GK SDK 源码库: XMIPCLinuxV100R005C00SPC030 (kernel/tools/open_source excluded)

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/include/arch/aarch64/arch_features.h

@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#ifndef ARCH_FEATURES_H
+#define ARCH_FEATURES_H
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+
+static inline bool is_armv7_gentimer_present(void)
+{
+	/* The Generic Timer is always present in an ARMv8-A implementation */
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_armv8_1_pan_present(void)
+{
+	return ((read_id_aa64mmfr1_el1() >> ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_PAN_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_PAN_MASK) != 0U;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_armv8_1_vhe_present(void)
+{
+	return ((read_id_aa64mmfr1_el1() >> ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_VHE_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_VHE_MASK) != 0U;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_armv8_2_ttcnp_present(void)
+{
+	return ((read_id_aa64mmfr2_el1() >> ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_CNP_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_CNP_MASK) != 0U;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_feat_pacqarma3_present(void)
+{
+	uint64_t mask_id_aa64isar2 =
+			(ID_AA64ISAR2_GPA3_MASK << ID_AA64ISAR2_GPA3_SHIFT) |
+			(ID_AA64ISAR2_APA3_MASK << ID_AA64ISAR2_APA3_SHIFT);
+
+	/* If any of the fields is not zero, QARMA3 algorithm is present */
+	return (read_id_aa64isar2_el1() & mask_id_aa64isar2) != 0U;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_armv8_3_pauth_present(void)
+{
+	uint64_t mask_id_aa64isar1 =
+		(ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_MASK << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT) |
+		(ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_MASK << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT) |
+		(ID_AA64ISAR1_API_MASK << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) |
+		(ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_MASK << ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT);
+
+	/*
+	 * If any of the fields is not zero or QARMA3 is present,
+	 * PAuth is present
+	 */
+	return ((read_id_aa64isar1_el1() & mask_id_aa64isar1) != 0U ||
+		is_feat_pacqarma3_present());
+}
+
+static inline bool is_armv8_4_dit_present(void)
+{
+	return ((read_id_aa64pfr0_el1() >> ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_MASK) == 1U;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_armv8_4_ttst_present(void)
+{
+	return ((read_id_aa64mmfr2_el1() >> ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_ST_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_ST_MASK) == 1U;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_armv8_5_bti_present(void)
+{
+	return ((read_id_aa64pfr1_el1() >> ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_BT_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_BT_MASK) == BTI_IMPLEMENTED;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int get_armv8_5_mte_support(void)
+{
+	return ((read_id_aa64pfr1_el1() >> ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_MTE_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_MTE_MASK);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_armv8_4_sel2_present(void)
+{
+	return ((read_id_aa64pfr0_el1() >> ID_AA64PFR0_SEL2_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64PFR0_SEL2_MASK) == 1ULL;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_armv8_6_twed_present(void)
+{
+	return (((read_id_aa64mmfr1_el1() >> ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_TWED_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_TWED_MASK) == ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_TWED_SUPPORTED);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_armv8_6_fgt_present(void)
+{
+	return ((read_id_aa64mmfr0_el1() >> ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_FGT_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_FGT_MASK) != 0U;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long int get_armv8_6_ecv_support(void)
+{
+	return ((read_id_aa64mmfr0_el1() >> ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_ECV_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_ECV_MASK);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_armv8_5_rng_present(void)
+{
+	return ((read_id_aa64isar0_el1() >> ID_AA64ISAR0_RNDR_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64ISAR0_RNDR_MASK);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_armv8_6_feat_amuv1p1_present(void)
+{
+	return (((read_id_aa64pfr0_el1() >> ID_AA64PFR0_AMU_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64PFR0_AMU_MASK) >= ID_AA64PFR0_AMU_V1P1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return MPAM version:
+ *
+ * 0x00: None Armv8.0 or later
+ * 0x01: v0.1 Armv8.4 or later
+ * 0x10: v1.0 Armv8.2 or later
+ * 0x11: v1.1 Armv8.4 or later
+ *
+ */
+static inline unsigned int get_mpam_version(void)
+{
+	return (unsigned int)((((read_id_aa64pfr0_el1() >>
+		ID_AA64PFR0_MPAM_SHIFT) & ID_AA64PFR0_MPAM_MASK) << 4) |
+				((read_id_aa64pfr1_el1() >>
+		ID_AA64PFR1_MPAM_FRAC_SHIFT) & ID_AA64PFR1_MPAM_FRAC_MASK));
+}
+
+static inline bool is_feat_hcx_present(void)
+{
+	return (((read_id_aa64mmfr1_el1() >> ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_HCX_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_HCX_MASK) == ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_HCX_SUPPORTED);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_feat_rng_trap_present(void)
+{
+	return (((read_id_aa64pfr1_el1() >> ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_RNDR_TRAP_SHIFT) &
+			ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_RNDR_TRAP_MASK)
+			== ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_RNG_TRAP_SUPPORTED);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int get_armv9_2_feat_rme_support(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Return the RME version, zero if not supported.  This function can be
+	 * used as both an integer value for the RME version or compared to zero
+	 * to detect RME presence.
+	 */
+	return (unsigned int)(read_id_aa64pfr0_el1() >>
+		ID_AA64PFR0_FEAT_RME_SHIFT) & ID_AA64PFR0_FEAT_RME_MASK;
+}
+
+/*********************************************************************************
+ * Function to identify the presence of FEAT_SB (Speculation Barrier Instruction)
+ ********************************************************************************/
+static inline bool is_armv8_0_feat_sb_present(void)
+{
+	return (((read_id_aa64isar1_el1() >> ID_AA64ISAR1_SB_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64ISAR1_SB_MASK) == ID_AA64ISAR1_SB_SUPPORTED);
+}
+
+/*********************************************************************************
+ * Function to identify the presence of FEAT_CSV2_2 (Cache Speculation Variant 2)
+ ********************************************************************************/
+static inline bool is_armv8_0_feat_csv2_2_present(void)
+{
+	return (((read_id_aa64pfr0_el1() >> ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_MASK) == ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_2_SUPPORTED);
+}
+
+/**********************************************************************************
+ * Function to identify the presence of FEAT_SPE (Statistical Profiling Extension)
+ *********************************************************************************/
+static inline bool is_armv8_2_feat_spe_present(void)
+{
+	return (((read_id_aa64dfr0_el1() >> ID_AA64DFR0_PMS_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64DFR0_PMS_MASK) != ID_AA64DFR0_SPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Function to identify the presence of FEAT_SVE (Scalable Vector Extension)
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static inline bool is_armv8_2_feat_sve_present(void)
+{
+	return (((read_id_aa64pfr0_el1() >> ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_MASK) == ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SUPPORTED);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Function to identify the presence of FEAT_RAS (Reliability,Availability,
+ * and Serviceability Extension)
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static inline bool is_armv8_2_feat_ras_present(void)
+{
+	return (((read_id_aa64pfr0_el1() >> ID_AA64PFR0_RAS_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64PFR0_RAS_MASK) != ID_AA64PFR0_RAS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+}
+
+/**************************************************************************
+ * Function to identify the presence of FEAT_DIT (Data Independent Timing)
+ *************************************************************************/
+static inline bool is_armv8_4_feat_dit_present(void)
+{
+	return (((read_id_aa64pfr0_el1() >> ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_MASK) == ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_SUPPORTED);
+}
+
+/*************************************************************************
+ * Function to identify the presence of FEAT_TRF (TraceLift)
+ ************************************************************************/
+static inline bool is_arm8_4_feat_trf_present(void)
+{
+	return (((read_id_aa64dfr0_el1() >> ID_AA64DFR0_TRACEFILT_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64DFR0_TRACEFILT_MASK) == ID_AA64DFR0_TRACEFILT_SUPPORTED);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Function to identify the presence of FEAT_AMUv1 (Activity Monitors-
+ * Extension v1)
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static inline bool is_armv8_4_feat_amuv1_present(void)
+{
+	return (((read_id_aa64pfr0_el1() >> ID_AA64PFR0_AMU_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64PFR0_AMU_MASK) >= ID_AA64PFR0_AMU_V1);
+}
+
+/********************************************************************************
+ * Function to identify the presence of FEAT_NV2 (Enhanced Nested Virtualization
+ * Support)
+ *******************************************************************************/
+static inline unsigned int get_armv8_4_feat_nv_support(void)
+{
+	return (((read_id_aa64mmfr2_el1() >> ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_NV_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_NV_MASK));
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Function to identify the presence of FEAT_BRBE (Branch Record Buffer
+ * Extension)
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static inline bool is_feat_brbe_present(void)
+{
+	return (((read_id_aa64dfr0_el1() >> ID_AA64DFR0_BRBE_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64DFR0_BRBE_MASK) == ID_AA64DFR0_BRBE_SUPPORTED);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Function to identify the presence of FEAT_TRBE (Trace Buffer Extension)
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static inline bool is_feat_trbe_present(void)
+{
+	return (((read_id_aa64dfr0_el1() >> ID_AA64DFR0_TRACEBUFFER_SHIFT) &
+		ID_AA64DFR0_TRACEBUFFER_MASK) == ID_AA64DFR0_TRACEBUFFER_SUPPORTED);
+}
+
+#endif /* ARCH_FEATURES_H */

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/include/arch/aarch64/arch_helpers.h

@@ -0,0 +1,671 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2022, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#ifndef ARCH_HELPERS_H
+#define ARCH_HELPERS_H
+
+#include <cdefs.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <arch.h>
+
+/**********************************************************************
+ * Macros which create inline functions to read or write CPU system
+ * registers
+ *********************************************************************/
+
+#define _DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(_name, _reg_name)		\
+static inline u_register_t read_ ## _name(void)			\
+{								\
+	u_register_t v;						\
+	__asm__ volatile ("mrs %0, " #_reg_name : "=r" (v));	\
+	return v;						\
+}
+
+#define _DEFINE_SYSREG_WRITE_FUNC(_name, _reg_name)			\
+static inline void write_ ## _name(u_register_t v)			\
+{									\
+	__asm__ volatile ("msr " #_reg_name ", %0" : : "r" (v));	\
+}
+
+#define SYSREG_WRITE_CONST(reg_name, v)				\
+	__asm__ volatile ("msr " #reg_name ", %0" : : "i" (v))
+
+/* Define read function for system register */
+#define DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(_name) 			\
+	_DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(_name, _name)
+
+/* Define read & write function for system register */
+#define DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(_name)			\
+	_DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(_name, _name)		\
+	_DEFINE_SYSREG_WRITE_FUNC(_name, _name)
+
+/* Define read & write function for renamed system register */
+#define DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(_name, _reg_name)	\
+	_DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(_name, _reg_name)	\
+	_DEFINE_SYSREG_WRITE_FUNC(_name, _reg_name)
+
+/* Define read function for renamed system register */
+#define DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(_name, _reg_name)	\
+	_DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(_name, _reg_name)
+
+/* Define write function for renamed system register */
+#define DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_WRITE_FUNC(_name, _reg_name)	\
+	_DEFINE_SYSREG_WRITE_FUNC(_name, _reg_name)
+
+/**********************************************************************
+ * Macros to create inline functions for system instructions
+ *********************************************************************/
+
+/* Define function for simple system instruction */
+#define DEFINE_SYSOP_FUNC(_op)				\
+static inline void _op(void)				\
+{							\
+	__asm__ (#_op);					\
+}
+
+/* Define function for system instruction with register parameter */
+#define DEFINE_SYSOP_PARAM_FUNC(_op)			\
+static inline void _op(uint64_t v)			\
+{							\
+	 __asm__ (#_op "  %0" : : "r" (v));		\
+}
+
+/* Define function for system instruction with type specifier */
+#define DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(_op, _type)		\
+static inline void _op ## _type(void)			\
+{							\
+	__asm__ (#_op " " #_type : : : "memory");			\
+}
+
+/* Define function for system instruction with register parameter */
+#define DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(_op, _type)	\
+static inline void _op ## _type(uint64_t v)		\
+{							\
+	 __asm__ (#_op " " #_type ", %0" : : "r" (v));	\
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * TLB maintenance accessor prototypes
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+#if ERRATA_A57_813419 || ERRATA_A76_1286807
+/*
+ * Define function for TLBI instruction with type specifier that implements
+ * the workaround for errata 813419 of Cortex-A57 or errata 1286807 of
+ * Cortex-A76.
+ */
+#define DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_FUNC(_type)\
+static inline void tlbi ## _type(void)			\
+{							\
+	__asm__("tlbi " #_type "\n"			\
+		"dsb ish\n"				\
+		"tlbi " #_type);			\
+}
+
+/*
+ * Define function for TLBI instruction with register parameter that implements
+ * the workaround for errata 813419 of Cortex-A57 or errata 1286807 of
+ * Cortex-A76.
+ */
+#define DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(_type)	\
+static inline void tlbi ## _type(uint64_t v)			\
+{								\
+	__asm__("tlbi " #_type ", %0\n"				\
+		"dsb ish\n"					\
+		"tlbi " #_type ", %0" : : "r" (v));		\
+}
+#endif /* ERRATA_A57_813419 */
+
+#if ERRATA_A53_819472 || ERRATA_A53_824069 || ERRATA_A53_827319
+/*
+ * Define function for DC instruction with register parameter that enables
+ * the workaround for errata 819472, 824069 and 827319 of Cortex-A53.
+ */
+#define DEFINE_DCOP_ERRATA_A53_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(_name, _type)	\
+static inline void dc ## _name(uint64_t v)			\
+{								\
+	__asm__("dc " #_type ", %0" : : "r" (v));		\
+}
+#endif /* ERRATA_A53_819472 || ERRATA_A53_824069 || ERRATA_A53_827319 */
+
+#if ERRATA_A57_813419
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(tlbi, alle1)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(tlbi, alle1is)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(tlbi, alle2)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(tlbi, alle2is)
+DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_FUNC(alle3)
+DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_FUNC(alle3is)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(tlbi, vmalle1)
+#elif ERRATA_A76_1286807
+DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_FUNC(alle1)
+DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_FUNC(alle1is)
+DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_FUNC(alle2)
+DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_FUNC(alle2is)
+DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_FUNC(alle3)
+DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_FUNC(alle3is)
+DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_FUNC(vmalle1)
+#else
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(tlbi, alle1)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(tlbi, alle1is)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(tlbi, alle2)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(tlbi, alle2is)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(tlbi, alle3)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(tlbi, alle3is)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(tlbi, vmalle1)
+#endif
+
+#if ERRATA_A57_813419
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(tlbi, vaae1is)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(tlbi, vaale1is)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(tlbi, vae2is)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(tlbi, vale2is)
+DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(vae3is)
+DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(vale3is)
+#elif ERRATA_A76_1286807
+DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(vaae1is)
+DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(vaale1is)
+DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(vae2is)
+DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(vale2is)
+DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(vae3is)
+DEFINE_TLBIOP_ERRATA_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(vale3is)
+#else
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(tlbi, vaae1is)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(tlbi, vaale1is)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(tlbi, vae2is)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(tlbi, vale2is)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(tlbi, vae3is)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(tlbi, vale3is)
+#endif
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Cache maintenance accessor prototypes
+ ******************************************************************************/
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(dc, isw)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(dc, cisw)
+#if ERRATA_A53_827319
+DEFINE_DCOP_ERRATA_A53_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(csw, cisw)
+#else
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(dc, csw)
+#endif
+#if ERRATA_A53_819472 || ERRATA_A53_824069 || ERRATA_A53_827319
+DEFINE_DCOP_ERRATA_A53_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(cvac, civac)
+#else
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(dc, cvac)
+#endif
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(dc, ivac)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(dc, civac)
+#if ERRATA_A53_819472 || ERRATA_A53_824069 || ERRATA_A53_827319
+DEFINE_DCOP_ERRATA_A53_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(cvau, civac)
+#else
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(dc, cvau)
+#endif
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(dc, zva)
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Address translation accessor prototypes
+ ******************************************************************************/
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(at, s12e1r)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(at, s12e1w)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(at, s12e0r)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(at, s12e0w)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(at, s1e1r)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(at, s1e2r)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_PARAM_FUNC(at, s1e3r)
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Strip Pointer Authentication Code
+ ******************************************************************************/
+DEFINE_SYSOP_PARAM_FUNC(xpaci)
+
+void flush_dcache_range(uintptr_t addr, size_t size);
+void flush_dcache_to_popa_range(uintptr_t addr, size_t size);
+void clean_dcache_range(uintptr_t addr, size_t size);
+void inv_dcache_range(uintptr_t addr, size_t size);
+bool is_dcache_enabled(void);
+
+void dcsw_op_louis(u_register_t op_type);
+void dcsw_op_all(u_register_t op_type);
+
+void disable_mmu_el1(void);
+void disable_mmu_el3(void);
+void disable_mpu_el2(void);
+void disable_mmu_icache_el1(void);
+void disable_mmu_icache_el3(void);
+void disable_mpu_icache_el2(void);
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Misc. accessor prototypes
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+#define write_daifclr(val) SYSREG_WRITE_CONST(daifclr, val)
+#define write_daifset(val) SYSREG_WRITE_CONST(daifset, val)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(par_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(id_pfr1_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(id_aa64isar0_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(id_aa64isar1_el1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(id_aa64isar2_el1, ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(id_aa64pfr0_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(id_aa64pfr1_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(id_aa64dfr0_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(id_afr0_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(CurrentEl)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(ctr_el0)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(daif)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(spsr_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(spsr_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(spsr_el3)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(elr_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(elr_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(elr_el3)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(mdccsr_el0)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(dbgdtrrx_el0)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(dbgdtrtx_el0)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(sp_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(sp_el2)
+
+DEFINE_SYSOP_FUNC(wfi)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_FUNC(wfe)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_FUNC(sev)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dsb, sy)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dmb, sy)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dmb, st)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dmb, ld)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dsb, ish)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dsb, osh)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dsb, nsh)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dsb, ishst)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dsb, oshst)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dmb, oshld)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dmb, oshst)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dmb, osh)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dmb, nshld)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dmb, nshst)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dmb, nsh)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dmb, ishld)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dmb, ishst)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dmb, ish)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_FUNC(isb)
+
+static inline void enable_irq(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The compiler memory barrier will prevent the compiler from
+	 * scheduling non-volatile memory access after the write to the
+	 * register.
+	 *
+	 * This could happen if some initialization code issues non-volatile
+	 * accesses to an area used by an interrupt handler, in the assumption
+	 * that it is safe as the interrupts are disabled at the time it does
+	 * that (according to program order). However, non-volatile accesses
+	 * are not necessarily in program order relatively with volatile inline
+	 * assembly statements (and volatile accesses).
+	 */
+	COMPILER_BARRIER();
+	write_daifclr(DAIF_IRQ_BIT);
+	isb();
+}
+
+static inline void enable_fiq(void)
+{
+	COMPILER_BARRIER();
+	write_daifclr(DAIF_FIQ_BIT);
+	isb();
+}
+
+static inline void enable_serror(void)
+{
+	COMPILER_BARRIER();
+	write_daifclr(DAIF_ABT_BIT);
+	isb();
+}
+
+static inline void enable_debug_exceptions(void)
+{
+	COMPILER_BARRIER();
+	write_daifclr(DAIF_DBG_BIT);
+	isb();
+}
+
+static inline void disable_irq(void)
+{
+	COMPILER_BARRIER();
+	write_daifset(DAIF_IRQ_BIT);
+	isb();
+}
+
+static inline void disable_fiq(void)
+{
+	COMPILER_BARRIER();
+	write_daifset(DAIF_FIQ_BIT);
+	isb();
+}
+
+static inline void disable_serror(void)
+{
+	COMPILER_BARRIER();
+	write_daifset(DAIF_ABT_BIT);
+	isb();
+}
+
+static inline void disable_debug_exceptions(void)
+{
+	COMPILER_BARRIER();
+	write_daifset(DAIF_DBG_BIT);
+	isb();
+}
+
+void __dead2 smc(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1, uint64_t x2, uint64_t x3,
+		 uint64_t x4, uint64_t x5, uint64_t x6, uint64_t x7);
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * System register accessor prototypes
+ ******************************************************************************/
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(midr_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(mpidr_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(id_aa64mmfr0_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(id_aa64mmfr1_el1)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(scr_el3)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(hcr_el2)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(vbar_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(vbar_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(vbar_el3)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(sctlr_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(sctlr_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(sctlr_el3)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(actlr_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(actlr_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(actlr_el3)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(esr_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(esr_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(esr_el3)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(afsr0_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(afsr0_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(afsr0_el3)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(afsr1_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(afsr1_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(afsr1_el3)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(far_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(far_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(far_el3)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(mair_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(mair_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(mair_el3)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(amair_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(amair_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(amair_el3)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(rvbar_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(rvbar_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(rvbar_el3)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(rmr_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(rmr_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(rmr_el3)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(tcr_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(tcr_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(tcr_el3)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(ttbr0_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(ttbr0_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(ttbr0_el3)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(ttbr1_el1)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(vttbr_el2)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(cptr_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(cptr_el3)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(cpacr_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(cntfrq_el0)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(cnthp_ctl_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(cnthp_tval_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(cnthp_cval_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(cntps_ctl_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(cntps_tval_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(cntps_cval_el1)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(cntp_ctl_el0)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(cntp_tval_el0)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(cntp_cval_el0)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(cntpct_el0)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(cnthctl_el2)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(vtcr_el2)
+
+#define get_cntp_ctl_enable(x)  (((x) >> CNTP_CTL_ENABLE_SHIFT) & \
+					CNTP_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)
+#define get_cntp_ctl_imask(x)   (((x) >> CNTP_CTL_IMASK_SHIFT) & \
+					CNTP_CTL_IMASK_MASK)
+#define get_cntp_ctl_istatus(x) (((x) >> CNTP_CTL_ISTATUS_SHIFT) & \
+					CNTP_CTL_ISTATUS_MASK)
+
+#define set_cntp_ctl_enable(x)  ((x) |= (U(1) << CNTP_CTL_ENABLE_SHIFT))
+#define set_cntp_ctl_imask(x)   ((x) |= (U(1) << CNTP_CTL_IMASK_SHIFT))
+
+#define clr_cntp_ctl_enable(x)  ((x) &= ~(U(1) << CNTP_CTL_ENABLE_SHIFT))
+#define clr_cntp_ctl_imask(x)   ((x) &= ~(U(1) << CNTP_CTL_IMASK_SHIFT))
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(tpidr_el3)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(cntvoff_el2)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(vpidr_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(vmpidr_el2)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(isr_el1)
+
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(mdcr_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(mdcr_el3)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(hstr_el2)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(pmcr_el0)
+
+/* GICv3 System Registers */
+
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(icc_sre_el1, ICC_SRE_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(icc_sre_el2, ICC_SRE_EL2)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(icc_sre_el3, ICC_SRE_EL3)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(icc_pmr_el1, ICC_PMR_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(icc_rpr_el1, ICC_RPR_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(icc_igrpen1_el3, ICC_IGRPEN1_EL3)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(icc_igrpen1_el1, ICC_IGRPEN1_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(icc_igrpen0_el1, ICC_IGRPEN0_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(icc_hppir0_el1, ICC_HPPIR0_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(icc_hppir1_el1, ICC_HPPIR1_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(icc_iar0_el1, ICC_IAR0_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(icc_iar1_el1, ICC_IAR1_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_WRITE_FUNC(icc_eoir0_el1, ICC_EOIR0_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_WRITE_FUNC(icc_eoir1_el1, ICC_EOIR1_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_WRITE_FUNC(icc_sgi0r_el1, ICC_SGI0R_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(icc_sgi1r, ICC_SGI1R)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(icc_asgi1r, ICC_ASGI1R)
+
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(amcfgr_el0, AMCFGR_EL0)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(amcgcr_el0, AMCGCR_EL0)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(amcg1idr_el0, AMCG1IDR_EL0)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(amcr_el0, AMCR_EL0)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(amcntenclr0_el0, AMCNTENCLR0_EL0)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(amcntenset0_el0, AMCNTENSET0_EL0)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(amcntenclr1_el0, AMCNTENCLR1_EL0)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(amcntenset1_el0, AMCNTENSET1_EL0)
+
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(mpamidr_el1, MPAMIDR_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(mpam3_el3, MPAM3_EL3)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(mpam2_el2, MPAM2_EL2)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(mpamhcr_el2, MPAMHCR_EL2)
+
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(pmblimitr_el1, PMBLIMITR_EL1)
+
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_WRITE_FUNC(zcr_el3, ZCR_EL3)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_WRITE_FUNC(zcr_el2, ZCR_EL2)
+
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(id_aa64smfr0_el1, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(smcr_el3, SMCR_EL3)
+
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(erridr_el1, ERRIDR_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_WRITE_FUNC(errselr_el1, ERRSELR_EL1)
+
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(erxfr_el1, ERXFR_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(erxctlr_el1, ERXCTLR_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(erxstatus_el1, ERXSTATUS_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(erxaddr_el1, ERXADDR_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(erxmisc0_el1, ERXMISC0_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(erxmisc1_el1, ERXMISC1_EL1)
+
+/* Armv8.2 Registers */
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(id_aa64mmfr2_el1, ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1)
+
+/* Armv8.3 Pointer Authentication Registers */
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(apiakeyhi_el1, APIAKeyHi_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(apiakeylo_el1, APIAKeyLo_EL1)
+
+/* Armv8.4 Data Independent Timing Register */
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(dit, DIT)
+
+/* Armv8.5 MTE Registers */
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(tfsre0_el1, TFSRE0_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(tfsr_el1, TFSR_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(rgsr_el1, RGSR_EL1)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(gcr_el1, GCR_EL1)
+
+/* Armv8.5 FEAT_RNG Registers */
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(rndr)
+DEFINE_SYSREG_READ_FUNC(rndrrs)
+
+/* FEAT_HCX Register */
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(hcrx_el2, HCRX_EL2)
+
+/* DynamIQ Shared Unit power management */
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(clusterpwrdn_el1, CLUSTERPWRDN_EL1)
+
+/* CPU Power/Performance Management registers */
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(cpuppmcr_el3, CPUPPMCR_EL3)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(cpumpmmcr_el3, CPUMPMMCR_EL3)
+
+/* Armv9.2 RME Registers */
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(gptbr_el3, GPTBR_EL3)
+DEFINE_RENAME_SYSREG_RW_FUNCS(gpccr_el3, GPCCR_EL3)
+
+#define IS_IN_EL(x) \
+	(GET_EL(read_CurrentEl()) == MODE_EL##x)
+
+#define IS_IN_EL1() IS_IN_EL(1)
+#define IS_IN_EL2() IS_IN_EL(2)
+#define IS_IN_EL3() IS_IN_EL(3)
+
+static inline unsigned int get_current_el(void)
+{
+	return GET_EL(read_CurrentEl());
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int get_current_el_maybe_constant(void)
+{
+#if defined(IMAGE_AT_EL1)
+	return 1;
+#elif defined(IMAGE_AT_EL2)
+	return 2;	/* no use-case in TF-A */
+#elif defined(IMAGE_AT_EL3)
+	return 3;
+#else
+	/*
+	 * If we do not know which exception level this is being built for
+	 * (e.g. built for library), fall back to run-time detection.
+	 */
+	return get_current_el();
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if an EL is implemented from AA64PFR0 register fields.
+ */
+static inline uint64_t el_implemented(unsigned int el)
+{
+	if (el > 3U) {
+		return EL_IMPL_NONE;
+	} else {
+		unsigned int shift = ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_SHIFT * el;
+
+		return (read_id_aa64pfr0_el1() >> shift) & ID_AA64PFR0_ELX_MASK;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * TLBIPAALLOS instruction
+ * (TLB Inivalidate GPT Information by PA,
+ * All Entries, Outer Shareable)
+ */
+static inline void tlbipaallos(void)
+{
+	__asm__("SYS #6,c8,c1,#4");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Invalidate TLBs of GPT entries by Physical address, last level.
+ *
+ * @pa: the starting address for the range
+ *      of invalidation
+ * @size: size of the range of invalidation
+ */
+void gpt_tlbi_by_pa_ll(uint64_t pa, size_t size);
+
+
+/* Previously defined accessor functions with incomplete register names  */
+
+#define read_current_el()	read_CurrentEl()
+
+#define dsb()			dsbsy()
+
+#define read_midr()		read_midr_el1()
+
+#define read_mpidr()		read_mpidr_el1()
+
+#define read_scr()		read_scr_el3()
+#define write_scr(_v)		write_scr_el3(_v)
+
+#define read_hcr()		read_hcr_el2()
+#define write_hcr(_v)		write_hcr_el2(_v)
+
+#define read_cpacr()		read_cpacr_el1()
+#define write_cpacr(_v)		write_cpacr_el1(_v)
+
+#define read_clusterpwrdn()	read_clusterpwrdn_el1()
+#define write_clusterpwrdn(_v)	write_clusterpwrdn_el1(_v)
+
+#if ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT
+/*
+ * Assuming SCTLR.M bit is already enabled
+ * 1. Enable page table walk by clearing TCR_EL1.EPDx bits
+ * 2. Execute AT instruction for lower EL1/0
+ * 3. Disable page table walk by setting TCR_EL1.EPDx bits
+ */
+#define AT(_at_inst, _va)	\
+{	\
+	assert((read_sctlr_el1() & SCTLR_M_BIT) != 0ULL);	\
+	write_tcr_el1(read_tcr_el1() & ~(TCR_EPD0_BIT | TCR_EPD1_BIT));	\
+	isb();	\
+	_at_inst(_va);	\
+	write_tcr_el1(read_tcr_el1() | (TCR_EPD0_BIT | TCR_EPD1_BIT));	\
+	isb();	\
+}
+#else
+#define AT(_at_inst, _va)	_at_inst(_va);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ARCH_HELPERS_H */

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/include/arch/aarch64/asm_macros.S

@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+#ifndef ASM_MACROS_S
+#define ASM_MACROS_S
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <common/asm_macros_common.S>
+#include <lib/spinlock.h>
+
+/*
+ * TLBI instruction with type specifier that implements the workaround for
+ * errata 813419 of Cortex-A57 or errata 1286807 of Cortex-A76.
+ */
+#if ERRATA_A57_813419 || ERRATA_A76_1286807
+#define TLB_INVALIDATE(_type) \
+	tlbi	_type; \
+	dsb	ish; \
+	tlbi	_type
+#else
+#define TLB_INVALIDATE(_type) \
+	tlbi	_type
+#endif
+
+
+	.macro	func_prologue
+	stp	x29, x30, [sp, #-0x10]!
+	mov	x29,sp
+	.endm
+
+	.macro	func_epilogue
+	ldp	x29, x30, [sp], #0x10
+	.endm
+
+
+	.macro	dcache_line_size  reg, tmp
+	mrs	\tmp, ctr_el0
+	ubfx	\tmp, \tmp, #16, #4
+	mov	\reg, #4
+	lsl	\reg, \reg, \tmp
+	.endm
+
+
+	.macro	icache_line_size  reg, tmp
+	mrs	\tmp, ctr_el0
+	and	\tmp, \tmp, #0xf
+	mov	\reg, #4
+	lsl	\reg, \reg, \tmp
+	.endm
+
+
+	.macro	smc_check  label
+	mrs	x0, esr_el3
+	ubfx	x0, x0, #ESR_EC_SHIFT, #ESR_EC_LENGTH
+	cmp	x0, #EC_AARCH64_SMC
+	b.ne	$label
+	.endm
+
+	/*
+	 * Declare the exception vector table, enforcing it is aligned on a
+	 * 2KB boundary, as required by the ARMv8 architecture.
+	 * Use zero bytes as the fill value to be stored in the padding bytes
+	 * so that it inserts illegal AArch64 instructions. This increases
+	 * security, robustness and potentially facilitates debugging.
+	 */
+	.macro vector_base  label, section_name=.vectors
+	.section \section_name, "ax"
+	.align 11, 0
+	\label:
+	.endm
+
+	/*
+	 * Create an entry in the exception vector table, enforcing it is
+	 * aligned on a 128-byte boundary, as required by the ARMv8 architecture.
+	 * Use zero bytes as the fill value to be stored in the padding bytes
+	 * so that it inserts illegal AArch64 instructions. This increases
+	 * security, robustness and potentially facilitates debugging.
+	 */
+	.macro vector_entry  label, section_name=.vectors
+	.cfi_sections .debug_frame
+	.section \section_name, "ax"
+	.align 7, 0
+	.type \label, %function
+	.cfi_startproc
+	\label:
+	.endm
+
+	/*
+	 * Add the bytes until fill the full exception vector, whose size is always
+	 * 32 instructions. If there are more than 32 instructions in the
+	 * exception vector then an error is emitted.
+	 */
+	.macro end_vector_entry label
+	.cfi_endproc
+	.fill	\label + (32 * 4) - .
+	.endm
+
+	/*
+	 * This macro calculates the base address of the current CPU's MP stack
+	 * using the plat_my_core_pos() index, the name of the stack storage
+	 * and the size of each stack
+	 * Out: X0 = physical address of stack base
+	 * Clobber: X30, X1, X2
+	 */
+	.macro get_my_mp_stack _name, _size
+	bl	plat_my_core_pos
+	adrp	x2, (\_name + \_size)
+	add	x2, x2, :lo12:(\_name + \_size)
+	mov x1, #\_size
+	madd x0, x0, x1, x2
+	.endm
+
+	/*
+	 * This macro calculates the base address of a UP stack using the
+	 * name of the stack storage and the size of the stack
+	 * Out: X0 = physical address of stack base
+	 */
+	.macro get_up_stack _name, _size
+	adrp	x0, (\_name + \_size)
+	add	x0, x0, :lo12:(\_name + \_size)
+	.endm
+
+	/*
+	 * Helper macro to generate the best mov/movk combinations according
+	 * the value to be moved. The 16 bits from '_shift' are tested and
+	 * if not zero, they are moved into '_reg' without affecting
+	 * other bits.
+	 */
+	.macro _mov_imm16 _reg, _val, _shift
+		.if (\_val >> \_shift) & 0xffff
+			.if (\_val & (1 << \_shift - 1))
+				movk	\_reg, (\_val >> \_shift) & 0xffff, LSL \_shift
+			.else
+				mov	\_reg, \_val & (0xffff << \_shift)
+			.endif
+		.endif
+	.endm
+
+	/*
+	 * Helper macro to load arbitrary values into 32 or 64-bit registers
+	 * which generates the best mov/movk combinations. Many base addresses
+	 * are 64KB aligned the macro will eliminate updating bits 15:0 in
+	 * that case
+	 */
+	.macro mov_imm _reg, _val
+		.if (\_val) == 0
+			mov	\_reg, #0
+		.else
+			_mov_imm16	\_reg, (\_val), 0
+			_mov_imm16	\_reg, (\_val), 16
+			_mov_imm16	\_reg, (\_val), 32
+			_mov_imm16	\_reg, (\_val), 48
+		.endif
+	.endm
+
+	/*
+	 * Macro to mark instances where we're jumping to a function and don't
+	 * expect a return. To provide the function being jumped to with
+	 * additional information, we use 'bl' instruction to jump rather than
+	 * 'b'.
+         *
+	 * Debuggers infer the location of a call from where LR points to, which
+	 * is usually the instruction after 'bl'. If this macro expansion
+	 * happens to be the last location in a function, that'll cause the LR
+	 * to point a location beyond the function, thereby misleading debugger
+	 * back trace. We therefore insert a 'nop' after the function call for
+	 * debug builds, unless 'skip_nop' parameter is non-zero.
+	 */
+	.macro no_ret _func:req, skip_nop=0
+	bl	\_func
+#if DEBUG
+	.ifeq \skip_nop
+	nop
+	.endif
+#endif
+	.endm
+
+	/*
+	 * Reserve space for a spin lock in assembly file.
+	 */
+	.macro define_asm_spinlock _name:req
+	.align	SPINLOCK_ASM_ALIGN
+	\_name:
+	.space	SPINLOCK_ASM_SIZE
+	.endm
+
+#if RAS_EXTENSION
+	.macro esb
+	.inst	0xd503221f
+	.endm
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Helper macro to read system register value into x0
+	 */
+	.macro	read reg:req
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+	bti	j
+#endif
+	mrs	x0, \reg
+	ret
+	.endm
+
+	/*
+	 * Helper macro to write value from x1 to system register
+	 */
+	.macro	write reg:req
+#if ENABLE_BTI
+	bti	j
+#endif
+	msr	\reg, x1
+	ret
+	.endm
+
+	/*
+	 * Macro for using speculation barrier instruction introduced by
+	 * FEAT_SB, if it's enabled.
+	 */
+	.macro speculation_barrier
+#if ENABLE_FEAT_SB
+	sb
+#else
+	dsb	sy
+	isb
+#endif
+	.endm
+
+	/*
+	 * Macro for mitigating against speculative execution beyond ERET. Uses the
+	 * speculation barrier instruction introduced by FEAT_SB, if it's enabled.
+	 */
+	.macro exception_return
+	eret
+#if ENABLE_FEAT_SB
+	sb
+#else
+	dsb	nsh
+	isb
+#endif
+	.endm
+
+#endif /* ASM_MACROS_S */

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/include/arch/aarch64/assert_macros.S

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014-2016, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+#ifndef ASSERT_MACROS_S
+#define ASSERT_MACROS_S
+
+	/*
+	 * Assembler macro to enable asm_assert. Use this macro wherever
+	 * assert is required in assembly. Please note that the macro makes
+	 * use of label '300' to provide the logic and the caller
+	 * should make sure that this label is not used to branch prior
+	 * to calling this macro.
+	 */
+#define ASM_ASSERT(_cc) \
+.ifndef .L_assert_filename ;\
+	.pushsection .rodata.str1.1, "aS" ;\
+	.L_assert_filename: ;\
+			.string	__FILE__ ;\
+	.popsection ;\
+.endif ;\
+	b._cc	300f ;\
+	adr	x0, .L_assert_filename ;\
+	mov	x1, __LINE__ ;\
+	b	asm_assert ;\
+300:
+
+#endif /* ASSERT_MACROS_S */

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/include/arch/aarch64/console_macros.S

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+#ifndef CONSOLE_MACROS_S
+#define CONSOLE_MACROS_S
+
+#include <drivers/console.h>
+
+/*
+ * This macro encapsulates the common setup that has to be done at the end of
+ * a console driver's register function. It will register all of the driver's
+ * callbacks in the console_t structure and initialize the flags field (by
+ * default consoles are enabled for the "boot" and "crash" states, this can be
+ * changed after registration with the console_set_scope() function). It ends
+ * with a tail call that will include return to the caller.
+ * REQUIRES console_t pointer in x0 and a valid return address in x30.
+ */
+	.macro	finish_console_register _driver, putc=0, getc=0, flush=0
+	/*
+	 * If any of the callback is not specified or set as 0, then the
+	 * corresponding callback entry in console_t is set to 0.
+	 */
+	.ifne \putc
+	  adrp	x1, console_\_driver\()_putc
+	  add	x1, x1, :lo12:console_\_driver\()_putc
+	  str	x1, [x0, #CONSOLE_T_PUTC]
+	.else
+	  str	xzr, [x0, #CONSOLE_T_PUTC]
+	.endif
+
+	.ifne \getc
+	  adrp	x1, console_\_driver\()_getc
+	  add	x1, x1, :lo12:console_\_driver\()_getc
+	  str	x1, [x0, #CONSOLE_T_GETC]
+	.else
+	  str	xzr, [x0, #CONSOLE_T_GETC]
+	.endif
+
+	.ifne \flush
+	  adrp	x1, console_\_driver\()_flush
+	  add	x1, x1, :lo12:console_\_driver\()_flush
+	  str	x1, [x0, #CONSOLE_T_FLUSH]
+	.else
+	  str	xzr, [x0, #CONSOLE_T_FLUSH]
+	.endif
+
+	mov	x1, #(CONSOLE_FLAG_BOOT | CONSOLE_FLAG_CRASH)
+	str	x1, [x0, #CONSOLE_T_FLAGS]
+	b	console_register
+	.endm
+
+#endif /* CONSOLE_MACROS_S */

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/include/arch/aarch64/el2_common_macros.S

@@ -0,0 +1,422 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2021, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#ifndef EL2_COMMON_MACROS_S
+#define EL2_COMMON_MACROS_S
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <asm_macros.S>
+#include <context.h>
+#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h>
+
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+	/*
+	 * Helper macro to initialise system registers at EL2.
+	 */
+	.macro el2_arch_init_common
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * SCTLR_EL2 has already been initialised - read current value before
+	 * modifying.
+	 *
+	 * SCTLR_EL2.I: Enable the instruction cache.
+	 *
+	 * SCTLR_EL2.SA: Enable Stack Alignment check. A SP alignment fault
+	 *  exception is generated if a load or store instruction executed at
+	 *  EL2 uses the SP as the base address and the SP is not aligned to a
+	 *  16-byte boundary.
+	 *
+	 * SCTLR_EL2.A: Enable Alignment fault checking. All instructions that
+	 *  load or store one or more registers have an alignment check that the
+	 *  address being accessed is aligned to the size of the data element(s)
+	 *  being accessed.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	mov	x1, #(SCTLR_I_BIT | SCTLR_A_BIT | SCTLR_SA_BIT)
+	mrs	x0, sctlr_el2
+	orr	x0, x0, x1
+	msr	sctlr_el2, x0
+	isb
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Initialise HCR_EL2, setting all fields rather than relying on HW.
+	 * All fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset. The following fields
+	 * do not change during the TF lifetime. The remaining fields are set to
+	 * zero here but are updated ahead of transitioning to a lower EL in the
+	 * function cm_init_context_common().
+	 *
+	 * HCR_EL2.TWE: Set to zero so that execution of WFE instructions at
+	 *  EL2, EL1 and EL0 are not trapped to EL2.
+	 *
+	 * HCR_EL2.TWI: Set to zero so that execution of WFI instructions at
+	 *  EL2, EL1 and EL0 are not trapped to EL2.
+	 *
+	 * HCR_EL2.HCD: Set to zero to enable HVC calls at EL1 and above,
+	 *  from both Security states and both Execution states.
+	 *
+	 * HCR_EL2.TEA: Set to one to route External Aborts and SError
+	 * Interrupts to EL2 when executing at any EL.
+	 *
+	 * HCR_EL2.{API,APK}: For Armv8.3 pointer authentication feature,
+	 * disable traps to EL2 when accessing key registers or using
+	 * pointer authentication instructions from lower ELs.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	mov_imm	x0, ((HCR_RESET_VAL | HCR_TEA_BIT) \
+			& ~(HCR_TWE_BIT | HCR_TWI_BIT | HCR_HCD_BIT))
+#if CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS
+	/*
+	 * If the pointer authentication registers are saved during world
+	 * switches, enable pointer authentication everywhere, as it is safe to
+	 * do so.
+	 */
+	orr	x0, x0, #(HCR_API_BIT | HCR_APK_BIT)
+#endif  /* CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS */
+	msr	hcr_el2, x0
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Initialise MDCR_EL2, setting all fields rather than relying on
+	 * hw. Some fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
+	 *
+	 * MDCR_EL2.TDOSA: Set to zero so that EL2 and EL2 System register
+	 *  access to the powerdown debug registers do not trap to EL2.
+	 *
+	 * MDCR_EL2.TDA: Set to zero to allow EL0, EL1 and EL2 access to the
+	 *  debug registers, other than those registers that are controlled by
+	 *  MDCR_EL2.TDOSA.
+	 *
+	 * MDCR_EL2.TPM: Set to zero so that EL0, EL1, and EL2 System
+	 *  register accesses to all Performance Monitors registers do not trap
+	 *  to EL2.
+	 *
+	 * MDCR_EL2.HPMD: Set to zero so that event counting by the program-
+	 *  mable counters PMEVCNTR<n>_EL0 is prohibited in Secure state. If
+	 *  ARMv8.2 Debug is not implemented this bit does not have any effect
+	 *  on the counters unless there is support for the implementation
+	 *  defined authentication interface
+	 *  ExternalSecureNoninvasiveDebugEnabled().
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	mov_imm	x0, ((MDCR_EL2_RESET_VAL | \
+		      MDCR_SPD32(MDCR_SPD32_DISABLE)) \
+		      & ~(MDCR_EL2_HPMD | MDCR_TDOSA_BIT | \
+		      MDCR_TDA_BIT | MDCR_TPM_BIT))
+
+	msr	mdcr_el2, x0
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Initialise PMCR_EL0 setting all fields rather than relying
+	 * on hw. Some fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
+	 *
+	 * PMCR_EL0.DP: Set to one so that the cycle counter,
+	 *  PMCCNTR_EL0 does not count when event counting is prohibited.
+	 *
+	 * PMCR_EL0.X: Set to zero to disable export of events.
+	 *
+	 * PMCR_EL0.D: Set to zero so that, when enabled, PMCCNTR_EL0
+	 *  counts on every clock cycle.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	mov_imm	x0, ((PMCR_EL0_RESET_VAL | PMCR_EL0_DP_BIT) & \
+		    ~(PMCR_EL0_X_BIT | PMCR_EL0_D_BIT))
+
+	msr	pmcr_el0, x0
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Enable External Aborts and SError Interrupts now that the exception
+	 * vectors have been setup.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	msr	daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Initialise CPTR_EL2, setting all fields rather than relying on hw.
+	 * All fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
+	 *
+	 * CPTR_EL2.TCPAC: Set to zero so that any accesses to CPACR_EL1 do
+	 * not trap to EL2.
+	 *
+	 * CPTR_EL2.TTA: Set to zero so that System register accesses to the
+	 *  trace registers do not trap to EL2.
+	 *
+	 * CPTR_EL2.TFP: Set to zero so that accesses to the V- or Z- registers
+	 *  by Advanced SIMD, floating-point or SVE instructions (if implemented)
+	 *  do not trap to EL2.
+	 */
+
+	mov_imm x0, (CPTR_EL2_RESET_VAL & ~(TCPAC_BIT | TTA_BIT | TFP_BIT))
+	msr	cptr_el2, x0
+
+	/*
+	 * If Data Independent Timing (DIT) functionality is implemented,
+	 * always enable DIT in EL2
+	 */
+	mrs	x0, id_aa64pfr0_el1
+	ubfx	x0, x0, #ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_SHIFT, #ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_LENGTH
+	cmp	x0, #ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_SUPPORTED
+	bne	1f
+	mov	x0, #DIT_BIT
+	msr	DIT, x0
+1:
+	.endm
+
+/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * This is the super set of actions that need to be performed during a cold boot
+ * or a warm boot in EL2. This code is shared by BL1 and BL31.
+ *
+ * This macro will always perform reset handling, architectural initialisations
+ * and stack setup. The rest of the actions are optional because they might not
+ * be needed, depending on the context in which this macro is called. This is
+ * why this macro is parameterised ; each parameter allows to enable/disable
+ * some actions.
+ *
+ *  _init_sctlr:
+ *	Whether the macro needs to initialise SCTLR_EL2, including configuring
+ *      the endianness of data accesses.
+ *
+ *  _warm_boot_mailbox:
+ *	Whether the macro needs to detect the type of boot (cold/warm). The
+ *	detection is based on the platform entrypoint address : if it is zero
+ *	then it is a cold boot, otherwise it is a warm boot. In the latter case,
+ *	this macro jumps on the platform entrypoint address.
+ *
+ *  _secondary_cold_boot:
+ *	Whether the macro needs to identify the CPU that is calling it: primary
+ *	CPU or secondary CPU. The primary CPU will be allowed to carry on with
+ *	the platform initialisations, while the secondaries will be put in a
+ *	platform-specific state in the meantime.
+ *
+ *	If the caller knows this macro will only be called by the primary CPU
+ *	then this parameter can be defined to 0 to skip this step.
+ *
+ * _init_memory:
+ *	Whether the macro needs to initialise the memory.
+ *
+ * _init_c_runtime:
+ *	Whether the macro needs to initialise the C runtime environment.
+ *
+ * _exception_vectors:
+ *	Address of the exception vectors to program in the VBAR_EL2 register.
+ *
+ * _pie_fixup_size:
+ *	Size of memory region to fixup Global Descriptor Table (GDT).
+ *
+ *	A non-zero value is expected when firmware needs GDT to be fixed-up.
+ *
+ * -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+	.macro el2_entrypoint_common					\
+		_init_sctlr, _warm_boot_mailbox, _secondary_cold_boot,	\
+		_init_memory, _init_c_runtime, _exception_vectors,	\
+		_pie_fixup_size
+
+	.if \_init_sctlr
+		/* -------------------------------------------------------------
+		 * This is the initialisation of SCTLR_EL2 and so must ensure
+		 * that all fields are explicitly set rather than relying on hw.
+		 * Some fields reset to an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED value and
+		 * others are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
+		 *
+		 * SCTLR.EE: Set the CPU endianness before doing anything that
+		 *  might involve memory reads or writes. Set to zero to select
+		 *  Little Endian.
+		 *
+		 * SCTLR_EL2.WXN: For the EL2 translation regime, this field can
+		 *  force all memory regions that are writeable to be treated as
+		 *  XN (Execute-never). Set to zero so that this control has no
+		 *  effect on memory access permissions.
+		 *
+		 * SCTLR_EL2.SA: Set to zero to disable Stack Alignment check.
+		 *
+		 * SCTLR_EL2.A: Set to zero to disable Alignment fault checking.
+		 *
+		 * SCTLR.DSSBS: Set to zero to disable speculation store bypass
+		 *  safe behaviour upon exception entry to EL2.
+		 * -------------------------------------------------------------
+		 */
+		mov_imm	x0, (SCTLR_RESET_VAL & ~(SCTLR_EE_BIT | SCTLR_WXN_BIT \
+				| SCTLR_SA_BIT | SCTLR_A_BIT | SCTLR_DSSBS_BIT))
+		msr	sctlr_el2, x0
+		isb
+	.endif /* _init_sctlr */
+
+#if DISABLE_MTPMU
+		bl	mtpmu_disable
+#endif
+
+	.if \_warm_boot_mailbox
+		/* -------------------------------------------------------------
+		 * This code will be executed for both warm and cold resets.
+		 * Now is the time to distinguish between the two.
+		 * Query the platform entrypoint address and if it is not zero
+		 * then it means it is a warm boot so jump to this address.
+		 * -------------------------------------------------------------
+		 */
+		bl	plat_get_my_entrypoint
+		cbz	x0, do_cold_boot
+		br	x0
+
+	do_cold_boot:
+	.endif /* _warm_boot_mailbox */
+
+	.if \_pie_fixup_size
+#if ENABLE_PIE
+		/*
+		 * ------------------------------------------------------------
+		 * If PIE is enabled fixup the Global descriptor Table only
+		 * once during primary core cold boot path.
+		 *
+		 * Compile time base address, required for fixup, is calculated
+		 * using "pie_fixup" label present within first page.
+		 * ------------------------------------------------------------
+		 */
+	pie_fixup:
+		ldr	x0, =pie_fixup
+		and	x0, x0, #~(PAGE_SIZE_MASK)
+		mov_imm	x1, \_pie_fixup_size
+		add	x1, x1, x0
+		bl	fixup_gdt_reloc
+#endif /* ENABLE_PIE */
+	.endif /* _pie_fixup_size */
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Set the exception vectors.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	adr	x0, \_exception_vectors
+	msr	vbar_el2, x0
+	isb
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * It is a cold boot.
+	 * Perform any processor specific actions upon reset e.g. cache, TLB
+	 * invalidations etc.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	bl	reset_handler
+
+	el2_arch_init_common
+
+	.if \_secondary_cold_boot
+		/* -------------------------------------------------------------
+		 * Check if this is a primary or secondary CPU cold boot.
+		 * The primary CPU will set up the platform while the
+		 * secondaries are placed in a platform-specific state until the
+		 * primary CPU performs the necessary actions to bring them out
+		 * of that state and allows entry into the OS.
+		 * -------------------------------------------------------------
+		 */
+		bl	plat_is_my_cpu_primary
+		cbnz	w0, do_primary_cold_boot
+
+		/* This is a cold boot on a secondary CPU */
+		bl	plat_secondary_cold_boot_setup
+		/* plat_secondary_cold_boot_setup() is not supposed to return */
+		bl	el2_panic
+	do_primary_cold_boot:
+	.endif /* _secondary_cold_boot */
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Initialize memory now. Secondary CPU initialization won't get to this
+	 * point.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+
+	.if \_init_memory
+		bl	platform_mem_init
+	.endif /* _init_memory */
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Init C runtime environment:
+	 *   - Zero-initialise the NOBITS sections. There are 2 of them:
+	 *       - the .bss section;
+	 *       - the coherent memory section (if any).
+	 *   - Relocate the data section from ROM to RAM, if required.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	.if \_init_c_runtime
+		adrp	x0, __BSS_START__
+		add	x0, x0, :lo12:__BSS_START__
+
+		adrp	x1, __BSS_END__
+		add	x1, x1, :lo12:__BSS_END__
+		sub	x1, x1, x0
+		bl	zeromem
+
+#if defined(IMAGE_BL1) || (defined(IMAGE_BL2) && BL2_AT_EL3 && BL2_IN_XIP_MEM)
+		adrp	x0, __DATA_RAM_START__
+		add	x0, x0, :lo12:__DATA_RAM_START__
+		adrp	x1, __DATA_ROM_START__
+		add	x1, x1, :lo12:__DATA_ROM_START__
+		adrp	x2, __DATA_RAM_END__
+		add	x2, x2, :lo12:__DATA_RAM_END__
+		sub	x2, x2, x0
+		bl	memcpy16
+#endif
+	.endif /* _init_c_runtime */
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Use SP_EL0 for the C runtime stack.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	msr	spsel, #0
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Allocate a stack whose memory will be marked as Normal-IS-WBWA when
+	 * the MMU is enabled. There is no risk of reading stale stack memory
+	 * after enabling the MMU as only the primary CPU is running at the
+	 * moment.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	bl	plat_set_my_stack
+
+#if STACK_PROTECTOR_ENABLED
+	.if \_init_c_runtime
+	bl	update_stack_protector_canary
+	.endif /* _init_c_runtime */
+#endif
+	.endm
+
+	.macro	apply_at_speculative_wa
+#if ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT
+	/*
+	 * Explicitly save x30 so as to free up a register and to enable
+	 * branching and also, save x29 which will be used in the called
+	 * function
+	 */
+	stp	x29, x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X29]
+	bl	save_and_update_ptw_el1_sys_regs
+	ldp	x29, x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X29]
+#endif
+	.endm
+
+	.macro	restore_ptw_el1_sys_regs
+#if ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT
+	/* -----------------------------------------------------------
+	 * In case of ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT, must follow below order
+	 * to ensure that page table walk is not enabled until
+	 * restoration of all EL1 system registers. TCR_EL1 register
+	 * should be updated at the end which restores previous page
+	 * table walk setting of stage1 i.e.(TCR_EL1.EPDx) bits. ISB
+	 * ensures that CPU does below steps in order.
+	 *
+	 * 1. Ensure all other system registers are written before
+	 *    updating SCTLR_EL1 using ISB.
+	 * 2. Restore SCTLR_EL1 register.
+	 * 3. Ensure SCTLR_EL1 written successfully using ISB.
+	 * 4. Restore TCR_EL1 register.
+	 * -----------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	isb
+	ldp	x28, x29, [sp, #CTX_EL1_SYSREGS_OFFSET + CTX_SCTLR_EL1]
+	msr	sctlr_el1, x28
+	isb
+	msr	tcr_el1, x29
+#endif
+	.endm
+
+#endif /* EL2_COMMON_MACROS_S */

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/include/arch/aarch64/el3_common_macros.S

@@ -0,0 +1,570 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015-2022, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#ifndef EL3_COMMON_MACROS_S
+#define EL3_COMMON_MACROS_S
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <asm_macros.S>
+#include <assert_macros.S>
+#include <context.h>
+#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h>
+
+	/*
+	 * Helper macro to initialise EL3 registers we care about.
+	 */
+	.macro el3_arch_init_common
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * SCTLR_EL3 has already been initialised - read current value before
+	 * modifying.
+	 *
+	 * SCTLR_EL3.I: Enable the instruction cache.
+	 *
+	 * SCTLR_EL3.SA: Enable Stack Alignment check. A SP alignment fault
+	 *  exception is generated if a load or store instruction executed at
+	 *  EL3 uses the SP as the base address and the SP is not aligned to a
+	 *  16-byte boundary.
+	 *
+	 * SCTLR_EL3.A: Enable Alignment fault checking. All instructions that
+	 *  load or store one or more registers have an alignment check that the
+	 *  address being accessed is aligned to the size of the data element(s)
+	 *  being accessed.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	mov	x1, #(SCTLR_I_BIT | SCTLR_A_BIT | SCTLR_SA_BIT)
+	mrs	x0, sctlr_el3
+	orr	x0, x0, x1
+	msr	sctlr_el3, x0
+	isb
+
+#ifdef IMAGE_BL31
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Initialise the per-cpu cache pointer to the CPU.
+	 * This is done early to enable crash reporting to have access to crash
+	 * stack. Since crash reporting depends on cpu_data to report the
+	 * unhandled exception, not doing so can lead to recursive exceptions
+	 * due to a NULL TPIDR_EL3.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	bl	init_cpu_data_ptr
+#endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Initialise SCR_EL3, setting all fields rather than relying on hw.
+	 * All fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset. The following fields
+	 * do not change during the TF lifetime. The remaining fields are set to
+	 * zero here but are updated ahead of transitioning to a lower EL in the
+	 * function cm_init_context_common().
+	 *
+	 * SCR_EL3.TWE: Set to zero so that execution of WFE instructions at
+	 *  EL2, EL1 and EL0 are not trapped to EL3.
+	 *
+	 * SCR_EL3.TWI: Set to zero so that execution of WFI instructions at
+	 *  EL2, EL1 and EL0 are not trapped to EL3.
+	 *
+	 * SCR_EL3.SIF: Set to one to disable instruction fetches from
+	 *  Non-secure memory.
+	 *
+	 * SCR_EL3.SMD: Set to zero to enable SMC calls at EL1 and above, from
+	 *  both Security states and both Execution states.
+	 *
+	 * SCR_EL3.EA: Set to one to route External Aborts and SError Interrupts
+	 *  to EL3 when executing at any EL.
+	 *
+	 * SCR_EL3.{API,APK}: For Armv8.3 pointer authentication feature,
+	 * disable traps to EL3 when accessing key registers or using pointer
+	 * authentication instructions from lower ELs.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	mov_imm	x0, ((SCR_RESET_VAL | SCR_EA_BIT | SCR_SIF_BIT) \
+			& ~(SCR_TWE_BIT | SCR_TWI_BIT | SCR_SMD_BIT))
+#if CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS
+	/*
+	 * If the pointer authentication registers are saved during world
+	 * switches, enable pointer authentication everywhere, as it is safe to
+	 * do so.
+	 */
+	orr	x0, x0, #(SCR_API_BIT | SCR_APK_BIT)
+#endif
+#if ENABLE_RME
+	/*
+	 * TODO: Settting the EEL2 bit to allow EL3 access to secure only registers
+	 * in context management. This will need to be refactored.
+	 */
+	orr	x0, x0, #SCR_EEL2_BIT
+#endif
+	msr	scr_el3, x0
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Initialise MDCR_EL3, setting all fields rather than relying on hw.
+	 * Some fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
+	 *
+	 * MDCR_EL3.SDD: Set to one to disable AArch64 Secure self-hosted debug.
+	 *  Debug exceptions, other than Breakpoint Instruction exceptions, are
+	 *  disabled from all ELs in Secure state.
+	 *
+	 * MDCR_EL3.SPD32: Set to 0b10 to disable AArch32 Secure self-hosted
+	 *  privileged debug from S-EL1.
+	 *
+	 * MDCR_EL3.TDOSA: Set to zero so that EL2 and EL2 System register
+	 *  access to the powerdown debug registers do not trap to EL3.
+	 *
+	 * MDCR_EL3.TDA: Set to zero to allow EL0, EL1 and EL2 access to the
+	 *  debug registers, other than those registers that are controlled by
+	 *  MDCR_EL3.TDOSA.
+	 *
+	 * MDCR_EL3.TPM: Set to zero so that EL0, EL1, and EL2 System register
+	 *  accesses to all Performance Monitors registers do not trap to EL3.
+	 *
+	 * MDCR_EL3.SCCD: Set to one so that cycle counting by PMCCNTR_EL0 is
+	 *  prohibited in Secure state. This bit is RES0 in versions of the
+	 *  architecture with FEAT_PMUv3p5 not implemented, setting it to 1
+	 *  doesn't have any effect on them.
+	 *
+	 * MDCR_EL3.MCCD: Set to one so that cycle counting by PMCCNTR_EL0 is
+	 *  prohibited in EL3. This bit is RES0 in versions of the
+	 *  architecture with FEAT_PMUv3p7 not implemented, setting it to 1
+	 *  doesn't have any effect on them.
+	 *
+	 * MDCR_EL3.SPME: Set to zero so that event counting by the programmable
+	 *  counters PMEVCNTR<n>_EL0 is prohibited in Secure state. If ARMv8.2
+	 *  Debug is not implemented this bit does not have any effect on the
+	 *  counters unless there is support for the implementation defined
+	 *  authentication interface ExternalSecureNoninvasiveDebugEnabled().
+	 *
+	 * MDCR_EL3.NSTB, MDCR_EL3.NSTBE: Set to zero so that Trace Buffer
+	 *  owning security state is Secure state. If FEAT_TRBE is implemented,
+	 *  accesses to Trace Buffer control registers at EL2 and EL1 in any
+	 *  security state generates trap exceptions to EL3.
+	 *  If FEAT_TRBE is not implemented, these bits are RES0.
+	 *
+	 * MDCR_EL3.TTRF: Set to one so that access to trace filter control
+	 *  registers in non-monitor mode generate EL3 trap exception,
+	 *  unless the access generates a higher priority exception when trace
+	 *  filter control(FEAT_TRF) is implemented.
+	 *  When FEAT_TRF is not implemented, this bit is RES0.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	mov_imm	x0, ((MDCR_EL3_RESET_VAL | MDCR_SDD_BIT | \
+		      MDCR_SPD32(MDCR_SPD32_DISABLE) | MDCR_SCCD_BIT | \
+		      MDCR_MCCD_BIT) & ~(MDCR_SPME_BIT | MDCR_TDOSA_BIT | \
+		      MDCR_TDA_BIT | MDCR_TPM_BIT | MDCR_NSTB(MDCR_NSTB_EL1) | \
+		      MDCR_NSTBE | MDCR_TTRF_BIT))
+
+	mrs	x1, id_aa64dfr0_el1
+	ubfx	x1, x1, #ID_AA64DFR0_TRACEFILT_SHIFT, #ID_AA64DFR0_TRACEFILT_LENGTH
+	cbz	x1, 1f
+	orr	x0, x0, #MDCR_TTRF_BIT
+1:
+	msr	mdcr_el3, x0
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Initialise PMCR_EL0 setting all fields rather than relying
+	 * on hw. Some fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
+	 *
+	 * PMCR_EL0.LP: Set to one so that event counter overflow, that
+	 *  is recorded in PMOVSCLR_EL0[0-30], occurs on the increment
+	 *  that changes PMEVCNTR<n>_EL0[63] from 1 to 0, when ARMv8.5-PMU
+	 *  is implemented. This bit is RES0 in versions of the architecture
+	 *  earlier than ARMv8.5, setting it to 1 doesn't have any effect
+	 *  on them.
+	 *
+	 * PMCR_EL0.LC: Set to one so that cycle counter overflow, that
+	 *  is recorded in PMOVSCLR_EL0[31], occurs on the increment
+	 *  that changes PMCCNTR_EL0[63] from 1 to 0.
+	 *
+	 * PMCR_EL0.DP: Set to one so that the cycle counter,
+	 *  PMCCNTR_EL0 does not count when event counting is prohibited.
+	 *
+	 * PMCR_EL0.X: Set to zero to disable export of events.
+	 *
+	 * PMCR_EL0.D: Set to zero so that, when enabled, PMCCNTR_EL0
+	 *  counts on every clock cycle.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	mov_imm	x0, ((PMCR_EL0_RESET_VAL | PMCR_EL0_LP_BIT | \
+		      PMCR_EL0_LC_BIT | PMCR_EL0_DP_BIT) & \
+		    ~(PMCR_EL0_X_BIT | PMCR_EL0_D_BIT))
+
+	msr	pmcr_el0, x0
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Enable External Aborts and SError Interrupts now that the exception
+	 * vectors have been setup.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	msr	daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Initialise CPTR_EL3, setting all fields rather than relying on hw.
+	 * All fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
+	 *
+	 * CPTR_EL3.TCPAC: Set to zero so that any accesses to CPACR_EL1,
+	 *  CPTR_EL2, CPACR, or HCPTR do not trap to EL3.
+	 *
+	 * CPTR_EL3.TTA: Set to one so that accesses to the trace system
+	 *  registers trap to EL3 from all exception levels and security
+	 *  states when system register trace is implemented.
+	 *  When system register trace is not implemented, this bit is RES0 and
+	 *  hence set to zero.
+	 *
+	 * CPTR_EL3.TTA: Set to zero so that System register accesses to the
+	 *  trace registers do not trap to EL3.
+	 *
+	 * CPTR_EL3.TFP: Set to zero so that accesses to the V- or Z- registers
+	 *  by Advanced SIMD, floating-point or SVE instructions (if implemented)
+	 *  do not trap to EL3.
+	 *
+	 * CPTR_EL3.TAM: Set to one so that Activity Monitor access is
+	 *  trapped to EL3 by default.
+	 *
+	 * CPTR_EL3.EZ: Set to zero so that all SVE functionality is trapped
+	 *  to EL3 by default.
+	 *
+	 * CPTR_EL3.ESM: Set to zero so that all SME functionality is trapped
+	 *  to EL3 by default.
+	 */
+
+	mov_imm x0, (CPTR_EL3_RESET_VAL & ~(TCPAC_BIT | TTA_BIT | TFP_BIT))
+	mrs	x1, id_aa64dfr0_el1
+	ubfx	x1, x1, #ID_AA64DFR0_TRACEVER_SHIFT, #ID_AA64DFR0_TRACEVER_LENGTH
+	cbz	x1, 1f
+	orr	x0, x0, #TTA_BIT
+1:
+	msr	cptr_el3, x0
+
+	/*
+	 * If Data Independent Timing (DIT) functionality is implemented,
+	 * always enable DIT in EL3.
+	 * First assert that the FEAT_DIT build flag matches the feature id
+	 * register value for DIT.
+	 */
+#if ENABLE_FEAT_DIT
+#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
+	mrs	x0, id_aa64pfr0_el1
+	ubfx	x0, x0, #ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_SHIFT, #ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_LENGTH
+	cmp	x0, #ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_SUPPORTED
+	ASM_ASSERT(eq)
+#endif /* ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */
+	mov	x0, #DIT_BIT
+	msr	DIT, x0
+#endif
+	.endm
+
+/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * This is the super set of actions that need to be performed during a cold boot
+ * or a warm boot in EL3. This code is shared by BL1 and BL31.
+ *
+ * This macro will always perform reset handling, architectural initialisations
+ * and stack setup. The rest of the actions are optional because they might not
+ * be needed, depending on the context in which this macro is called. This is
+ * why this macro is parameterised ; each parameter allows to enable/disable
+ * some actions.
+ *
+ *  _init_sctlr:
+ *	Whether the macro needs to initialise SCTLR_EL3, including configuring
+ *      the endianness of data accesses.
+ *
+ *  _warm_boot_mailbox:
+ *	Whether the macro needs to detect the type of boot (cold/warm). The
+ *	detection is based on the platform entrypoint address : if it is zero
+ *	then it is a cold boot, otherwise it is a warm boot. In the latter case,
+ *	this macro jumps on the platform entrypoint address.
+ *
+ *  _secondary_cold_boot:
+ *	Whether the macro needs to identify the CPU that is calling it: primary
+ *	CPU or secondary CPU. The primary CPU will be allowed to carry on with
+ *	the platform initialisations, while the secondaries will be put in a
+ *	platform-specific state in the meantime.
+ *
+ *	If the caller knows this macro will only be called by the primary CPU
+ *	then this parameter can be defined to 0 to skip this step.
+ *
+ * _init_memory:
+ *	Whether the macro needs to initialise the memory.
+ *
+ * _init_c_runtime:
+ *	Whether the macro needs to initialise the C runtime environment.
+ *
+ * _exception_vectors:
+ *	Address of the exception vectors to program in the VBAR_EL3 register.
+ *
+ * _pie_fixup_size:
+ *	Size of memory region to fixup Global Descriptor Table (GDT).
+ *
+ *	A non-zero value is expected when firmware needs GDT to be fixed-up.
+ *
+ * -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+	.macro el3_entrypoint_common					\
+		_init_sctlr, _warm_boot_mailbox, _secondary_cold_boot,	\
+		_init_memory, _init_c_runtime, _exception_vectors,	\
+		_pie_fixup_size
+
+	.if \_init_sctlr
+		/* -------------------------------------------------------------
+		 * This is the initialisation of SCTLR_EL3 and so must ensure
+		 * that all fields are explicitly set rather than relying on hw.
+		 * Some fields reset to an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED value and
+		 * others are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
+		 *
+		 * SCTLR.EE: Set the CPU endianness before doing anything that
+		 *  might involve memory reads or writes. Set to zero to select
+		 *  Little Endian.
+		 *
+		 * SCTLR_EL3.WXN: For the EL3 translation regime, this field can
+		 *  force all memory regions that are writeable to be treated as
+		 *  XN (Execute-never). Set to zero so that this control has no
+		 *  effect on memory access permissions.
+		 *
+		 * SCTLR_EL3.SA: Set to zero to disable Stack Alignment check.
+		 *
+		 * SCTLR_EL3.A: Set to zero to disable Alignment fault checking.
+		 *
+		 * SCTLR.DSSBS: Set to zero to disable speculation store bypass
+		 *  safe behaviour upon exception entry to EL3.
+		 * -------------------------------------------------------------
+		 */
+		mov_imm	x0, (SCTLR_RESET_VAL & ~(SCTLR_EE_BIT | SCTLR_WXN_BIT \
+				| SCTLR_SA_BIT | SCTLR_A_BIT | SCTLR_DSSBS_BIT))
+		msr	sctlr_el3, x0
+		isb
+	.endif /* _init_sctlr */
+
+#if DISABLE_MTPMU
+		bl	mtpmu_disable
+#endif
+
+	.if \_warm_boot_mailbox
+		/* -------------------------------------------------------------
+		 * This code will be executed for both warm and cold resets.
+		 * Now is the time to distinguish between the two.
+		 * Query the platform entrypoint address and if it is not zero
+		 * then it means it is a warm boot so jump to this address.
+		 * -------------------------------------------------------------
+		 */
+		bl	plat_get_my_entrypoint
+		cbz	x0, do_cold_boot
+		br	x0
+
+	do_cold_boot:
+	.endif /* _warm_boot_mailbox */
+
+	.if \_pie_fixup_size
+#if ENABLE_PIE
+		/*
+		 * ------------------------------------------------------------
+		 * If PIE is enabled fixup the Global descriptor Table only
+		 * once during primary core cold boot path.
+		 *
+		 * Compile time base address, required for fixup, is calculated
+		 * using "pie_fixup" label present within first page.
+		 * ------------------------------------------------------------
+		 */
+	pie_fixup:
+		ldr	x0, =pie_fixup
+		and	x0, x0, #~(PAGE_SIZE_MASK)
+		mov_imm	x1, \_pie_fixup_size
+		add	x1, x1, x0
+		bl	fixup_gdt_reloc
+#endif /* ENABLE_PIE */
+	.endif /* _pie_fixup_size */
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Set the exception vectors.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	adr	x0, \_exception_vectors
+	msr	vbar_el3, x0
+	isb
+
+#if !(defined(IMAGE_BL2) && ENABLE_RME)
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * It is a cold boot.
+	 * Perform any processor specific actions upon reset e.g. cache, TLB
+	 * invalidations etc.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	bl	reset_handler
+#endif
+
+	el3_arch_init_common
+
+	.if \_secondary_cold_boot
+		/* -------------------------------------------------------------
+		 * Check if this is a primary or secondary CPU cold boot.
+		 * The primary CPU will set up the platform while the
+		 * secondaries are placed in a platform-specific state until the
+		 * primary CPU performs the necessary actions to bring them out
+		 * of that state and allows entry into the OS.
+		 * -------------------------------------------------------------
+		 */
+		bl	plat_is_my_cpu_primary
+		cbnz	w0, do_primary_cold_boot
+
+		/* This is a cold boot on a secondary CPU */
+		bl	plat_secondary_cold_boot_setup
+		/* plat_secondary_cold_boot_setup() is not supposed to return */
+		bl	el3_panic
+
+	do_primary_cold_boot:
+	.endif /* _secondary_cold_boot */
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Initialize memory now. Secondary CPU initialization won't get to this
+	 * point.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+
+	.if \_init_memory
+		bl	platform_mem_init
+	.endif /* _init_memory */
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Init C runtime environment:
+	 *   - Zero-initialise the NOBITS sections. There are 2 of them:
+	 *       - the .bss section;
+	 *       - the coherent memory section (if any).
+	 *   - Relocate the data section from ROM to RAM, if required.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	.if \_init_c_runtime
+#if defined(IMAGE_BL31) || (defined(IMAGE_BL2) && \
+	((BL2_AT_EL3 && BL2_INV_DCACHE) || ENABLE_RME))
+		/* -------------------------------------------------------------
+		 * Invalidate the RW memory used by the BL31 image. This
+		 * includes the data and NOBITS sections. This is done to
+		 * safeguard against possible corruption of this memory by
+		 * dirty cache lines in a system cache as a result of use by
+		 * an earlier boot loader stage. If PIE is enabled however,
+		 * RO sections including the GOT may be modified during
+                 * pie fixup. Therefore, to be on the safe side, invalidate
+		 * the entire image region if PIE is enabled.
+		 * -------------------------------------------------------------
+		 */
+#if ENABLE_PIE
+#if SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA
+		adrp	x0, __TEXT_START__
+		add	x0, x0, :lo12:__TEXT_START__
+#else
+		adrp	x0, __RO_START__
+		add	x0, x0, :lo12:__RO_START__
+#endif /* SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA */
+#else
+		adrp	x0, __RW_START__
+		add	x0, x0, :lo12:__RW_START__
+#endif /* ENABLE_PIE */
+		adrp	x1, __RW_END__
+		add	x1, x1, :lo12:__RW_END__
+		sub	x1, x1, x0
+		bl	inv_dcache_range
+#if defined(IMAGE_BL31) && SEPARATE_NOBITS_REGION
+		adrp	x0, __NOBITS_START__
+		add	x0, x0, :lo12:__NOBITS_START__
+		adrp	x1, __NOBITS_END__
+		add	x1, x1, :lo12:__NOBITS_END__
+		sub	x1, x1, x0
+		bl	inv_dcache_range
+#endif
+#if defined(IMAGE_BL2) && SEPARATE_BL2_NOLOAD_REGION
+		adrp	x0, __BL2_NOLOAD_START__
+		add	x0, x0, :lo12:__BL2_NOLOAD_START__
+		adrp	x1, __BL2_NOLOAD_END__
+		add	x1, x1, :lo12:__BL2_NOLOAD_END__
+		sub	x1, x1, x0
+		bl	inv_dcache_range
+#endif
+#endif
+		adrp	x0, __BSS_START__
+		add	x0, x0, :lo12:__BSS_START__
+
+		adrp	x1, __BSS_END__
+		add	x1, x1, :lo12:__BSS_END__
+		sub	x1, x1, x0
+		bl	zeromem
+
+#if USE_COHERENT_MEM
+		adrp	x0, __COHERENT_RAM_START__
+		add	x0, x0, :lo12:__COHERENT_RAM_START__
+		adrp	x1, __COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__
+		add	x1, x1, :lo12: __COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__
+		sub	x1, x1, x0
+		bl	zeromem
+#endif
+
+#if defined(IMAGE_BL1) || (defined(IMAGE_BL2) && BL2_AT_EL3 && BL2_IN_XIP_MEM)
+		adrp	x0, __DATA_RAM_START__
+		add	x0, x0, :lo12:__DATA_RAM_START__
+		adrp	x1, __DATA_ROM_START__
+		add	x1, x1, :lo12:__DATA_ROM_START__
+		adrp	x2, __DATA_RAM_END__
+		add	x2, x2, :lo12:__DATA_RAM_END__
+		sub	x2, x2, x0
+		bl	memcpy16
+#endif
+	.endif /* _init_c_runtime */
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Use SP_EL0 for the C runtime stack.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	msr	spsel, #0
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Allocate a stack whose memory will be marked as Normal-IS-WBWA when
+	 * the MMU is enabled. There is no risk of reading stale stack memory
+	 * after enabling the MMU as only the primary CPU is running at the
+	 * moment.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	bl	plat_set_my_stack
+
+#if STACK_PROTECTOR_ENABLED
+	.if \_init_c_runtime
+	bl	update_stack_protector_canary
+	.endif /* _init_c_runtime */
+#endif
+	.endm
+
+	.macro	apply_at_speculative_wa
+#if ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT
+	/*
+	 * Explicitly save x30 so as to free up a register and to enable
+	 * branching and also, save x29 which will be used in the called
+	 * function
+	 */
+	stp	x29, x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X29]
+	bl	save_and_update_ptw_el1_sys_regs
+	ldp	x29, x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X29]
+#endif
+	.endm
+
+	.macro	restore_ptw_el1_sys_regs
+#if ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT
+	/* -----------------------------------------------------------
+	 * In case of ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT, must follow below order
+	 * to ensure that page table walk is not enabled until
+	 * restoration of all EL1 system registers. TCR_EL1 register
+	 * should be updated at the end which restores previous page
+	 * table walk setting of stage1 i.e.(TCR_EL1.EPDx) bits. ISB
+	 * ensures that CPU does below steps in order.
+	 *
+	 * 1. Ensure all other system registers are written before
+	 *    updating SCTLR_EL1 using ISB.
+	 * 2. Restore SCTLR_EL1 register.
+	 * 3. Ensure SCTLR_EL1 written successfully using ISB.
+	 * 4. Restore TCR_EL1 register.
+	 * -----------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	isb
+	ldp	x28, x29, [sp, #CTX_EL1_SYSREGS_OFFSET + CTX_SCTLR_EL1]
+	msr	sctlr_el1, x28
+	isb
+	msr	tcr_el1, x29
+#endif
+	.endm
+
+#endif /* EL3_COMMON_MACROS_S */

source/trusted-firmware/trusted-firmware-a-2.8/include/arch/aarch64/smccc_helpers.h

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#ifndef SMCCC_HELPERS_H
+#define SMCCC_HELPERS_H
+
+#include <lib/smccc.h>
+
+/* Definitions to help the assembler access the SMC/ERET args structure */
+#define SMC_ARGS_SIZE		0x40
+#define SMC_ARG0		0x0
+#define SMC_ARG1		0x8
+#define SMC_ARG2		0x10
+#define SMC_ARG3		0x18
+#define SMC_ARG4		0x20
+#define SMC_ARG5		0x28
+#define SMC_ARG6		0x30
+#define SMC_ARG7		0x38
+#define SMC_ARGS_END		0x40
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+#include <context.h>
+
+#include <platform_def.h> /* For CACHE_WRITEBACK_GRANULE */
+
+/* Convenience macros to return from SMC handler */
+#define SMC_RET0(_h)	{					\
+	return (uint64_t) (_h);					\
+}
+#define SMC_RET1(_h, _x0)	{				\
+	write_ctx_reg((get_gpregs_ctx(_h)), (CTX_GPREG_X0), (_x0));	\
+	SMC_RET0(_h);						\
+}
+#define SMC_RET2(_h, _x0, _x1)	{				\
+	write_ctx_reg((get_gpregs_ctx(_h)), (CTX_GPREG_X1), (_x1));	\
+	SMC_RET1(_h, (_x0));					\
+}
+#define SMC_RET3(_h, _x0, _x1, _x2)	{			\
+	write_ctx_reg((get_gpregs_ctx(_h)), (CTX_GPREG_X2), (_x2));	\
+	SMC_RET2(_h, (_x0), (_x1));				\
+}
+#define SMC_RET4(_h, _x0, _x1, _x2, _x3)	{		\
+	write_ctx_reg((get_gpregs_ctx(_h)), (CTX_GPREG_X3), (_x3));	\
+	SMC_RET3(_h, (_x0), (_x1), (_x2));			\
+}
+#define SMC_RET5(_h, _x0, _x1, _x2, _x3, _x4)	{		\
+	write_ctx_reg((get_gpregs_ctx(_h)), (CTX_GPREG_X4), (_x4));	\
+	SMC_RET4(_h, (_x0), (_x1), (_x2), (_x3));		\
+}
+#define SMC_RET6(_h, _x0, _x1, _x2, _x3, _x4, _x5)	{	\
+	write_ctx_reg((get_gpregs_ctx(_h)), (CTX_GPREG_X5), (_x5));	\
+	SMC_RET5(_h, (_x0), (_x1), (_x2), (_x3), (_x4));	\
+}
+#define SMC_RET7(_h, _x0, _x1, _x2, _x3, _x4, _x5, _x6)	{	\
+	write_ctx_reg((get_gpregs_ctx(_h)), (CTX_GPREG_X6), (_x6));	\
+	SMC_RET6(_h, (_x0), (_x1), (_x2), (_x3), (_x4), (_x5));	\
+}
+#define SMC_RET8(_h, _x0, _x1, _x2, _x3, _x4, _x5, _x6, _x7) {	\
+	write_ctx_reg((get_gpregs_ctx(_h)), (CTX_GPREG_X7), (_x7));	\
+	SMC_RET7(_h, (_x0), (_x1), (_x2), (_x3), (_x4), (_x5), (_x6));	\
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convenience macros to access general purpose registers using handle provided
+ * to SMC handler. These take the offset values defined in context.h
+ */
+#define SMC_GET_GP(_h, _g)					\
+	read_ctx_reg((get_gpregs_ctx(_h)), (_g))
+#define SMC_SET_GP(_h, _g, _v)					\
+	write_ctx_reg((get_gpregs_ctx(_h)), (_g), (_v))
+
+/*
+ * Convenience macros to access EL3 context registers using handle provided to
+ * SMC handler. These take the offset values defined in context.h
+ */
+#define SMC_GET_EL3(_h, _e)					\
+	read_ctx_reg((get_el3state_ctx(_h)), (_e))
+#define SMC_SET_EL3(_h, _e, _v)					\
+	write_ctx_reg((get_el3state_ctx(_h)), (_e), (_v))
+
+/*
+ * Helper macro to retrieve the SMC parameters from cpu_context_t.
+ */
+#define get_smc_params_from_ctx(_hdl, _x1, _x2, _x3, _x4)	\
+	do {							\
+		const gp_regs_t *regs = get_gpregs_ctx(_hdl);	\
+		_x1 = read_ctx_reg(regs, CTX_GPREG_X1);		\
+		_x2 = read_ctx_reg(regs, CTX_GPREG_X2);		\
+		_x3 = read_ctx_reg(regs, CTX_GPREG_X3);		\
+		_x4 = read_ctx_reg(regs, CTX_GPREG_X4);		\
+	} while (false)
+
+typedef struct {
+	uint64_t _regs[SMC_ARGS_END >> 3];
+} __aligned(CACHE_WRITEBACK_GRANULE) smc_args_t;
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the assembler's view of the size of the tsp_args is the
+ * same as the compilers.
+ */
+CASSERT(sizeof(smc_args_t) == SMC_ARGS_SIZE, assert_sp_args_size_mismatch);
+
+static inline smc_args_t smc_helper(uint32_t func, uint64_t arg0,
+	       uint64_t arg1, uint64_t arg2,
+	       uint64_t arg3, uint64_t arg4,
+	       uint64_t arg5, uint64_t arg6)
+{
+	smc_args_t ret_args = {0};
+
+	register uint64_t r0 __asm__("x0") = func;
+	register uint64_t r1 __asm__("x1") = arg0;
+	register uint64_t r2 __asm__("x2") = arg1;
+	register uint64_t r3 __asm__("x3") = arg2;
+	register uint64_t r4 __asm__("x4") = arg3;
+	register uint64_t r5 __asm__("x5") = arg4;
+	register uint64_t r6 __asm__("x6") = arg5;
+	register uint64_t r7 __asm__("x7") = arg6;
+
+	/* Output registers, also used as inputs ('+' constraint). */
+	__asm__ volatile("smc #0"
+			: "+r"(r0), "+r"(r1), "+r"(r2), "+r"(r3), "+r"(r4),
+			  "+r"(r5), "+r"(r6), "+r"(r7));
+
+	ret_args._regs[0] = r0;
+	ret_args._regs[1] = r1;
+	ret_args._regs[2] = r2;
+	ret_args._regs[3] = r3;
+	ret_args._regs[4] = r4;
+	ret_args._regs[5] = r5;
+	ret_args._regs[6] = r6;
+	ret_args._regs[7] = r7;
+
+	return ret_args;
+}
+
+#endif /*__ASSEMBLER__*/
+
+#endif /* SMCCC_HELPERS_H */