t arg4,
+				  uint64_t arg5,
+				  uint64_t arg6,
+				  uint64_t arg7)
+{
+	/* Panic if the SPMC did not forward an FF-A call. */
+	if (!is_ffa_fid(smc_fid)) {
+		ERROR("%s: Unknown SMC FID (0x%lx)\n", __func__, smc_fid);
+		panic();
+	}
+
+	switch (smc_fid) {
+	case FFA_INTERRUPT:
+		/*
+		 * IRQs were enabled upon re-entry into the TSP. The interrupt
+		 * must have been handled by now. Return to the SPMC indicating
+		 * the same.
+		 */
+		return set_smc_args(FFA_MSG_WAIT, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+
+	case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC64:
+	case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC32:
+		/* Check if a framework message, handle accordingly. */
+		if ((arg2 & FFA_FWK_MSG_BIT)) {
+			return handle_framework_message(smc_fid, arg1, arg2, arg3,
+							arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7);
+		}
+		return handle_partition_message(smc_fid, arg1, arg2, arg3,
+							arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7);
+	}
+
+	ERROR("%s: Unsupported FF-A FID (0x%lx)\n", __func__, smc_fid);
+	panic();
+}
+
+static smc_args_t *tsp_loop(smc_args_t *args)
+{
+	smc_args_t ret;
+
+	do {
+		/* --------------------------------------------
+		 * Mask FIQ interrupts to avoid preemption
+		 * in case EL3 SPMC delegates an IRQ next or a
+		 * managed exit. Lastly, unmask IRQs so that
+		 * they can be handled immediately upon re-entry.
+		 *  ---------------------------------------------
+		 */
+		write_daifset(DAIF_FIQ_BIT);
+		write_daifclr(DAIF_IRQ_BIT);
+		ret = smc_helper(args->_regs[0], args->_regs[1], args->_regs[2],
+			       args->_regs[3], args->_regs[4], args->_regs[5],
+			       args->_regs[6], args->_regs[7]);
+		args = tsp_event_loop(ret._regs[0], ret._regs[1], ret._regs[2],
+				ret._regs[3], ret._regs[4], ret._regs[5],
+				ret._regs[6], ret._regs[7]);
+	} while (1);
+
+	/* Not Reached. */
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * TSP main entry point where it gets the opportunity to initialize its secure
+ * state/applications. Once the state is initialized, it must return to the
+ * SPD with a pointer to the 'tsp_vector_table' jump table.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+uint64_t tsp_main(void)
+{
+	smc_args_t smc_args = {0};
+
+	NOTICE("TSP: %s\n", version_string);
+	NOTICE("TSP: %s\n", build_message);
+	INFO("TSP: Total memory base : 0x%lx\n", (unsigned long) BL32_BASE);
+	INFO("TSP: Total memory size : 0x%lx bytes\n", BL32_TOTAL_SIZE);
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+
+	/* Initialize the platform. */
+	tsp_platform_setup();
+
+	/* Initialize secure/applications state here. */
+	tsp_generic_timer_start();
+
+	/* Register secondary entrypoint with the SPMC. */
+	smc_args = smc_helper(FFA_SECONDARY_EP_REGISTER_SMC64,
+			(uint64_t) tsp_cpu_on_entry,
+			0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+	if (smc_args._regs[SMC_ARG0] != FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32) {
+		ERROR("TSP could not register secondary ep (0x%lx)\n",
+				smc_args._regs[2]);
+		panic();
+	}
+	/* Get TSP's endpoint id. */
+	smc_args = smc_helper(FFA_ID_GET, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+	if (smc_args._regs[SMC_ARG0] != FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32) {
+		ERROR("TSP could not get own ID (0x%lx) on core%d\n",
+				smc_args._regs[2], linear_id);
+		panic();
+	}
+
+	tsp_id = smc_args._regs[2];
+	INFO("TSP FF-A endpoint id = 0x%x\n", tsp_id);
+
+	/* Get the SPMC ID. */
+	smc_args = smc_helper(FFA_SPM_ID_GET, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+	if (smc_args._regs[SMC_ARG0] != FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32) {
+		ERROR("TSP could not get SPMC ID (0x%lx) on core%d\n",
+				smc_args._regs[2], linear_id);
+		panic();
+	}
+
+	spmc_id = smc_args._regs[2];
+
+	/* Call RXTX_MAP to map a 4k RX and TX buffer. */
+	if (ffa_rxtx_map((uintptr_t) send_page,
+			 (uintptr_t) recv_page, 1)) {
+		ERROR("TSP could not map it's RX/TX Buffers\n");
+		panic();
+	}
+
+	mailbox.tx_buffer = send_page;
+	mailbox.rx_buffer = recv_page;
+	mailbox.rxtx_page_count = 1;
+
+	/* Update this cpu's statistics. */
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_on_count++;
+
+	VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu on requests\n",
+			read_mpidr(),
+			tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count,
+			tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count,
+			tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_on_count);
+
+	/* Tell SPMD that we are done initialising. */
+	tsp_loop(set_smc_args(FFA_MSG_WAIT, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0));
+
+	/* Not reached. */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function performs any remaining book keeping in the test secure payload
+ * after this cpu's architectural state has been setup in response to an earlier
+ * psci cpu_on request.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_on_main(void)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+
+	/* Initialize secure/applications state here. */
+	tsp_generic_timer_start();
+
+	/* Update this cpu's statistics. */
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_on_count++;
+	VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx turned on\n", read_mpidr());
+	VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu on requests\n",
+			read_mpidr(),
+			tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count,
+			tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count,
+			tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_on_count);
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Jump to the main event loop to return to EL3
+	 * and be ready for the next request on this cpu.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	return tsp_loop(set_smc_args(FFA_MSG_WAIT, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0));
+}

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/tsp/tsp_interrupt.c

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+
+#include "tsp_private.h"
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function updates the TSP statistics for S-EL1 interrupts handled
+ * synchronously i.e the ones that have been handed over by the TSPD. It also
+ * keeps count of the number of times control was passed back to the TSPD
+ * after handling the interrupt. In the future it will be possible that the
+ * TSPD hands over an S-EL1 interrupt to the TSP but does not expect it to
+ * return execution. This statistic will be useful to distinguish between these
+ * two models of synchronous S-EL1 interrupt handling. The 'elr_el3' parameter
+ * contains the address of the instruction in normal world where this S-EL1
+ * interrupt was generated.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void tsp_update_sync_sel1_intr_stats(uint32_t type, uint64_t elr_el3)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].sync_sel1_intr_count++;
+	if (type == TSP_HANDLE_SEL1_INTR_AND_RETURN)
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].sync_sel1_intr_ret_count++;
+
+	VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx sync s-el1 interrupt request from 0x%" PRIx64 "\n",
+		read_mpidr(), elr_el3);
+	VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d sync s-el1 interrupt requests,"
+		" %d sync s-el1 interrupt returns\n",
+		read_mpidr(),
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].sync_sel1_intr_count,
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].sync_sel1_intr_ret_count);
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ * This function is invoked when a non S-EL1 interrupt is received and causes
+ * the preemption of TSP. This function returns TSP_PREEMPTED and results
+ * in the control being handed over to EL3 for handling the interrupt.
+ *****************************************************************************/
+int32_t tsp_handle_preemption(void)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].preempt_intr_count++;
+	VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d preempt interrupt requests\n",
+		read_mpidr(), tsp_stats[linear_id].preempt_intr_count);
+	return TSP_PREEMPTED;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * TSP interrupt handler is called as a part of both synchronous and
+ * asynchronous handling of TSP interrupts. Currently the physical timer
+ * interrupt is the only S-EL1 interrupt that this handler expects. It returns
+ * 0 upon successfully handling the expected interrupt and all other
+ * interrupts are treated as normal world or EL3 interrupts.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int32_t tsp_common_int_handler(void)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(), id;
+
+	/*
+	 * Get the highest priority pending interrupt id and see if it is the
+	 * secure physical generic timer interrupt in which case, handle it.
+	 * Otherwise throw this interrupt at the EL3 firmware.
+	 *
+	 * There is a small time window between reading the highest priority
+	 * pending interrupt and acknowledging it during which another
+	 * interrupt of higher priority could become the highest pending
+	 * interrupt. This is not expected to happen currently for TSP.
+	 */
+	id = plat_ic_get_pending_interrupt_id();
+
+	/* TSP can only handle the secure physical timer interrupt */
+	if (id != TSP_IRQ_SEC_PHY_TIMER) {
+#if SPMC_AT_EL3
+		/*
+		 * With the EL3 FF-A SPMC we expect only Timer secure interrupt to fire in
+		 * the TSP, so panic if any other interrupt does.
+		 */
+		ERROR("Unexpected interrupt id %u\n", id);
+		panic();
+#else
+		return tsp_handle_preemption();
+#endif
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Acknowledge and handle the secure timer interrupt. Also sanity check
+	 * if it has been preempted by another interrupt through an assertion.
+	 */
+	id = plat_ic_acknowledge_interrupt();
+	assert(id == TSP_IRQ_SEC_PHY_TIMER);
+	tsp_generic_timer_handler();
+	plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(id);
+
+	/* Update the statistics and print some messages */
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].sel1_intr_count++;
+	VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx handled S-EL1 interrupt %d\n",
+	       read_mpidr(), id);
+	VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d S-EL1 requests\n",
+	     read_mpidr(), tsp_stats[linear_id].sel1_intr_count);
+	return 0;
+}

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/tsp/tsp_main.c

@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include <arch_features.h>
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h>
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <lib/spinlock.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+#include <platform_tsp.h>
+#include "tsp_private.h"
+
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * TSP main entry point where it gets the opportunity to initialize its secure
+ * state/applications. Once the state is initialized, it must return to the
+ * SPD with a pointer to the 'tsp_vector_table' jump table.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+uint64_t tsp_main(void)
+{
+	NOTICE("TSP: %s\n", version_string);
+	NOTICE("TSP: %s\n", build_message);
+	INFO("TSP: Total memory base : 0x%lx\n", (unsigned long) BL32_BASE);
+	INFO("TSP: Total memory size : 0x%lx bytes\n", BL32_TOTAL_SIZE);
+
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+
+	/* Initialize the platform */
+	tsp_platform_setup();
+
+	/* Initialize secure/applications state here */
+	tsp_generic_timer_start();
+
+	/* Update this cpu's statistics */
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_on_count++;
+
+	INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu on requests\n",
+	     read_mpidr(),
+	     tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count,
+	     tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count,
+	     tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_on_count);
+	return (uint64_t) &tsp_vector_table;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function performs any remaining book keeping in the test secure payload
+ * after this cpu's architectural state has been setup in response to an earlier
+ * psci cpu_on request.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_on_main(void)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+
+	/* Initialize secure/applications state here */
+	tsp_generic_timer_start();
+
+	/* Update this cpu's statistics */
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_on_count++;
+
+	INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx turned on\n", read_mpidr());
+	INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu on requests\n",
+		read_mpidr(),
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count,
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count,
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_on_count);
+	/* Indicate to the SPD that we have completed turned ourselves on */
+	return set_smc_args(TSP_ON_DONE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function performs any remaining book keeping in the test secure payload
+ * before this cpu is turned off in response to a psci cpu_off request.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_off_main(uint64_t arg0,
+			   uint64_t arg1,
+			   uint64_t arg2,
+			   uint64_t arg3,
+			   uint64_t arg4,
+			   uint64_t arg5,
+			   uint64_t arg6,
+			   uint64_t arg7)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+
+	/*
+	 * This cpu is being turned off, so disable the timer to prevent the
+	 * secure timer interrupt from interfering with power down. A pending
+	 * interrupt will be lost but we do not care as we are turning off.
+	 */
+	tsp_generic_timer_stop();
+
+	/* Update this cpu's statistics */
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_off_count++;
+
+	INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx off request\n", read_mpidr());
+	INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu off requests\n",
+		read_mpidr(),
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count,
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count,
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_off_count);
+
+	/* Indicate to the SPD that we have completed this request */
+	return set_smc_args(TSP_OFF_DONE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function performs any book keeping in the test secure payload before
+ * this cpu's architectural state is saved in response to an earlier psci
+ * cpu_suspend request.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_suspend_main(uint64_t arg0,
+			       uint64_t arg1,
+			       uint64_t arg2,
+			       uint64_t arg3,
+			       uint64_t arg4,
+			       uint64_t arg5,
+			       uint64_t arg6,
+			       uint64_t arg7)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the time context and disable it to prevent the secure timer
+	 * interrupt from interfering with wakeup from the suspend state.
+	 */
+	tsp_generic_timer_save();
+	tsp_generic_timer_stop();
+
+	/* Update this cpu's statistics */
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_suspend_count++;
+
+	INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu suspend requests\n",
+		read_mpidr(),
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count,
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count,
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_suspend_count);
+
+	/* Indicate to the SPD that we have completed this request */
+	return set_smc_args(TSP_SUSPEND_DONE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function performs any book keeping in the test secure payload after this
+ * cpu's architectural state has been restored after wakeup from an earlier psci
+ * cpu_suspend request.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_resume_main(uint64_t max_off_pwrlvl,
+			      uint64_t arg1,
+			      uint64_t arg2,
+			      uint64_t arg3,
+			      uint64_t arg4,
+			      uint64_t arg5,
+			      uint64_t arg6,
+			      uint64_t arg7)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+
+	/* Restore the generic timer context */
+	tsp_generic_timer_restore();
+
+	/* Update this cpu's statistics */
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_resume_count++;
+
+	INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx resumed. maximum off power level %" PRId64 "\n",
+	     read_mpidr(), max_off_pwrlvl);
+	INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu resume requests\n",
+		read_mpidr(),
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count,
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count,
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_resume_count);
+	/* Indicate to the SPD that we have completed this request */
+	return set_smc_args(TSP_RESUME_DONE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * TSP fast smc handler. The secure monitor jumps to this function by
+ * doing the ERET after populating X0-X7 registers. The arguments are received
+ * in the function arguments in order. Once the service is rendered, this
+ * function returns to Secure Monitor by raising SMC.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+smc_args_t *tsp_smc_handler(uint64_t func,
+			       uint64_t arg1,
+			       uint64_t arg2,
+			       uint64_t arg3,
+			       uint64_t arg4,
+			       uint64_t arg5,
+			       uint64_t arg6,
+			       uint64_t arg7)
+{
+	uint128_t service_args;
+	uint64_t service_arg0;
+	uint64_t service_arg1;
+	uint64_t results[2];
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+	u_register_t dit;
+
+	/* Update this cpu's statistics */
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++;
+	tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++;
+
+	INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx received %s smc 0x%" PRIx64 "\n", read_mpidr(),
+		((func >> 31) & 1) == 1 ? "fast" : "yielding",
+		func);
+	INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets\n", read_mpidr(),
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count,
+		tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count);
+
+	/* Render secure services and obtain results here */
+	results[0] = arg1;
+	results[1] = arg2;
+
+	/*
+	 * Request a service back from dispatcher/secure monitor.
+	 * This call returns and thereafter resumes execution.
+	 */
+	service_args = tsp_get_magic();
+	service_arg0 = (uint64_t)service_args;
+	service_arg1 = (uint64_t)(service_args >> 64U);
+
+#if CTX_INCLUDE_MTE_REGS
+	/*
+	 * Write a dummy value to an MTE register, to simulate usage in the
+	 * secure world
+	 */
+	write_gcr_el1(0x99);
+#endif
+
+	/* Determine the function to perform based on the function ID */
+	switch (TSP_BARE_FID(func)) {
+	case TSP_ADD:
+		results[0] += service_arg0;
+		results[1] += service_arg1;
+		break;
+	case TSP_SUB:
+		results[0] -= service_arg0;
+		results[1] -= service_arg1;
+		break;
+	case TSP_MUL:
+		results[0] *= service_arg0;
+		results[1] *= service_arg1;
+		break;
+	case TSP_DIV:
+		results[0] /= service_arg0 ? service_arg0 : 1;
+		results[1] /= service_arg1 ? service_arg1 : 1;
+		break;
+	case TSP_CHECK_DIT:
+		if (!is_armv8_4_dit_present()) {
+			ERROR("DIT not supported\n");
+			results[0] = 0;
+			results[1] = 0xffff;
+			break;
+		}
+		dit = read_dit();
+		results[0] = dit == service_arg0;
+		results[1] = dit;
+		/* Toggle the dit bit */
+		write_dit(service_arg0 != 0U ? 0 : DIT_BIT);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return set_smc_args(func, 0,
+			    results[0],
+			    results[1],
+			    0, 0, 0, 0);
+}

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/tsp/tsp_private.h

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#ifndef TSP_PRIVATE_H
+#define TSP_PRIVATE_H
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * The TSP memory footprint starts at address BL32_BASE and ends with the
+ * linker symbol __BL32_END__. Use these addresses to compute the TSP image
+ * size.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+#define BL32_TOTAL_LIMIT BL32_END
+#define BL32_TOTAL_SIZE (BL32_TOTAL_LIMIT - (unsigned long) BL32_BASE)
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h>
+#include <lib/cassert.h>
+#include <lib/spinlock.h>
+#include <smccc_helpers.h>
+
+typedef struct work_statistics {
+	/* Number of s-el1 interrupts on this cpu */
+	uint32_t sel1_intr_count;
+	/* Number of non s-el1 interrupts on this cpu which preempted TSP */
+	uint32_t preempt_intr_count;
+	/* Number of sync s-el1 interrupts on this cpu */
+	uint32_t sync_sel1_intr_count;
+	/* Number of s-el1 interrupts returns on this cpu */
+	uint32_t sync_sel1_intr_ret_count;
+	uint32_t smc_count;		/* Number of returns on this cpu */
+	uint32_t eret_count;		/* Number of entries on this cpu */
+	uint32_t cpu_on_count;		/* Number of cpu on requests */
+	uint32_t cpu_off_count;		/* Number of cpu off requests */
+	uint32_t cpu_suspend_count;	/* Number of cpu suspend requests */
+	uint32_t cpu_resume_count;	/* Number of cpu resume requests */
+} __aligned(CACHE_WRITEBACK_GRANULE) work_statistics_t;
+
+/* Macros to access members of the above structure using their offsets */
+#define read_sp_arg(args, offset)	((args)->_regs[offset >> 3])
+#define write_sp_arg(args, offset, val) (((args)->_regs[offset >> 3])	\
+					 = val)
+
+uint128_t tsp_get_magic(void);
+
+smc_args_t *set_smc_args(uint64_t arg0,
+			 uint64_t arg1,
+			 uint64_t arg2,
+			 uint64_t arg3,
+			 uint64_t arg4,
+			 uint64_t arg5,
+			 uint64_t arg6,
+			 uint64_t arg7);
+smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_resume_main(uint64_t max_off_pwrlvl,
+				uint64_t arg1,
+				uint64_t arg2,
+				uint64_t arg3,
+				uint64_t arg4,
+				uint64_t arg5,
+				uint64_t arg6,
+				uint64_t arg7);
+smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_suspend_main(uint64_t arg0,
+				 uint64_t arg1,
+				 uint64_t arg2,
+				 uint64_t arg3,
+				 uint64_t arg4,
+				 uint64_t arg5,
+				 uint64_t arg6,
+				 uint64_t arg7);
+smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_on_main(void);
+smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_off_main(uint64_t arg0,
+			     uint64_t arg1,
+			     uint64_t arg2,
+			     uint64_t arg3,
+			     uint64_t arg4,
+			     uint64_t arg5,
+			     uint64_t arg6,
+			     uint64_t arg7);
+
+/* Generic Timer functions */
+void tsp_generic_timer_start(void);
+void tsp_generic_timer_handler(void);
+void tsp_generic_timer_stop(void);
+void tsp_generic_timer_save(void);
+void tsp_generic_timer_restore(void);
+
+/* S-EL1 interrupt management functions */
+void tsp_update_sync_sel1_intr_stats(uint32_t type, uint64_t elr_el3);
+
+
+/* Data structure to keep track of TSP statistics */
+extern work_statistics_t tsp_stats[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT];
+
+/* Vector table of jumps */
+extern tsp_vectors_t tsp_vector_table;
+
+/* functions */
+int32_t tsp_common_int_handler(void);
+int32_t tsp_handle_preemption(void);
+
+smc_args_t *tsp_abort_smc_handler(uint64_t func,
+				  uint64_t arg1,
+				  uint64_t arg2,
+				  uint64_t arg3,
+				  uint64_t arg4,
+				  uint64_t arg5,
+				  uint64_t arg6,
+				  uint64_t arg7);
+
+smc_args_t *tsp_smc_handler(uint64_t func,
+			    uint64_t arg1,
+			    uint64_t arg2,
+			    uint64_t arg3,
+			    uint64_t arg4,
+			    uint64_t arg5,
+			    uint64_t arg6,
+			    uint64_t arg7);
+
+smc_args_t *tsp_system_reset_main(uint64_t arg0,
+				  uint64_t arg1,
+				  uint64_t arg2,
+				  uint64_t arg3,
+				  uint64_t arg4,
+				  uint64_t arg5,
+				  uint64_t arg6,
+				  uint64_t arg7);
+
+smc_args_t *tsp_system_off_main(uint64_t arg0,
+				uint64_t arg1,
+				uint64_t arg2,
+				uint64_t arg3,
+				uint64_t arg4,
+				uint64_t arg5,
+				uint64_t arg6,
+				uint64_t arg7);
+
+uint64_t tsp_main(void);
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
+
+#endif /* TSP_PRIVATE_H */

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/bl32/tsp/tsp_timer.c

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+
+#include "tsp_private.h"
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Data structure to keep track of per-cpu secure generic timer context across
+ * power management operations.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+typedef struct timer_context {
+	uint64_t cval;
+	uint32_t ctl;
+} timer_context_t;
+
+static timer_context_t pcpu_timer_context[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT];
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function initializes the generic timer to fire every 0.5 second
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void tsp_generic_timer_start(void)
+{
+	uint64_t cval;
+	uint32_t ctl = 0;
+
+	/* The timer will fire every 0.5 second */
+	cval = read_cntpct_el0() + (read_cntfrq_el0() >> 1);
+	write_cntps_cval_el1(cval);
+
+	/* Enable the secure physical timer */
+	set_cntp_ctl_enable(ctl);
+	write_cntps_ctl_el1(ctl);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function deasserts the timer interrupt and sets it up again
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void tsp_generic_timer_handler(void)
+{
+	/* Ensure that the timer did assert the interrupt */
+	assert(get_cntp_ctl_istatus(read_cntps_ctl_el1()));
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable the timer and reprogram it. The barriers ensure that there is
+	 * no reordering of instructions around the reprogramming code.
+	 */
+	isb();
+	write_cntps_ctl_el1(0);
+	tsp_generic_timer_start();
+	isb();
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function deasserts the timer interrupt prior to cpu power down
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void tsp_generic_timer_stop(void)
+{
+	/* Disable the timer */
+	write_cntps_ctl_el1(0);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function saves the timer context prior to cpu suspension
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void tsp_generic_timer_save(void)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+
+	pcpu_timer_context[linear_id].cval = read_cntps_cval_el1();
+	pcpu_timer_context[linear_id].ctl = read_cntps_ctl_el1();
+	flush_dcache_range((uint64_t) &pcpu_timer_context[linear_id],
+			   sizeof(pcpu_timer_context[linear_id]));
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function restores the timer context post cpu resumption
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void tsp_generic_timer_restore(void)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+
+	write_cntps_cval_el1(pcpu_timer_context[linear_id].cval);
+	write_cntps_ctl_el1(pcpu_timer_context[linear_id].ctl);
+}